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In order to pNpare herself for the task of world 
conquetrtti Japan, like Nat1 Germany • car:ried tht'Ough within 
ten years a complete spiritual, political; economic, and 
military mobilization of the nation. The mobi11~ation began 
in 1931, when the "Manchurian Incident" put the nation in a 
wa~l1ke mood and the m111t~ry in the saddle. The military 
then courted and won the band of the Jl&b~rtsy. the giant 
financial e.nd. industrial combines, to form a deadly duo 
dedicated to subjugating the world. Throusb the events of 
this '•decisive decade" from 19,1•1941• Japan was converted 
from a promising democracy into a totalitarian mili ta:ey 
state whose euper-struetu~ followed the Nazi blua•print but 
whose foundations were 't'tholly Japanese. 
The m111tar1sta and the ~~~b,&tsy combined to e:fffJct a 
-
i 
spiritual. mo'bilir.ation coneieting of a :ruthless purge of all 
~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~not~--------~---
Old Japan. L1be:r·alism and indiv1dua.lism 41 freedom end demoo ... 
racy, llhicb had given Japan the semblance of a modern nation, 
were denounced as causes of disunion and d$Cay and expunged 
a.e~ dangerous tbought!J. Instead, Japan was subjected to a 
Qs that of Nazi Germany. tn the spiritual field it was even 
more successful because it he"d a.n anc 1ent religion to build 
upon.. As 1n Germany; this new tota.li tarianism. based on 
revivtll of ancient ways and ancient eupereti tione:t was 
hailed: in Japa.n as the wave of the future and was presented 
to the world as means for its salvation. 
The mili ta.rists and the Zail?!tsy :infiltrated into the 
political rea.lrn by bringing about the suppression of all 
poli tiea.l pe.rtiee and the creation of a one-party state 
functioning under the Fueher principle as centered in the 
Emperor with the war-lords and the economic combines as his 
spokesman.. These two groups maintained leadership in the 
country.. The single pe,rty orga,nization with ita control of 
the Diet became a puppet of the military; the Foreign Office 
wae a Geisha girl for the war• lords; the Emperor stood in 
the background and issued Imperial Rescripts under the 
d.ireot1on of the mllitariets and the Zf!1batfi!Y• 
The economic mobilization, carried through by the 
~9,1batsy under the aegis of the military, established com ... 
ete state eontro±---ev-e-r-1-n-dtu:~t:ry, comm&ree 9 a.nd trade J ove-;¥"------+---
oapital and labor; over production ~md consumption. In this 
particular realm the combines were supreme. They made and 
unmade la\1TS and regula.t1one at will. They controlled tdth 
an iron band the economic destines of Japan. 
efficiency that ita results surprised trhe world. The 
wa~lords knew wha.t they l'tanted• and they useo eveey method 
at their disposal to aoh2.eve it, 
These are the l'tays in which Japan wa.s prepared for 
w-at-. The purpose of this pttper will be to sho"r how the mil• 
1 tart et,s aahi.eVed the powe~ tht1t. thf'hy d1d11 pow~~ eo g;rea.t 
the.t it ena.bl$d th~m to go over the heads of' • tJ,nd th$ :pro• 
tests of, the ()1vil.Hm bra.noh of government and ~ven th((t 
Empeu7or himself it' n~cessat>y •. The bistol'J of the t.rax-..,.lords 
needs to be exa:m1ned in o:rdet• to furnl eh a baekg:r.>ound m:itld.ed 
tor a. stud;y suc;th am this •. 
1*ogether w1th a hit,!tory of the m111t,e.r1sts ~dll be e. 
survey of the begirm1nge of the ,l!i,pa't.fl..Y. e.nd their rie~ to 
t.tndiaput~d prominence 1n the economic life of .Jap.!lUl" l'his 
is vi ta,l owing to the faet tha.t it is doubtful 1.f tht1 mili"~~> 
tarists could ha:ve p.r·oo$edttd on th$1.r trail of ·lterror 
without the aid ~.nd aol1<J1.tations of thEJ eco11om:l o oc::mlbineel 
the Jti\J \i1tY ~. 
Th$ pr1:m&ey function of this 1nvast1ss.tion will be to 
-l----------1i~LW-~~~~--i. ,_l,.~.e;e,"t/y-fll4i~d:-. bf>;.l-;:rr ~the ee two r~u~t.ione during th 
'
1deoisive deoaibl 0 t:rom 19:31•1941. IJ:'hcrt deca.da begfm with 
th$ ine:tdant at MukdEm 11 Manchuria, September l8t~ l93li*· and 
snded td th the bomb 1ne; of l'e a.r<t He.;rbo :r 11 lJ$ oem1b$l? 7 ., · 1941, · 
Va-rious aspects of th~ eitu~t1on will 'be eJtamined in o:t"d.EJ:r 
e ___________ ;_ --
of the militarists a.nd the .lfl~.o~:trua• ln th1~ ,.,ay the true 
piotul"$ o:t' Japanese fol"$1sn policy c~.r1 be seen!> 
, 
Som~ cibserva:rs of the world $Cem~ oi te September 18, 
1931, as the beginning of ~fo:rld Wat> II. Perhaps they i.U'$ 
rle;ht., It 1e ~ known fact that both IUtler nt.td Mtu~ao11n1 
took courage for conquest when they saw Japan win in 
Manchuria without serious opposit1on by the eo""os.lled Great 
Power$. At any rs.te 9 th$ "Manchurian Incident._ marked the 
beginning of a.ggr$ae1on by the twentieth century mil1te.r1S"'!' 
tic and totali tar1an powers, e.e;grEiuuaion tfhiob we.s to plunge 
the ant ire o:l vil1 !l.e<! world into war .• 
4 
The l$g\U'ltll9.cy hist.oey of Japan says the Ernp1re wa.e 
founded in 660 :a.a. Ja.pttnEHl& hi0to:r1~na aator:1be to that 
date an Imperial RtH!C)!tipt said to have 'beel'l :l.tiH~uad by ti'le 
first :Emperor. Jimmu fann<h Xn this dooum•nt occur two 
(tlaasio phrases upon which thet'$ we.s built up a ma.$s of 
myst:toa,l thcmght e.nd inte:rpretatioth fbe first phrase is 
Hgkg ;toh~y (literally, uAll. the world unde:r otte t-oo:r") 
Which woae int$:rp~ted to mean the bringing togethE'I~ of the 
eomera of' the tforld under one ruler o:r th$ making of tbe 
world into one fWMily. 
fhe eeoond p:rineipl• of conduct was the <loet:rine o:f 
~. ~· oont:r~otion for an ancient phrase which tn$ant 
li te~a.ll;v "the on.aness of the Imper1e.l Way. '*1 'fb0 wa.y to 
the Naliza.t1on of Itliis 12!1,.!4 was through the b$n1sn rule 
of the Empe~or; e.nd therefor>a th<a nwa.y of' the J!~ropEn:tcU." 11 tt the 
.J--------tt---.l· I.W'G·~~-ne;ly wt!q 1 n was a---&Em~K~a-d------­
a ma::d.nl of conduct. Hil$lt;g 'eiJJ.!l was the mornl goal; and 
loyalty to the Emperor wa~ the road. wh1ch led to it~ Theae 
11 .I l'bAI."I . l :1 ...... ' f. If I\ '14 
two ideas wf!lre faabionad b;st Japanese m111 tari.sts into a 
g:roteeque distortion of their original ptn•poee. This was 
done • , of oour-EJ$, to :rurthe :r the ends and. the goals of tbe 
m111 tt:t.~ clique that ha$ dom1n(;},t.$d Japan for eo lone.;. 2 
:Ill· itl.f.l~! B!t9ti!" ln th$ h1ato:ry e.nd oul ture of 
J&pan., tn!li ·ea.X>y tl"adi tion ocou:pie~J a conl&fp1cuous e.~d .impo~ 
tant place., ~is :1~ owing, to the faot that fxoom the· seventh 
to th$ nineteenth e&ntury J~tpan wa~ t>uled by the sword.' In 
all ma.tt~ra th$ pOWf:U? o:f' the trtl9,te vaa the military power, 
a,nd the l"ulins olass W$& tbe militaey class. .This a.ll besan 
with the 'ra1kwfl. R0fo:rm of the seventh o~ntury. Th1s .move• 
ment t<¥as the :f'il:'at P.:tep in tbe asoenda.ncr 0f tb~ m1lite..-
A . , 
r1ets. Tl:le otrtata:ndl.ng fee.ture of the ~aikw(A Raform was 
th$ conf1ms,t1on or power ~:n the htU1de. or the mili tar1fAte or 
fl,!lt!!U£fid.• ln sff$Ct it made Japan a nation by 1ntroauo1ng 
the 1d~Ht of a government whiab lrtiUil ruled l$'Qd administered. by 
a aup:ra.looal authority. an~ .1t firmly and solidly 
eatablishad th$ ol1gnren1c structure in both the political 
. 2Mark Gayn, J.:!ll!!a tl1f!tx {:l\T$lr Xot>k ~ 1t1 ~ Sloane, 1948), 
P• ~2, ~ 
:5-w., Macma.non l3ail1 t.T,lQ!Jill irJea 9.x Al,=bl,? (New' Y~rlu 
I 
Japanese history beeaxHte .it brought the I!!QY£!1 hlto the 
role of the moet pO\'Ie~ft~l agent of the government • 
. IY!M~t.. The advent of the warrior olass 't'ras one of 
the decisive events of Japa:neee history. This added. the 
m:tli ta.ry element. to the a-lready ~atabliahed oligarchic 
7 
:pattern. Not only did th$ '"arrio:rs domina.ta Japan• s 
$Conomic and po.lj.-ttcal syat.~ms, they also created the oondi ... 
tiona tot" the acceptance ot.modern militarism in Japan,5 
Ttle ~~rq•u:q,• put an end, onoe and. fo~ all, to· the role of the 
court nobility in Jape:n., They pUt into a:tfeot e. system 
whereby the Empat"'ot> would be the t:t tular hea.d of the goV((Jl:"n"" 
mant .. but the rains of power would be in the hm1da of the 
m1litaf1• Japan, the~efore. was to ba governed by a faudalt 
mili te.ri$t1o reg~me the,t $Stabl1sbed enduring political and 
ee>onornio :ra1at1onsh1pe which were to survive fo:r centuries. 
The code o:t' Jape.n. hanQE)forth was to be the ood.e of· t.he 
.i~ID!;!~a~ • 
~.YihiSQt 'l'b$,. <l0$1~ ,2.;t. thsz .~fliUUtal., In exploring the 
r-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ia necessa~r to exam~i~.n-e~----------­
lHi!Sbiflq, the etoetrlne of tna warrior. 
~!a~ means lmight, do 11 way. ~yst\3.~~~ therefore, is 
"the knightly way':' o:r .••tne way of the ~H-J.murai." dur:tously. 
' . 
enough, tbG~ QB.:nll!t~~! never heta:rd of '9J:lf:?r~. 
1----------......_ __ ........., ___ _. __ _._._. _______________________________________________________________________ ._ 
It would'be hard to find a mora amazing case of 
deception pre.c.rticed by the rulers .. of a nation UJ?on 1 ts. 
people~ The ~11" tar:tsts 11 1ntant upon bending thfl masses t,o 
their will~ fabricated bU!l1t,di in the l890•a.6 They put it 
into the acho.olbooks. knowing well that to deceive tbe 
people it is neoeasa:ry to start \t1th the young. They also 
knew that to impress the Japanese with any doctrine it must 
appf!>ar to have age. Tb$y made blJsh,\_t-\q retroactiveo Built 
to order. like a false antique 11 1 t was ;pUt :fo:r'ff1ard as the 
ancient philosophy of the race. 1be Japanese believed in 
its longevity"' 
8 
Foreign scholars were also duped. British and 
American histories and encyclopedias gravely refer to 
:tuum14i as Japan~ s ase•old code of chivalry. 7 The truth is 
that the word l:;>~sh:\,<!Q never appeared in any dictionary, 
liJng11sh or Ja.panEH.;e, before 1900~8 
Why was the hoax perp$trated upon the Japanese 
people? It wae simply a mea.na of holding the Japanese 
--l 
eople 1n eubject1tln. D~:rdtl~h~a.rs foJlowing_th.ll;J-e-1oi.I-.Jp:!"e"""'n"""'""''------~-~--. . 
1ng of Japan by Command.er Perry, a :flood of European and 
6~. 
7 John F, Embree •. ll!§. J{\l2!QEV4! lt,at~oQ (New York t 




Amet1can i<lea.s was endangering the authority of the 
oligarchy. It was felt necessary. that the eyes of t,h~ 
nation.be turned away from ideas from the Western world• 
back to tht<> maeter.,.and ... slt.tv~ psyohology of' old Japan 11 benoe 
~Yib~~-q,. 'l'he anny plao~d. the code of :gu~h~c;'iQ on a pedestal. 
School lessons, magazines. books~ dramas, Kabuki plays, 
motion pictures by the hundreds, were tu~ad out to glorify 
me,m.arat da,ys, Godlike virtues were pinned on the 'breaste ot' 
the Japanese soldiers••honor, love, truth, courtesy, 
modesty, and unpa.rallaled galla,ntryo;.""and the whole ltas 
called ~uag~qa.9 
The code of :\14~l:l~92 has been one. of the most 1mpo:r ... 
tant weapons in the hande c>f the m111tar1ats. It helped 
them instill within the people a aUb$ilr.v1anQa and loyalty 
that has been unmatched elsewhe:t"e tn the world, a subservi• 
$nee a.nd loyalty so strong that the thought of queet1.on1ng 
the wisdom o:f' the Empe:ro:r- or his advisors did not ooour. 
Willa.rd Priee $xple,ins thin feeling vividly wben he saya: 
+-----------------~~~~~· ~e-on~aeter, t~ghl----------------~--­
ha be a criminal or a ba.bbling idS.ot, is supreme. 
For a superior officer one must if neoesea;ry 
faae:r1fica :family atld friends and self. 
Law must not atHU'ld in the way~ If you lie, 
~teal, destX'oy or kill in the se:rvioe of your 
commander, you are e:bove the la"'• It extends 
to interna.tional tree.ties ~ they a:ra but scraps 
of paper if they conflict !~tr1 the highat> law. 
that of the Son of Heaven. · · ' 
lO 
Through tne use of the code of bushid.o, tbe milita-
r:tats strengthened their gz-ip on the government"' The people 
he.d. unfla.ggil'lg :faith, loyalty, and devotion to the :Empe:ror: 
and the. m11:t tariets ware a.ble to control the Son of Heaven 
and 'bend hia will to theirs. This might be described aa the 
or:t{5inal ~*vicious eirel$, u but it did much ·to insure the 
~omina.nr;e of the m111 taey in Japanese governmental affairs. 
The rasulta of the 'l'aikwa. Reform oon:tinued fol" about 
five htU'ld:red. yea:rs. l)uring this period th~re wa:re years 
when culture, art, philosophy~ and religion came to the 
fot-e; but they '"are. ahort.;.lived. The death knell wa.s 
sounded for civil power in the yea:r- 1192 when the warrior 
e;hie!', lori tomo IUna.moto. ha.v:tns crushed tha Te1.re. nobles 
and captu:red the Emperor, reoei ved the title of 
.1!!~4·1!1• SbQeiU,D (aubduing,barba.r1 an•e;enerali saimo) • 
~qr* ~P.lli~ a lb!, f,1rrJ;& f:fS2eiY!h The oom~ieeion of .t~9814S 
d bean granted pre1dous1~e Emperor in Japanese 
histoey 'but only fo:r specified a.nd l1m1 ted periods of time. 
In the case of Yoritomo, h01'teve:r, it was for life; ~nd ha 
ws;s also g:re.nted the honor of ma.ming his O"t-nl euooessor, 
...... ' ttl. .... 
' 
r------o ... ,-om_p_a __ .n-y-,-.l94en' ~ d p!rls~ , __ IU; __ :!JLi!B!JJ~_!-~!~!u_!"_ohn __ ~--------- -~ 
i 
thus assuring tbe Yori tomo clan the hereditary supremE* 
command of' Japa.n • a fighting machine •11 
ll 
Under Yori to1:no the ,t\'H),!i};!S beoa.m~ the warrior ohiet; 
tbe administrative head, and the political leader of Japan. 
This was to continue for almost e~ven centuries. the 
off'ioe, of eotu•se. NUH~tined the mo:tlOpoly of the most po'W'$r-
ful milit~U''Y families, except on e, few occasions not long 
after the dee.th of Ioritomo, when his successors to pol>rer 
appointed youthful impel:'1al princes and members of the 
FuJi wa:ra family e.s puppet occupants of the office •12 
During these years, the !~SS!Ul was the actual ruler 
of Japan and the Emperor merely a figurehead. The people 
paid r(rveranee and. respect to the Emperor~ but the ehoWijl 
or1gillt:!tted. the laws end edicts issued in the name of the 
Emperor. The theory of the divinity of the Emperor was 
encoura,e;ed by the 'hQflL!ll beCH1Use this would inc:rea.se the 
loys.lty of the people to the Emperor and at the aa,me time 
enhancE~ the pow$r o:f anyone. who controlled ·the Emperor. 
+-----------J,r",~,e-powe:r of the .~Ah9.SHU wa,s made even~· .w.mou_r..._,e""---"e.,_.vu.i ..... d..,..e""n._..t _____ ~--
whan Yor1tomo consolidated h1a position by le~v:ing th& 
Emperor and his court a.t the oa:pital of Kyoto and moving the 
b,a,J!f;!a (military earup) away from the luxury of the civil 
-1-- -
12 
capital to the city of Kama.kura.., In this l'la,y the Emperor 
would not be able to oounterme.nd. the policies of the ghgsun 
bE'H,Hnu1e., in most cases, he woul<ln' t knc;n1 l'lha.t the G!28Yll was 
doine;. The Empel"'r waned and thlil military srew,13 
After the death of Yoritomo and down to the middle of 
the sixteenth century, the ~bg£5\Ul!~! increased in importance 
l<~hile the Emperor l'emained in a. aemi~Babylonian Capt1v1 ty. 
Kncn·m aa the dark age of Je,pan, ·this period was one of' 
e>lrnost continuous warfare between th$ i'eudal lords., None of 
them t.ras strong enough to diapoaa of the sx1sting.AalJ~k&,fi!J 
•b!aS!a!h and none was strong enough to capture and control 
enough of the country to become po11t:lcally dominant. 
Ma:ttere W$l'a so d.isorderly and so disunif,.ed that, ev..,ntu~ 
ally, the way was pa.ved fol" a strongly cent:re11 z~d govern• 
tMmt.. The ei tuat1on had gotten to the point where it 
ooul~:n• t get any wo.r>$0'; .1 t Stimply ha.d to gat better. 
At the end of the sixteenth century there appeared 
o.n the seene contemporaneously th;t>$& ot Japa.n• s {~reate at 
+------~.--~·a Ncibunae;a, To~~~~sh'ir-and.-Tokug,~~;~,aw~a(:l,..----------+---­
Iyeyasu. 'lba$e th:ree ut~sn knt:Jw $ach other personally, a.nd 1t 
ts doubtful i:f' the works of one could have been poeaible 
'fithout the contributions and works of the other- two .. 
Together they consolidated the posi t1on of the mili ta:r-y. 





~ .Ngbynft:61• No'bun~ga. paved th~ way for H1deyosh1 
a.nd Tokugawa by blasting ·away the elements within the nation 
that stood in the way of unification. He put down revolts 
and, insurrections among the rivr;tl cle.ns and succeeded in 
restoring peace to the ravaged country. He'! made Yoshiaki 
.!!hSS!dlil a.nd then proceeded to tall the §h~S!.a~ wha~ anc1 what 
not to do. Yoshia.ki plotted against Nobuna.ga; but Yoshiak1 
lost out a.nd wa.e exiled in 1573; thus ma.rking the. and of the 
A§hil:tt!i~ !b2ts9!l'!tt~ •14 
Nobuna.ga struck still another blow against the ;forces 
of disunion by d.estroyine; the Buddhist temples throughout 
Je,pan. Many of these temples bad existed :for year$, as 
virtual city statae ldthi.n the territorial limits of Japan. 
TbeY, had. accumulated large land holdings and wealth a.nd. had 
built up armies of their own. Nobuna.ga struck h1sgreateet 
blow against the monasteries in the yetu• 1571 wh~n he 
storrrHf~d and ca.ptUrE~d the Buddhist stronghold on Mount Hiei 
near Kyoto. He burned the temple to the e;round and put to 
r--------'~~~;v:-the-sw.a~pr~e sts. l5 The Ja.pan""'-e-l:>s..._e ______ ----;--__ 
people were :revolted, bu.t. this aot~on elim1natE?d :from the 
scene a source of grave disorder and strengthened Nobumaga•s 
rule. 
_j.·J ··.·e ·1 .. 1. '. t ·,.·•~ 
14 
; 
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The bu1ld•vcp of the tQ111 tary inc:rse.sed under the 
reign of. Nobunaga beoatase of the v1ctor•1ee achieved under 
his rule. This first phase of unification came to an end in 
1582 when Nobun.aga was asee,etd.nated. Ffis po11o1ee, however. 
were to be carried. on • 
. jg,;zotgm!. Jj~de;zosl11· _ Hideyoshi was ¥it lieutene.nt 1n 
the army of Nobunaga and assumed command of th·e e,:rmed. forces 
upon the dea.th of Nobunage.. He :was to carry forward in 
aggresa,.ve.:raehion .the unification process that had been 
started by his predeoes$o:r; that is, the laying of the foun· 
de.tio.n for a warrior dom1ne.ted state. 
Hideyosbi \ta.e unique in tht:tt he we.s virtually the 
only- me:n in pre•modet'n Japan who rosa to a, position of powE:ll" 
and influence :from a.mong the common people. He soon forgot 
his beginnings, however, and .became completely· absorbed 'fi th 
the warrior claae. Through his ab111 ty and foroe of zlrms, 
he becuuna one of the grea,test men in Ja.pa,neae bietory. He 
conquered. the country and brought pea,ce to the nation whic~ 
:Ct was Hidfityoshi who set the patte:r·n for the caste 
syatem of Je.pa.nll He issued ediota which prohibited people· 
from -changing their statue. He proh1b1 ted the changing of 
employment by a person without the permission of the lorc'L, 
+-------fti:r--f!lr+.t:r~.+-f>:h!~__.,...,...-tlj~-~~--J_r.-~_O__!}__~~l~'t.)_!~~~--~~_!!l_'!fll!!!L___ _ ___ __j __ _ 
tha.t no farmer could leave the land; and that no landlord 
15 
could protect va.grante. Tbia la,w led the way :tn placing the 
.ianpJra~ upon almost hallowed srounet, 16 
One or Hideyoshi • s most, \tidely known acts was the 
nsword hunt" in the year 1587~17 He declared that all 
farmers had to band in to the government any and all weapons 
that they had in th$ir possession, . It is plain to aee that 
by this act he 'ltrantad to eet up a de.:f'~nite divi<.Ung lin$ 
between the warrior class and the rest of the. popultltion. 
The privilege and profes$1ort of be~ring s.:rms was to be 
reserved henceforth for the members of the warrior class, 
thue lltrengthening the author! ty of the warriors W'"'.S} ... V1e 
the gree.t mass of the peoplE!}. 
H1deyoeh:t is a.leo :rernemba:red for his attempted. 
· 1nva~io11 of China and l{oraa in what lraa probably the first 
stae~ of a world. co~que~o:r complex~> He invad$.d. Korea in 
1592 and. re.pidly crver r~n most of that nation. The Jape.neee 
were eventually enecked when they ove:r-ex:tertded their lines 
or comrnUl1ioe,t1on and eupply. They held on for several yes.rSJ 
eteri orating situation_i1LJi""-"h=a__.m.,...a"""i .... n.._.t..,..,e=""'---------,---
nance of their sea commun1catione!! The death of lU.d.eyosbi 
1n 1598 gave the commanders a welcome excuse for" abandoning 







they decapitated 38,000 Korea.ns, out off the left E.Jars and 
noses, pickled them 1n be.rrels of brine. and sent them back 
to Ja.pe,n as a symbol of their glorious v:tcto:"tas. 18 'J.'heet;; 
••souv~.mire" are still kept at the large Buddhist temple in 
the e1 ty of rtyotot and. the entir·e edifice is known as th~ 
"Mound of Ee.ra~ n 
H1dayoshi had perf¢cted. a syetam. which guaranteed his 
uncha.llenged pos1 tion in the gover-ament of Japan so long ae 
he lived, but his regime fell apart after. his passing. Thie 
1e Where the third memb~x· of the triumve:rate, Tokt~g&.\<Ta 
Iyeyasu. comes upon the scene, 
*'£2lfiHS8:~{' I;Lt},i!ae,u,~ IYE>Y€U\H.t perfected the system bee;un 
by hie t<tt~o illuatrioua t>rEH~lecEH~Jsors. The first thing he did 
wae to crush t~he opposition. This wa.e done a.t the Battle of 
Sekigahara in l.Goo. 19 Iyeyasu emerged from this battle as 
the most po't'16'lrtul and dominant figU:t."e in Je,pan. He then 
went to work with the finishing sta.gea of the unification 
prooe se • He :1 aola.ted J a.pan from the reet of' the world1. an 
1eola.t on tha.t '..raa to last until Commander Far 
the country. Iyeyamu imposed a strict control of the feudal 
lords and of t.he 1tnp19r1a.l throne. He imposed. stricter 








predecessors. He placed num~:rous restrictions upon the life 
of every indivi~tH~l in Japan. ?:be system concentrated so 
much po'\>rer in the hands of Iyeya.su and h:te fam.ily that they 
were able to me.intain control and power over the nation for 
over two and a half centuries. The rule of Iyeyaeu d.1d ,much 
to craate the poli tiofl.l and social a.tti tudes that were the 
basis :fo:r the modern authoritarian state in pra•Pea.rl Harbor 
20 
Ja:p!9.n. This was the period of the $iill£5BW§; .~Q,oe;una,.te,, the 
moat powerful period of rule in Japan prior to the 
Restoration. 
qgl~a:emm 9j t}?~ Sgospn. Various forces werf» ferment .... 
1ng w:l. thin J.a.pan during the years of the T<fkYSB.W§ Shgsgna.te. 
These forces finally burst forth in active rebellion in 
1567. This followed by a few years the visit of Commander 
Perry, and many historia.ns and soholara cite this visit as 
the rea.eon for the overthrow of the abSSYZJ• However, 
Jerry's visit was not alone responsible. Other factors 
pla.yed an even more important role in elimj.natine; the 
First• there were certain Japanese scholars led by 
Motoori Norinaaa who delved into certain ancient writings 
which s·tatad that the Emperor, not the ~hof$!;\9 11 lt¥EMtJ the 
rightful ruler of the ne.tion. During the years of t.he 
- ---- --- -- ----- - -- ---- --- ----- --- - --- -------
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l~k,usa~tt{, ~l'tO.EH!PBi~$, the !.'tnpero:r had been virtually for• 
gotten. Iori nag a and his associate e pi"fHtohed that the 
Emperor, as the direct deac$nd.e.nt of the Sun Goddeas; 
Ama.terasu•Omikam:t, wa.s divine,. lt the Emperor was divine, 
what right ha.d any mortal to rule in his place,. They 
unoo'Vered wri tinga to bolster their ideas. and they brought 
to the people the doctrine ot the divine origin of the 
Emperor. This caused a great commotion throughout the 
nation, and soon the people were clamoring for the return of 
their divine ruler. This Emperor revival was probably th~. 
most important factor in the downfe,ll of the S,l'.U2f$2lile<tt,. 21 
Another factor ''~as: tbe w1de~spraad diseatisfa.etion 
among the peasants of .Japan. For hunctrede of yf;lars they ht!Mi 
been exploited by the ~bSS~UI• They lived 1n economic con• 
d1 t1ons t<tb1ch were pi t1able while at the same time they were 
forced to give to the &b2/$Yil outra.geoue amounts of t'ioe an<l, 
other farm crops as tax~tuh They did the work 1rrh1le the 
e:q()eaau end his followers rae.ped the harvest. It is not na.rd 
r-------~~~~~~T.n~~~tu~l~drT.btse~inn-+fav~~f-the r1~e-e4-the-----------~----
In ad.di tion to these :fa.ctors, an empire such a.e had 
be~n built by tht Xyeya.eu family needed strong men to 
19 
continue. During the nineteenth oentury no strong men were 
to be found within the ruling class~ Oentur1ee of luxur,v 
and. idleness ha.~ softened the once mighty ruling claas., 
This lack of leadership was crucial a~ a time when the 
p:ressure of both events and men on the 1'o~ugawa regime lre.s 
e;rowing stronger and stronger. 
§&.if-~ ... !11-l!L• Leading the :rebellious :torct1s we~ 
the trib.~smEUl from the western clans or tribes of Japan. 
These clans were four 1n number; SatsQma, Ohoshu; Hizen; 
and Tbsa, generally shortened to the more convenient 
.llii~ .... 01la·l!•l$1.• '!'be se clans wet'$ located a great distance 
from the center of tJovernm~nt1 and this encouragEJd them to 
be independent. Moreover~ they were the strongest and most 
prog:re ssive of the Je.pa.nese clans. In developing manufac-
ture and trade as a means of boosting alan revenue. 
§a,•014g·lt1•.1Q. were far ahead of -~he other clan$. They 
fostered not only handiorafte, porcelain manufacture, sue;ar• 
refining, and textile mills, but m~n1ng, 1~on foundries, 
+--------@~~a~~!ns, an~4~~~~&e±ll~.~2=2~------------­
ln these western cla:ne the anti ... :foreign sp1ri t wa.s 
intense. For some yea.re 9 in defiance of the ~Qiin• the 
clans carried on what was practically an 1ndep$ndent war 
20 
against the \*Tastern Povrers and. against the newly acquired 
treaty rights of 1ieetemer•s in Japtm. They frequently 
attacked foreisners, both on land and sea... Things oa.me to a 
bea.d in 1863-61-t- when they tried. to expel all foreigners by 
2:5 f'oroe., In August. 186::>. 1n retal1tl.ticm for ·the murder of 
a.n Ertglishmall by the ele;tstrma cla.n!i a Br1 ti sh equa.d.ron · bom• 
barded the Satsuma port of !\agosh:tma. ln September, 1864, 
an a.lli(Jd fleet composed of Br1 t1eh, Dutch, F'ranoh, ancL 
American ships eestroyad the Ohoshu forts at Shimonos~k1. 
These fort~ had been firing on \'lastern vessels pe,ssinfti 
through the narrow Shi.mo:noseld, Stra.1 te. 24 
'l'hese d<tcieive proo:ff3 of ifestern m1l1 tary and naval 
superiorft,y s~we .§.!~"'Cbo,.•.H1•l2. reasons for a revie"' of their 
policies. Soon. all four clans stopped their anti .. foraign 
aetivi ties. They had long seen the need of acquir~ng modern 
armaments. This cJ.Efltermination was no'lrt made doul;)ly strong. 
Many ·other lea.ders 08.me to see that Japan could not l,teep her 
d.oor shut forever and th~t her salvation lay in learning and 
n ues 25 This ould not be done. 
under the rule. of the §lltOSYlf- :f'or the §!:!Q62ll$l'te repres$nted 
the isolation of Japan f:rom the rest of the wo:rld." In order 






to· adopt the policies o:t' S~~"".Qlm.'""!U.,..l'.a• the §hOS!.Ul ha.d t.o be 
disposed of. Onoa ha.ving g:r•a.eped ~ihie rea.li zation, the 
lf.t~stern cla.na acted. ·on 1t, boldly e.nd unhEH:\1 ta.t1ne;ly. 'Thei:r 
actions paved the lftay for the overthrow- ot the shces\Ul and 
the Iteetorat1.on of the Emperor!> 26 
One oe.n aeo that a oomplex · a.:rray of economic, poli ti• 
cal, social, e.11d d1plome.t~.o fs.otora \.ras pressing ever more 
bsav11y on the Tokuga:~·fa. regime. · 'll:H'J SG!iYrY waa b$comins 
ine:raaeingly helpless to solve the major problems. that ~:re 
f'a,eing 1 t. Events ware rnov:tng .:rapidly in the di:rection of 
al'lother change i.n the oligarchy that had ruled Japtu; for 
centuries. The milj:barista had g:r·own tremendously d.u:ring 
the shogun era., Th$1 t'I7~H·~ to .grow ~ven mora a.s Japa,n stood 
on the v~rge of the moat d:ramej:.ic and significant oha:nge~ in 
:1. ts n1 story. 
' ' 
~.- l',jZ'.l!"i!'l'" .,_._ .. i d ~-----· ----~----------------
. THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND REIGN 
~e $eeds of militarism were sown in feudal Japan. 
During the reign of the Emperor Meiji• they grew amazingly. 
Th1a entire process came about under the pretense of democ-
racy and oonsti tut:tonal govfl:rnmEn:tt, and 1 t all began with 
the Restoration of the Emperor. 
As has bean eho\m earlier, the Shqe~ngte~ in its 
latter years, came und.er increased fire from both the peas-
ants and the le:ndlords. This brought a,bout a sharpening of 
Japan• s internal conflict. The extrao:rdina:ry thing fJ-bout 
this internal conflict was thi.e. The groups opposing the 
~bosynate ware revolutione.:ries; they rejected the existing 
system and fought for a. new one,. They sought progress for 
Japan, and progress meant opening the country to Western 
influence" Yet, in their struggle with the ~b2SU%l• they 
l were all a.ga.inat the foreigner. The :reason for this is not 
cult to d1scePn. Th~~~ore~n-demonstratinn~a~--------------­
providad a handy weapon for attacking a.nd d.iseredi tine; the 
Sbo.e;yna~t.• As ha,s baEm noted in the discussion of the 
S~~""Ohq-1!1 ..... '-f.g cla.na, the cry to "drive out the barbariann 
disa.ppeareci when ·the cla.nemen realized that the only we..y in 
r-------------.-------- --------------------------------------------------------------- -----------"--
which progress could be a.oh1eved was through the adoption of 
Western ways. The old oliohe udon•t fight 'em, join •em" 
was employed. Join up they did. 
,fj41:!~ .2.£ the ~m;Q,rq~ .iJa inf~yanqi .!!!S! Bres,t41 6~. :our"' 
1ng thE~ time that the ~.bPS!a!t!'!! was under fi:ra internally,. 
the prastie;a and aotua.l authority of the Emperor grew, It 
grew and it continued to grow during this period of trans1• 
tion •. Ae ee.rly as 1858, reeog~1zing the Emperor• a new 
importance, the ~bo.aYq sought hi$ approval. of e;:reater 
intercourse 1"1 th the West; and. in 1863 the qho&an even 
obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto .. 2 It we.s plain to see 
that th<tJ time waa app:roa.o{d.ng for the revocation of the 
powe:rt!! of the ~f!l9sun and for thf~ reato:ra.tion of the Emperor. 
tn September, 1966, tm2ei!Ul it1,TD2<'.b! d.ied.. In 
February, 1867 11 the Emperor KomE'!i also died. 
3 These two 
dee.ths p:rovided an id.ea.l opportunity for a. radi<H~.l change. 
In October, 1867 11 Yosh1nobu Ke1k1, the fj.fteenth 'J:okuga:t'la 
gl)lgf5!Jlh reced. ved, a memorial frQm the leader of the 'rosa clan 
f 
Satsuma, Qhoehu, and Hizen clans later joined in this 
2Ma.ry A. Nourse, ~* l!ll! vl~;t .Q! J.ll:l! E,m;eerQr. p. 205. 
3 
·----~~~--'---·---~--.!~---· --------------------------- ---------------------------------------------~------------__j-
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reque~t. Completely underm:tned, K&ik1, on November 3, 1867, 
sent hie resignation to the Emperor. 5 . With. the disinteg:ra• 
tion of ~fultugawa power, the fttt?•Ctao•,B1 ... ls, clans were left in 
complete .eontr.ol .of the court at Kyoto •. After tt-m htmdred 
and fifty years, the ~gk~ea~~ ~~qs~n~t~ had fallen: and the 
way wa.e OJ)enad for the restoration to full aovereian power, 
in theory at lea.at, of the fourteen year old Emperor 
Mutsuhito who ruled under the name of Meiji (enlightened 
aovemment) from .1815'7 to 1912. 
Jm.J !~t;~d ~h~ m~li ta:r~? How did the military fare in 
the Restoration battle? Mili taey tl'adi t:ton we.e not absent 
in the struggle for the t~estore.t1on of the A'mpero:r and the 
e.boli tion ot' fEH'Idalism. The group of clever statesmen who 
destroyed the Sbg5gna:~m oonta1nEH1 many warriors. Many of 
the 8.ble, sttl!.tesmen who expedi. ted the mode:rnization of Japan 
were soldiers. The g:reat na.t:tonal plan of political and , 
economic developmE:mt which they adopted tor Nippon included 
not only the building of railways. the cree.t1on ot bt11.nks• 
r-------~~~~~~~~·~i~o~n~o*f~1~~~~arn li~~b~u~t~·------------~----­
a.l'So the a.rming of the nation in the latest European 
fashion, the subet1 tut1on of a ata11dine; e,rmy 1n place of et 
feuds.l soldier-y, the introduction of consoription on a 
na.t1ou ... w1de seale, and· the construction .of .a pm>~erful 
1----------·-~-~-.. --~~~ 
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6 navy. Important also was the inculcnti.on .ot mili tar1sm in 
schools and a oontlnunnce of the fanatic cod$ o:f' loyalty to 
t,he ;ttmperor. 'l'b~.a loyalty w:as. oul.tivated as a mea;ne of 
> ' 
arotH~ing an intense entbuaia.sm and a.evoti.on to. the eta.te on 
the pe,;rt of the humble citizenry. 
Qrreqa1t1rua and r.~.vol."Y• In 1877 the last bit of armed 
reaist&noe to. the new o.rder fl~red up in the form of a . 
. N'Yolt by the. Satsumet clan, lfhia seems ra.the:r surprising 
beoauae the. Satsuma,, 1 t will be remembered., lad the way for 
the restoration of the Enrperor. As 1 t developed~ however, 
f3a.1go Tak~unori, lea,der of the Satsuma, ha(l. b(:Hl~m,e d1ee;run"" 
tled with the Empex-o:r and the new ayf:'ltem b$oause they had 
7 thwarted hie attempts to in't/e.de Korea. in the year 1874, 
The S~.tauma clan; traditionally one of the most wa.:r•l1ke of 
the feudatories. t'las e,lfi!!O disee,tis:fied with the. treatment 
the.t the ~Aarriors were receiving. They saw the waX>riors as 
t:t class losing their favo:red pos1 tion ,_n Japanese society. 
The a,rmy was be ins thrown op~;m to the mas see by the inet1 tu• 
-t--------'rr:tt'H'l---n'!"-----lirn&--flfv-wMHB---f''l'F--nte~-e-e-n-a~~on~~a-illatts\4=------'-----
-- -·------------------------- -------------~---------
P2!lS.St*~J2l~O!.'h The system of conacriptioi'l clema.nded 
that every Japanese male wi tbout d1!ittinct1on of ;rank or 
class serve, hi a country as a conscript,. three years in 
autiVE;} o.uty togatber 't~i th two years in the first reserve !!md 
another two yea.re in the seoortd reserve-. 8 At first glance 
1 t .would ~e$m .tb~t. t}le military signed their own dee.tn 
we.rra.nt by opening their ranks to a.dmi t the common oi tizen. 
This wae not th~ case. Since the system of cons.cription wae 
begun by the· 1Tlil1·tarit:rt.a• tnen au:rely they would not under"" 
. mine tl:Ha.:tr own motives, Conscription was brought about for 
a ptU:'pose; and. tbie purpose "rae to hasten the do\<mfall of 
feudalism ae the economic e,nd pol1 tical et:ructu:re of the 
country. Although this wa.a accomplished, feudal psychology 
remained the domtnating factor• in the establishment ·of a new 
t'ot'm of government, e. government fa,sh:tonad to meet th~ ends 
.of the· mili te.ry. The new tom of government dema.ndt1d 
unque stion1ng aocspte.nce of control of authority e,e 1 ts 
found.ation. The old class barriers that we:re erected during 
+--------;~~nm~~~~$~~~nd-tha wn~~s-aa&s~a~--------~----­
separ$.te and distinct olaes in Ja,paneee society t!liaappea.:red. 
However., the whole Japanese nation became instilled with the 
3ea1 a.nd ·ambition thttt .on.ce affected t)nly a very small 
--------------~-
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percentage of tha people. Univers~l m~le conscription 
<tian•t sweep a.we.y the idea of a domin~mt mil1taJ:•y ola.es. On 
the contrary, it carried this theory even farther, right to 
the \-thole of the ~ra.peJ'l(\Hl~ paopla ~ . tj;ibe ep1 ri t of the m111 ... 
tacy ola,es beoame the feelings of all of Je.pan., 9 . This 
.feeling was to b(l) incorpo:.ra.ted into '\t.rhe..t t-ras supposed to be 
. the symbol of a demoora.tic and const1 tutiorlt·l.l government. 
the ConstitutJion of Je:pan 1 teel:f. 
ltli. l~~J! QQrtl1!:!:1,tgti9Jl" One of the first ma.1or prob.,.. 
lama to fa.ce the military waa l'l0'-11 to form a conati tut1onal 
government 1<¥hioh woul<l p:reee:rve the rights e.nd pow0rs of the 
m:tli~ ta.xw· ·and a.t the same t!tma satisfy the grmdng demand for 
representative gov~rnment. 
The solution of this n:roblem fell to l?:rinoe Hit-obum1 
<.'1> ' ' 
Ito, tbe leading advocate of a ooneti tut,1ona.1 gov~.nmment 
with a.bsolut~ powe~s. tn 1882 be .went abr()a.d to study 
governm$nt admini etration throughout the .v1orld. He found 
the P:r>usaia.n eyatem th~ best model .for the p:reserva.t.ion of 
+---~-VHJI;lf----'\tT.hi~~-'1:':;----H{J~:-Il'r.t.' ~~G.w~-S. :Be t':lfll~n 
Ito laJ.d down the principles of a sui table oor1sti tutional 
document and paV$d the we.y for 1 te ~.doption. 
Ito• a const1 tution was drafted in secret. Thera was 
no coru~ti tutiona.l oonvent:ton 11 no consul tat ion 1d th pll.rty 
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lea.ders, no poymle,r d1souaeion or d$bate~. e.nd no popular 
ratificaM.on. The constitution resulted in the creation of 
a new aristoc:t'e.oy .. A Oabin~t replaced.the old. Oounc:tl of 
Stnte • a~d 1 ts first members were young men with mili tarie,.. 
tic sympath1~ 1:1. No repres$nta.ti vee of the old nobil.i ty were 
included. Local govermnents were reorga.n1 zed in a compro ... 
. mise with democracy. Tbe Privy Council, composed of members 
. of the ne'" nobility and d.istinguished stl3.tesmen. was 
o:rea.ted. . It \'las the duty of this Privy Council to approve. 
10 the constitution and tt;> dra.ft eonst~ tutional amendments •. 
A representative Diet composed. of two chambera was 
established.. The upper oha.mber, Ol" Hot~se of Peers, included 
members of the royal family an<! the nobility. The lower 
chamber, the House of R$pl"eeent8.t.1ves, was a body of some 
· three hundred selected for f'our year terms by all adult 
males who paid a specified annual ttJtx:. The Diet hal! the 
right of debate and th~ right to question members of the 
Cabinet. ;J:t 1-ra.s never able to gain control over the pu:rae, 
eror rete' ned the power to summon a.nd to 
dissolve the House of Repreeentat1vee, 11 
At first gla.noe it might e.ppEHU" that the forces of 
liberalism and democracy "rere e;ain1ng the upper hand in the 
•-----ooiumlH.a~tJnlversl ty ~Pri,iia ;·~ 
11:tbi~. 
battle for control of the e;ovti*rnment •. 1bie was not the case, 
hO\<,'SV$1?. T'tler•e WEI!'€! aeVare.l t'EH.~Sf)rlS why this S.liHH.'Itnption WSB 
not t~ue. First. the ministers of war and the navy had' the 
:r1e;ht of iaku Josu, or d1:rect access to the Emperor. This 
practice "totae permitted by Article VII of the Imperial 
Ordinance on the O:rgGmization of the Oabin~t of 1889 \'lh,.ch. 
Wi. th the e){ce:ption of tstmk} a~Jnte6 or. of military 
affairs of secrecy and s~ave mportance which, hav• 
ing been reported d1:ractly to the Emperor_ may have 
been submitted by the Emperor for the oonsidera.tion 
of the cabinet, the ministers of state for war a.~S 
the navy shall t'eport to the minister president. 
Thia meant that the ttl1li tarlste could take their case 
di~ctly to the Emperor while the non•mil1tariats were 
fot·oed to reeort to oorurti tutiona.l means in o:rd.ar to convey 
their feelings to tbe throne., This was a decided advants,ge 
for the m1l1 ta.ry, a.nd they did not besite.te to use 1 t. 
$eoond, tht:t militarists insured. the continuance of 
their posi t.ion by placing the organiza,tion and standing of 
the A:rmy and Navy, not in the Diet where 1 t would be subject 
to OiV'ilian ju;risdiotion• but in the hands ot the Emperor. 
Thie, in effecta made the Army e.nd Navy the private property 
I 
of the Emperor. The Japanese 'believed the.t the Emperor was 
divine and could do no wrong: therefore, the Army and Navy 
ooul.d do no wrong, 13 IJ.'he posi t1on of the m1l1 ta:riste in 
this particular facet of the problem was tremendously aided 
by the principle of ~!!~ .J.suua, or "direct access." Third, 
through the use of Article 67 of tbe coneti tution, the Diet 
was prohibited from reducing the budget onoe 1 t had been 
' 
f'1xed. 14 In other words, the Army and Navy could always 
count on a certain amount of money. !he Diet might not 
increase funds for m111 tary appropriations J but, on the 
other hand, 1 t could not dec:rea63e them. Th1 e continuous, 
stea.dy source of' income helped to stabilize the position of 
the military. 
Probably the most important single weapon in the 
hands of the mili ta,rista was a law which stipulftted that the 
Minister of War could. be ohosen only :from a list of active 
genera.ls. Each Cabinet had to have a Mini mter of War before 
it could function,. If the militarists didn't approve of the 
-+----~~.u..,~-t.~-l!---bis policies, th$.1-----Wtlu~ply refuse to permit 
a genera,l on active d.uty to accept the pos1 tion of Minister 
of War.. If a general aid accept the poet again.st the wishes 
of the mil1 tar1sts, he was taken off of the active list 51 the 
31 
.CJabinet would fall, and the potenM.a.l premier would ha.ve to 
cate~ to the milita:rists in order to secur$ a Minister of 
Wa.xo, In this manner the mili ta.ry clique made· and. unmade 
Cabinets ar1d premiers. 
The oonsti tuti()n orE1a.ted a tra.mework of govet>nment. 
whioh included insti tuM.ons similar in form te> tho ee found. 
1n democra.t1c states bt.lt marked by features which rna.de the 
development of a democratic system impossible. The lt..'mperor 
eont:rolled the budg<i!t of the Army and the Navy; yet tbe 
people in no way exet•oieed control over the Emperor. The · 
only 1nfluenoe playing e. direct role on the Emperor was . 
levied by the mi11 tar;v ~~ The war• lords ware playing w1 th the 
deck stacked in their :f'e;Vo:r. The ooneti tut1on made the 
military independent of civ:llie,n cont~ol, added nothing to 
the civil arm of government, and detracted nothing ft-om the 
role of the m1.l1 tary. As one ~.uthor has notedl 
The 1889 constitution is a document embodying 
Japanese pol:ttical principles under the cloak of 
representative il1ati tutiona. It put the m.ili tarists 
ln the drivers eeat,. They 't~Tere riding high, wide 
+-------·n""...,.d~· ...... h..... an.de.ome andl!tbere was nothi.~hair wat-tG---------~ 
even more power.· 5 
lbi m~t~~~rx ~ f.~82·i21~. Beginning With the 
Me1j1 Restoration, Japan wa.s expansionist in feeling and 
polioy. Even bef'o:re ~he RE;Hrto~ation mtu'ly Japanese leaders 
had fe,v.o!'ed terri to rial expansion* l6 During the years of 
' 
internal reform, however, they had cautiously retrained from 
x:-ash adventures abroad. A strong movement in favor of a 
punt tive exped.i tion t.o Korea ha.d developed in 187l•H373, but 
the dominant ·clan bureaucrats had skillfully prevented the 
outbreak of war, They h~d pe~itted a Formosan expedition 
in 1874 bQt had settled the resulting issues pea.cef~lly w1 th 
China.. Some em all gains ha.~ been m~.de, however. ~e Bonin 
Island.s w~re annexed in 1876 and the Ryuku Islands in 1879. 
A naval demons.trat1on in 1876 secured for Japan spe,oial 
treaty rights in Korea which led to more and mo.re interven ... 
tion in Korean affaire •17 It, was in .Korea that the mi11 ta:cy 
masters of Japan l·tere to la.~noh thei:r first full scale 
,.mperialistic ambitions. 
, ~-ruan~S!~ lf.it * ~-l~~~· For centuriE: o iCol:'ee. 
had been Ut1der the eUZ$ra1nty of Oh,.na.. Under- this arrange• 
L---
'···;. 
ment China gave Korea protec\ion. ae;a1nst external e.ggresaion 
-+----~Uf,.\;'----l;.lJIJ-,I..;ii.-U.l~~-{-w.s~n-a-nd----aJ!proval of eaeh-ne-lo~---------­
ruler,18 In 1882 anti.,.foreign riots broke out in Seoul~t the 
oe.pital of Korea. Acting in accorda.noe with her mutua.lly 
16
Gubb1ns, SU!• P!~·~ P• 113. 
1. 
•----Yorlta V!lti~g F-resa-;-lg4kl;--p-.~-35;-~-~-~-----·~---~uL ___ ~_ 
18~., p. 38 •. -
recognized obligation, China ~ant troops to assist in reeto~ 
1ng order, Japan; with whom Korel;l had no sucb ag;reement, 
felt she t~hould. have a finger in the Korean pie and, acoor-d• 
~.ne;ly• sent, troops to the soene., Oomplicationa arose which 
led to intense feeling between China and Japan, ·and war 
between the two countl:"iea wae narr<nfly averted. In 1885 
Ohina and Japan.mut~ally ag~ed to withdraw their troops, 
and K:orea wa.a urged to organize bar own army. It was, more• 
over,, agreed tba.t in the event of any further disorders 
calling for outside intervention both China and Js.pan $hould 
notify each other before d.ispatohing troops and that troops 
so sent were to he withdrawn as soon a.s t~heir obJect was 
attained. Th1 e a,greem.tmt became known ae the Qc;mJ,e,J1:§!s.n sa, 
T!e.!Jl:~1!l• 19 
Despite the gg~vi;\Jlt1gn .g,X l'.&!~~@iJh the s1 tuation was 
full of pol:t tical dynamite; and only a spark was neede,d to 
bring about a major explosion. Such a. spark was furnished 
in 1894 when Korea wa.s again throlm into serious confusion 
+-----~~~~-H.I---~~i¥;11-----Wh-at--1-S-kno-t.m---l!LS-the .:t,p:qsQ!Jt--,e~~<e~!~~r:::~ ~19Dw. :to ... ---~-­
an indigenous nat1ona.l1st1c movem~nt~ mildly religious. but 
intensely patriotic and ant1 ... foN1gn. 20 Ohina dispatched 
two thousand troops to the scene and. in accordance with the 
agreement of 1885, :notifled Japan .of her a.ot1on, Ja.pan 
1-----""'------------~---------------------- ____________________ : ___ ~ ________ .:___ ________________________________  
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replied. by sending mo;-e than forty""five hundred troops and 
at th~ eatpe time rejec·t.:tng China• s long•stancUng claim to 
euze:rainty by pointing out that Je,pa.n had nav.:n" recognized 
Korea1 as a state tributary to Cl:lina. . The m111 tarists had 
their boot in tba door, a.nd. they were intent upon forcing 
the door wide open. 
TOe Japanese eomma.nder eerved notioe upon China that 
Jap~1n intended to undertalte single•handed the task of reor ... 
21 
gani~ing the government of Korea. The first move 1.n thi a 
dil:'eotion by Japan was the dema.nd that the King of Korea 
declare his country an independent ata.te no longar under the 
suzerainty of China. vl.h1la these negotiations were beine; 
carried on, Ohina. mr;mae;ed to increase her forces to a.pprox•. 
imately three thousand men while the war""lords of Japan 
pou%"$d over eighteen thousand troops into. tbe "land of the 
1 J n22 early morn ng ca.m. 
On July 21, 1894, Japanese troops entered Seoul and 
quickly t:md quietly proceed.ed to taka ove:r· the palace. 
, the oity gates, and Korean military 
. . . 2lr. A. MoKenz1e1 ~ r.f~a~se9-.l. 2!, Korea (New York: 
The Macm.1llan Company, J.9l7T. p. 59. 
22;tb1!1. t ·p~ 62. 
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brought a.bout heea.uee Ko:res,n sold.iers had fired upon 
Japanea(') troops. The Japanese pl.a.ced. the young regent upon 
the crown and forced him into demanding the expulsion of all 
Chinese t:roops from ltore8 .• 23 \far seemed imminent and 1 t 
was. 
The confliot which ensued" , lmown aJ; the S:ln9""Japanese 
Wa.:t-1 was of short duration. Hoetili ties eommetlced when the 
Ja:pa.neee torpedoed the }iQ;t.{,Ef:tl~!.h a Chinese transport '\Tith 
tt\telve hundred men aboard. The ~a.pa.ne~e forces then etruok 
one blo'lfr after another in rapid. sucoeseionlt throwing into 
confusion the ill ... prepa:rea and sadly over-..confidlin'lt Chinese · 
army which was outnumbered and finally almost annihilated at 
Pingya:ng, 24 Than followed. the destruction of the Chinese 
fle$t in the Battle of Ye.lu, the capture of Port Arthur with 
1 ta ho:rr1 ble maeeaore, 25 tha invasion of the Lia.otuns 
Peninsula, and. the capture of We1}la.1\1&1 in Northern 
Shantung" Orushed. and J:lumiliated Ohina was forced• by the 
Treaty of Sh1monoseki 11 to accept the following terms& 
the ceding to Je.pan of the Lia.otung P~ninsula, the ieland of 
23Will1ams, ~· ~-· P• 67. 24 
McKenz1e 11 5nl· q~!r·. P• 73. 
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Formosa, and the Pesca.dorea; and payment to Japa.n of au 
A 26 indemni'ty of 'iPlSO,OOO,OOO. 
The war-lords t1ere jubilant~ Their first full scale 
effort had met with tremendous success. Uot-tever. the 
enthusiasm \'las short•JJ.ved.. The terms of the Treaty of 
Sh1monosek1 were not at all to the liking of three powerful 
\fastern nations# Germany, France, a.nd Russia. All three 
had their own very definite ideas as to the future exploi• 
ta.tion of the Chinese Empire, and. they ha.d no intention of 
pcal"mi tting a Japan the;t ha.d just emerged from a state of 
sem1 ... ba.rba.rism to disrupt their plans. A few d.a.ye after the 
signing of the Shimonoseki T~aty, . Ja.pan :received from these 
three r1atione a firm but loftily wo:t·ded protest. concerning 
her p:ropoeed a.aquisi tion of the vastly $tre,teg1c L1a.otung 
Peninaula. Such an arrangement would• this proteet pointed 
out. constitute a. dire menace to China's capital at Peking 
and would render purely illusory the newly declared inda~ 
pendence of Korea.. 27 What could Japan do in the face of 
difficulty the armed forces of her ba.ckward neighbor; but to 
fa.oe t.he armed. forces of three of tha world1 a leading powers 
would. be an entirely different ma.tter. There was nothing to 
26 
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do but accept the "reoommandat1onen of the Tripe.rti te 
Powers. 
Even this set-back strengthened the mili tar1sts. 
They used 1 t to discretli t the F'ore1gn Office of the govern-
ment. They pointed out how the armed forces of Japa.n had 
won e. glorious victory only to be deprived. of 1 t by the 
ineptness of the civ111a.n branch of the government. A 
double victory was, therefore, gained by the militarists. 
The nTriparti te In·tervention, '' as the milite.riste 
called 1 t. rankled. Japanese hearts. Salt was rubbed in to 
the wound only a year after the signing of the Treaty of 
Shimonosek1 and the Tripartite Intervention. 
y ... tgbanov Tt!a!x .. 18,2!?. In March. 1896; the famous 
Ohinese diplomat I.~i Hung-chang was appointed by the Empress 
Dowager Teu Hsi to journey to St, Petersburg, osteneil,ly for 
the purpose of rapre ee.nti.ng Chirul at the coronation of 
Russia's 11ew Czar, Nicholas II. There was, however 11 another 
purpose for his visit and a vary important commission which 
+-------~~~~~~~~~-=~~~~~~~~~~e~a~r~a~~----~----------~-----
at. Petersburs in all the :r•egalia of hie office and attended 
by an impressive retinue; and in June, 1896, ha negotiated 
·with Russia a secret treaty of allie.nce specifically aimed 
at Japa.n. It wa.e a.g:read that if the le.tter should pursue an 
tracting parties would assist one another on land e,na sea. 
At the ·time 11 the Russian representative, Loba.nov • who 
actually negoM.e.ted the treat~ with Li Hung-chang succeeded 
in persua.ding 1;1 tha.t the safety of China d.epend$d upon the 
construction of a transcontinental railway across Northern 
Manchuria to.Vladiyostok; thie right was embodied in the 
tree.ty. This treaty marked the start of the fortification 
of the Lia.otung Peninsula. a~d the building of the Dairen• 
Ha:rb1n railroad by the Russiant.h 28 Japan saw the handwri t ... 
ing on the wall, a.nd the ~111 ta.ry decided to erase 1 t. 
J$U§§O•.rapanegl W1r: 1204-.Q!i. Having firmly estab· 
liebed herself on the Liaotung Peninsula~ Russia lost no 
time 1n extending her influence to the north; and by the 
beginning of the year 19?2, J:tussian forces were tn 
undisputed mili ta.ry possession o:f' Ohina' s three eastern 
provinces, the terri tory better known tHI ~1anchuria. 29 Such 
a dominant Rueeia.n po~i t~.on was full of danger, to all other 
foreign interests in the F'ar Ea.st as well as to tboee of 
, China. It was to Japan, however, tha.t the situatlon 
~------~~HH~~~~enac~~~,~a*r~1s~t~s~------------­
of Japan who deoided the.t they ware sufficiently prepared to 
challenge Rueeia! a e.lleged rights. One of the sources of 
28 
Webb, .fm• &• $ p,. 89. 
29 
( i()ndon t 
p. 153. 
oon:f'idenoe :f'or the Je.paneee was the Anglo•Je.panese Alliance 
of 1902 by wh1oh each would so to the defense of the other 
if ei the:r were attacked by more tb~;n1 one nation. This 
t:ree.ty \i'as USEH'J' b;y the :British as a means of curtailing 
Russian expansionist tendencies in the Far East. but e.t the 
same time 1 t gave the war-lords of Japan a free hand. in the 
Orient. 30 
Early in 1903 the e:ttuatlon began to assume a serious 
aspect, and once again '!Ita~ clouds began to gather in the Far 
East, Throughout the year Russia al'}d •Je,pan were engaged in 
more or lees wearisome negotiations, which arrived at no 
definite conclusions. In Japan the mil1 tariste \>~ere stress-
ing the divinity of' the Emperor. the code of ~Q!lhidq, the 
concept of ha:Jsk2 1gh1y (bringing the corners ot' the world 
und.er one, roof), and the belief !.n kQ,do (the way of th'iJ 
Emperor) to stir the people into a frenzy. They succeeded 
in do~.ng this to suo~ B. degree that public opinion soon 
demanded tha,t Russian penetration and inf1l tra.tion in 
+-------~~Hw.~~ale~s~t~offpmp,~.3l This~a-ene-tim~~&-t~~~---------------­
rista were more than willing to stibmit to the will of the 
people. 





In the negotiations bet.ween the x-ap:resente,tives, of 
, Russia· and. Ja,pan, the Ruaeiana dilly-dallied and· a.ppea:red to 
) ., ' ' 
be in no g:rea:t. hurry to come to a settlement. Ja,pan, on the 
: \ ' • t 
other hand, feeling herself competent, would brook no 
:further delay. On February 6, 1904, Japan aeve:re,d diplo .. 
matic relatione with Rus~ia.. Two days le.te:r the Imperial 
Ja,panese Navy under the oommtn'ld of ,.Admiral Togo a:ttaoked the 
Russian fleet off Port Arthur., Fo:rme.l declaration of war 
did not come until the lOth. Host1l1 ties lasted nea,rly two 
jf'EHu·a. ,Although Russia wae badly beaten, the Je.panese them• 
selves were on the verge of collapse beo~,uee of the pro• 
longed atra.1n of t.be war on men. auppliea, and raw m,.,_teria.ls. 
Both sides. we:re rea.d.y :ror p~Ht()e. 
T~J~~l st. fo.rt~~~::=tbt ~·, Under the sponsorship 
of Theodore Roosevelt, Russia and Japan til.gread to the 
follo1't:lng peace terms as set up at the Trae:ty of Po;rtsmouth a 
(l) Both pol<~ers agreed to evr1.ouate M.anoburta which we.GJ to be 
restored to the exclusive administration of China with the 
+----------"'hl\.\o.~~VJ.-&-v--.-~.,.__.""",i"""'a""o,l-'t .... t""m~s~P,_.,e4rinw.1..«-n auJ. a, the J as ee of wh.i..o.h-w .... a ..._s ------'----~ 
to be tx•ansferred to Japan; (2) Ja.pan• s para.mount poli M.oal, 
mil1 tary, and economic 1nte:rasts in Korea were reoogni zed; 
( '3) Russia. ceded to Japan the railway from Port Arthur to 
Ohangoht:m, retaining the railway north of the,t point; and 
Japan ancl sra.nted 1mporta.rrll fishing rights in northern 
· Pao1fic waters ·to Ja.pa.neae · intrn·$.sta. 32 
Japa:n ha.d taken on the ncolosaus of. t.he not>tht' a.nd, 
much to the su:rpr:tse of everyor.u~f ha.d.emet"ged. vi.oto:r•ioue. 
The mil1 ta.:r:t eta were praised throughout Japan. Never did 
their prestige glo1rr eo b:rie;htly, They "'ere the saviors of 
t.he Yamato race.. It aQlemed that the policy of !J~l;IF.sl a_c14~Y. 
was to succeed. 
41 
On July 30~ 1912 11 the Emperor Meij1 died. \'fitb his 
d.ea.th .an era. came to e.n end. Feuda.lism had been repls,ced by 
constitutional m111ta.:riam. '1\>ro great tfa.:rs hadbeen ;Pought· 
e.nd won. Jap$.11 "'as r$cogn1 zed as one of the wc>:rld' e gr~a,t 
powers, ot1ing pr,.ma:r:tly to the policy of the m1l,.tar1sts, 
Two years later anothe.~ period of still more amb1 tious 
exparu~'-on and growth waa ushered in by Worl.d ~ie.r I. 
I b I ;lj: I . ,II ------------- - ---- ----------------
JAPANESE MILITARISM AND lvORL:O \vAR I 
World War I gave Japan a great oppor·tuni ty for 
expansion and srowthp and her military leadare \<tere quick to 
seize ,.t, The conditions created by \~lorld War I ha<.'l peen 
made to order for Japan. They brought all her str·ategio 
a.dvantases into play and were ideally e.dapted to meet her 
eaonomio •. politioal, and tt~ilita.:ry neoeesities. The pred1o-
t:ton. of Viscount Tani upon his return from the 1'1est in 1888 
eaeme4 about ready to coma true; 
Make our country secure by military preparation • 
• ·• • Encourage and protect the people at home, and 
tbe!l wait for the time of th$ confusion o:f' Europe 
which must oom$ eventually eooner·or later ••• 
Such an event will. agitate the nations of the Orient 
ae well• anf we Will then become the chief na.tion of 
the Orient. . 
Q!Jt'l?tt!i~ a! l'1oz;-l4 .\f.t,:r .1: loW• Atte:r the outb:tteak 
of hoatili ti~s, Japan. acting she claimed in consonance with 
the terms of the Anglo.o.Ja.pe:nese Alliance, .offered to come to 
-+---------,------'Gne---nhlba-----fH:.-\:l!'£'e-lau--.!1H~a-in.. In ~~rea if ~~~-'l.b--------­
tha"t Ja,pa,n oon:f'~ne he:r• f1,ght1ng to the sea; that is, attacks 
upon armed G:erma.n me~hantmen in Pacific wa.tera. 2 Japan, 
--2---·--------~. ------------------------- ------------------------c----~-------------------:m. T. W~.lliaxllat ~. }:'e@t~tdf!:X ~ '11$2d!!J£ New Yorlu 





bo'l.;l'eV<H'I refused to so :restr1,ct. h~r opera;t1Qns if she 
'G.l'ltered the. war ~t all; f:or the eyes. of the ·Japanese mil1ta• 
riti'ts were upon Tsingtao •. '~ea.lthy city .a!)d s·trt=t,tegio. for-.. 
tress on the Ohinese mainland, togeth$1" wi,th Kie,oehow. a. 
terri tol,"y of one hundred ana ninety-. three square miles and 
. an impo:rtan·t center of trade sa. wall as the gateway to 
historic Bhanttme; Province, one, of the richest f;ltates in 
Ohlne .• 3 1\lese wero the terri tori as that had been lea.sed by 
the Germans during the heo.tic years when ChirHl was oonaid,.. 
ered a plum tor Well!tern iqlperis.l:tsnh 
Great 13:ri tain was in a dilemma. AQcording to the 
terms of the Anglo-Japanese Pa.ot~ o.f 1902, which had 'been 
reaffirmed in 1911, e:l'the1~ of tha countries wa.s supposed to 
ootnEl to the aid of the other in case· of an attack 'by more 
than one po'lrrer, D:rita:tu. bad been attaclted by. more than one 
pcrwer and now Japan -rt~e,$ offel:'ing to come to her·tM':lSiats,noe;• 
not for th~ pU:rpOSt;) Of living Up to the tertna of. tbe treaty; 
but for furthering her own mil:t te.ristic ar1d impe:r;te.listio 
+------!(l~Ha-..--~~~n.fiJ--'c~,~,U*"d . .~.--1n;.&\o~t.._· -¥t>~ran~at.l-i.n.....t'b.e-'t>;ar bu-t,~d .. 1u.d~nu .. o~.J.-·.u-t --------
l~ 
know how to keep her out• 
'~··· p. 498. 
4:o:r~ Stanley Ho. rnbeek, 9Ql;l~~J9:QQJ7$-X:l ?;g*i ~!~s 111· £he 
s (New York~ D. Appleton""O$ntu:ry Company, 928T, 
ln th$ fine,l analya1e, Ja.pan decided to e.ct upon her 
own aocotmt; and on August" ·15, 1914, abe issued an ults.matum 
to Germ~my df!mamUng comP,lete wi thdrawa.l by Germa.ny from her 
poesaasions in the l?acif1e.5 . Rece1 "'~ng no reply Japan 
declared wa.r againf!lt C}ermany on August 23 and immediately 
oommenoed operaM.one e.gainet the Germany. lea.eed territory of 
[iaochow a.nd against the surround1.ng Ch~.nese terri tory. He~ 
the m111 t.e.riets were t:t:"eading upon d.e:ngeroue ground.. !hey 
wanted to move ahead rapidly and felt tbe.t they had a good 
ohe:noe in suocEHld,.ng in their objectives beca~ee of the fact 
the,t the reH~t of the ,.,orld was embroiled in the eonflagra;.. 
t.ion in Europe. Yet, there was a. need for basi tanoy :;md 
caution lest the ent~.re Je.pa.neae scheme· for the ultimate 
control of China be reeogn1zed. 
In her ~1 t:lmatum to Garmany on A\.1gu st 1.5, Japan had 
demtmded tha.t Germany deli Vet' to her the lEH'),sed. terl:-1 tor'Y . 
•*llliqll1 t .. 
S~e:re is quite a difference of opinion on this 
matter. Dr .. Gilbert Reid in his vl;u::.: ii!tl, C~~tv~ 9.£ 
ree (Ntlw Yor~ees11 ~ . .. · .. · U---t.O--s.Ome·-------~ 
pa.i.na in a.n effort to show that Jape.n entered the war at the 
request of Grea,t Britain quoting as authority for hi.s 
statements a. rather formlae.ble array of taetlmony almost 
. ·. . . . . • 5 CO!lCUl" With 
r----~t=h-=e~~v~1~e~so:f rofeaaor 1 liama. e ~te-.te~m~ant.-a--o-f ------------~ 
ent1.raly Ja.panese in origin., ProftH.iH~or E. 1\ Williams. on 
the other hand,· in hie q~1na ~eeter~e.z ina :Codfl¥ 11 p., 498, 
s&ye that Je.pan offe:rad . o come to the aseit!!t~lnce ot G:reat 
Bri tai:n, but that' th~ 'la.tter declined the offer, whereupon 
Ja.pan undertook to e.ot ind.epen.dently. Dr. St~1nley Hornbeck• 
ont m orar J!.gl'~*oelJl ~!Jea ~. Ea t, P• 286. a:nd J>a.ul s. 
Professor Williams and Dr. Hornbeck are based upon incon ... 





of K1aoohow nwi th a view to the eventual restoration of the 
same to Obina"; and on the da.;v tha.t this ultimatum was 
delivered.- Count Iltuma, Premier of Japan, in s, telegro,m to 
the American press had said: 
Japan's proximity to Ohine, breeds many absurd 
rumors; but I declare that Japan acts w1 th a. clear 
conscience in conformity with justice, and in perfect 
accord w1 th her ally. Japan has no territorial 
ambitions and hopee ~o stand a.s the protector of the 
peace in the Orient. -
Thus spoke the Premier of Japan, the spokesman of the · 
" .. , ' ·' 
militarists. Later, in a message sent to the New Y,grt 
Independent, l?rem1er Ikuma declared: 
It :te my desire to convince your people of the 
sincerity of m;r government and of my people in all 
their utterances and a.aeura.nces •••• This Far 
Eastern ei tuation 1e not of' our seeking. • • • I 
have ree.d w:l th adm1re,tion the lofty message of 
President Wilson to his people on the subject of 
neutra.li ty. • • • As Prem1eJ:- of Japan I have 
stated, and I now again state, to the people of 
America and of the world, that Japan has no 
ulterior motive, no desire to eeoure more terri• 
tory~ no thought of d.epriv1ng China or any other 
peoples of anything which they no\>t possess • • • 
My government and my people have given their word and 
their• pledge • which will be as honorably kept as 
Japan always keeps prom1ses.7 
The whole thing now seems grimly humorous in the 
light of Japan • s sublequent depredations. but it. served the 
purpose of th~ militarist clique by lulling the nations of 
7 Quoted in Close, SU'l• .s.J:! .. 9 pp. 10:3 ... 104. 
the West into. a false sensa of security while the secret 
plans of th$ \'l'ar-lords were put into effect,. 
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Weaks passed. Tej.ngtao had been ta,ken; German control 
had been wholJy eliminated from the leasehold a.nd the rail• 
way. China waited, expecting that Japan would at least 
eva,ouate the parte of Sha.ntung which she had occupied out• 
side of the German area; but Japan save no indication of any 
move in that direction. F'inally, on Januray 7 • 1915 1 almost 
two months after Tsingtao had fallen, the Chinese. Government 
off'ic1a1.1y notified Japan, that, inasmuch as the mili ta:ry 
neoeesity no longer existed, the zone of belligerency in 
. . 
Shantung waa abolished; and she requested tha.t all J'apa.nese 
8 troops be w:t thclra,wn into the Kia.ochow area.. this Jape;n 
stigmatized as an unfriendly act. Not under ~ny circum• 
stance, she declared w1 th \-Tell-affected umb:re,ge, would she 
acquiesce in euob a request. Japanese troops- she asserted 
d$f1antly 11 would oon~lnue to move freely in Chinese terri• 
to:ry.,9 It must 'be remembered t.bat thiS he.ppenad lese than 
~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e lor~~Y------~--~ 
statements pledging Ja:pan to honor e.nd uphold the 1nteg:r1 ty 
and sovereignty of China; a pledge which we,s to be 
*'honox-ably ltept a.s Japa.n always keeps promisee. u 




k ~ntz-~ .~m~Hl~f!t l~,l~. Immediately follo1dng 
the braz~n affront to Oh1na1 s' sovereign rights described 
above came Ja,pan • e notorious Tt>~enty .... one Peme,nd:l! for oert,e,1n 
privileges which, if granted, t-toulc1 have r·educad Obina to 
the poei tion of an economic and adm:tnietra ti v·e protectorate 
of Japan. 1besa demand$ comprised a most astounding d1plo .... 
ma.tic communication and have been characterized by more than 
one eminent poli tioe,l wri tar as a more vicious assault upon 
Chinese sovereignty than was Austria's ultimatum in 1914 
t~pon the. sovereignty of Serb1a. 10 Astonishing also was the 
fact that, contrary to esta,blishad diplomatic usage. these 
deme;nds were presented not to the Minister of F'oreign 
Affairs but directly to 'the Presid<!mt of China by the 
Ja.p(Ules~ Minister Hioki, who enjoined upon him the utmost 
aeereoy •11 Their prer:.n~nt~1,ti'm waa aceompa.nied by verbal 
demands for prompt acoepta,noe and by threats of dire oonae,.. 
quenoes to President Yua.n 5bih•ka1, the governmentp and. the 
na.t:lon' should the matter become lmm·m to the world. 12 
-r------.t."-t::J-M:.ne'-'f'mA-t'1~---'ITr'~-----'tt1~l'l~t wrltt~Hl on the stationary of th-e-----'----
Japanese Foreign Office but upon J'~a,pa.nese t-lar Office. paper" 
10L. A. Lyall, 2b~.n~ (New Yorks The Macmillan 





we.termarked with machine guns and be.ttleehipe, a bit of 
Jingaiam that the Japanese war-lords have never bothered to 
~xple.1n. 1~ 
1"he Twenty ... one ~roa:nde were divided. into five groupth 
The first group, consisting of four articles, covered 
Japa.n' e position in the Shantung Peninsula. and in effect 
would ha.ve converted that Chinese area into a Japanese bold• 
ing. The seven a.rticlee of the second group would h8.ve 
given ll1anchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. ~he status of 
Japanese preserves. Japa.neee sub.1ects would have been given 
special rights in these a.reas 11 and Oh:l.na would ha.ve been 
forced to consult Japan in the event tba:t other governments 
requeet.ed. :rail'ttTay or fina.noial privileges in these areas. 
The two at•ticlee of group three covered cert~ain Japanese 
mining holdings 1.n China. Group four, a eingle article, was 
del\31gned ''with object of. effectively preeerv1ng the terri to-
rial integrity of China." China was to agree not to cede or 
lease to any other power any harbors or any 1 eland a e.long 
.. e d.eaigned .to prevent any 
o t.her t'l9.tion from challenging Ja.pe.nt s paramount poei t1on in 
Ohim.a.14 The f'ifth and final group. of seven articles 'ITould 
l31W· If P • 218 • 
14· 
··-·- - -· ---· '" --. --• ' '·-· ·--
(New York: Century 
have placed influential Japanese in the Chinese government 
' ' 
as po:t.1 tical, financial, and m.il1 tary adv:ts@ra,; given 
Japanese hospi ts.la, temples, and s.ohool.a thEf right to own 
land in the inta;rio.r of Chin~; placed ~Tapanaee in• v1:rttual 
'control of the Chinese police system; given Japan a.ont:rol 
ove:r Chinese arme,ments; granted Japan the :right to construct 
certain rail1trays :ln Ohina; placed Japan in a position to 
veto the pa.rt1o1pat1.on of foreign cap1 tal in the development 
of Fukietl province; and given Japaneae the :ri~-:;ht to preach· 
in China., The last a.:rtieles were so bare•faoecl in their 
1.nfringement on Ohi.nese sovereignty that the Japanese 
evantua.lly. att~mptad to deny· tha.t they repreaftHlted anything 
mora than ,rapanese ttwi ehe a. nl5 
Contrary to Japa.nese 1natructions, the news or these 
demands vrae not kept secret. Information lealted out, and 
world opinion was so greatly aroused that the Japanese 
m1l1 tariets were forced to baek down on their claims. 
Although the war-lords did retreat, they d:td not give up 
$. Some, in fact~ were eg:raed to by 
China in two treaties: that of May 1915, :respectins 
Sha.ntung, and another signed concurrently respecting 
Ja.panese rights in South .M:anaht~ria. Under the first treaty 
China agreed to 8.b1da by e,ny agreement made by J~pan and 
---"1"· -----·-........... __ ,,.... . 1 .... 1 ~-·-··· 
;o 
Germany regardin6 Shantung. The second treaty gave Japatlase 
stl'bJ$ats <'Hill"ta .. in rights. ~.n Sou.th Manchuria and more limited 
ones in Inner Mongol:ta. In notes accompanying the a.bove 
tre.!tties, th~ Chinese governm$nt as:reed to give preference to 
Je;pe,nese subjects •in the employment of advisers, to. consult 
. with the Japanese government Lf' :tt proposed to negotiate· 
certain loe;ns involving South Ma.nchux-1a. and. Irmet- Mongol~.a., 
and to keep foreigners and foreign cap1 tal· out of Fuld.en · 
Prov~.nee. !n return!) Japan e.greed· to turn back to China the 
Kiaoohm·I l..eased Territory provided that the Chinese. govern• 
ment. msJm epecia.l ooncesslons :regarding 1 t. 
Although the m111 te.riets were foiled :l.n their attempt 
tt., take ove:r ChixlD. completely, progress had been made which 
enht:moed t.hair. already eoti\,r:l.ne; prestige.. They could afford 
to 'ti"t:~.1 t. 
The end of i.'lorld 'V'lar I 11aw Japan recognized as one of 
the five Great Power.$,. During the wa.r ehe had tremendously 
expa.nded her possessions 1-tith small loss o:f' life. Secret 
es drawn up cltl:ring the war ·1.d tb the. A,llj ad nat.ione 
allowed heX' to keep her· newly eatabliehed poai tion in 
Sha,ntung province a~ well ae the extension of her rights in 
South Mant,huria. These p:rov1s1.ons were wr1 tten into the 
Treaty ofVersaillee.16 In addition to this. the German 
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i sla.nds north of t.he eque.tor were aWtll"d.ad to J a.pan as ·a 
Class C ma.nd.ate .under the Lee,gue of Nations., This was the 
type of manda.te that bordered qpon being outright annex-
at1.on, and t,he 1n:tli ta.rists m~.o.e good use of this clasAifica .... 
. tion. 
Peace saw Japa.n and her ml11 ta:riate reigning supreme 
over Asia. From Mongolia in the north to tho tropical isl~a 
in the south~ tha blazins sun of the F41kado waved over all. 
tmi ~ !a ~! ls V,l:r;; l2.~~~;t;t~l. Soon ~lfter the 
end oi' ~1orld "TaJ:• !, tb~ Japane-se m1litar3.sts found thetr 
preat1.ge declining. The main reason for th1.s lo\-re:rine; of the 
prestige of the Army "'a.s the univeraal movement fo;t> pea.cll:l, a 
movement that seems to occur at the end of all grea.t con• 
flicts, l?eople the world over we:re engaged in 1JT1shful 
thinking tqhioh waa ao '~ell expressed in the slogan nwar to 
d tt en wars. Even the people of ~re:pan ha>1led the doctrines o:t 
pee.ce. The mili tar1.nta '\<iere a.t. a loss ae to holit to combat 
the srow1ng sense of :raslstanee 1;o force a.e a means of· 
+------...,__.,.'-"-"'~e-----c ....... S.._P"""p!!"'t-+-~t .... a"-"' s.,_, • .___.,..The-war-J Ol;'<l,s d' d not chane~,.._e_;l,....r..,._l_t""'h""'e.._.. ~ .... r._ ______ _ 
feelings, however. Th~y referred to this period as one of 
"deoad.ent sentiment nurtured by the pr.ospel."i ty o:f' war, 
fusing td tb liberal thought. nl7 
i 
Du:r:tng this period, th~ m111.tarie,te bee;e.n to autt·e~ 
. the:tr firet r.eversa,ls since their moder¥1 inception during 
the Me1.1i Restoration~ First, the:re wa.s the fJ;l.ilura or the 
Sibert an Intervention in "rh1ch Ja.pan was repul t'!Erd ln 1 te · 
e.ttempt to ta.ke over a portion of Rueaian Siberia~. Then 
there 'tf1aa the \•lashing ton l?eaee Conference of 1921'""1922. The 
Conference mat to solve those problema in the F'e,r East that 
mignt, lead to wo.r. The Japanese dalega.t1<:H! to the Conference 
accepted, a. 5 ... 5 ... ~ nava.l ratio wh:toh gave G·reat Britain a11d 
the IJn:l ted Ste.tes a na:va.l atrenesth o:f 5 t.o :3 for Japan.. The 
m111 tarists were vehamtant 1.11 the:tt~ denunciation of the trea.;, 
ty, 'but i.t was approved ova~\ their protests. In addition, 
Je,pan pledged to ret.urn to Oh,.na the province of Shantung, 
which had bean taken f:rom Ge:rrne.ny after 'vo:rld 1tlar. I.;18 This 
eegmemt of the pact in:f'uriated the mili ta.:r:tets, but the wish 
for peace '"as eo st:t"ong throughout the 'tiTOrld that the we.r-
lorde were fot'ced ·to aaced.a ~· 
In 1928 Jape.n signed the KErllog·<Brinnd PeacE! Pa.ct, 
outJ awed ~ta.r as a means of nationa.l nol:tcy,. Aga.:tn ·. 
her ~:tplomatn aroused the ire of the mil:t tnr:tsta but to no 
a:vail., The clique fE:llt the.t Japan should have insisted upon 
the same right as that given to Great Br:t ta.il1t th~t is, 
Japan should h~lve dama.nded apeci:fied freedom of action in 
~·-")f.4if4WJ".-1j1 ~-,. w:w. ~w·~·- IIi lfo.11• ~ ·~"------------- --------------------------
· her aphe!'ftls o:f inflttenoe, However, the diplomats did ·not 
feel thfit this wao neoeese.r; to. the future of Japan. l9 
While the Japanese diplomate had Signed these ve,rious 
treaties and ag:reemente which would have done mt~ch to ineu1"6 
the peace of the "'orld if they had been observao .• the 
Je..panese war cltque continued to speculate on the· doctrine 
of hakto,, l!J,Q~ta and. to ma.ke plans for 1 te aocomplishmer.rt), 
.one of these plane oe.me to the fore du:ri11g the one period of 
dominat,1on that the mill ta.riste had in governmenta.l aff&;ire 
t during the 1920 s. This avant occurred during the pr$m~.er• 
ship of Baron Iohiro Tana.ka and i e known as the Tanaka 
Memor1a.1,. 
~i I!r!!'!Ul M!mqr.ttl ; l2.tt· Toda.y, the Tanaka 
Memoria.l. 1$ rege"tl"ded as the bluept>1nt followed by the 
t1apaneae in thei:r attempt to bring the eight oornare of the 
world under one roof. At the time of 1 ts publicatie>n, how• 
evar11 very :tev1 people placed any eredenoe in 1 ts sta.tements. 
It we.fl! not until the chance disclosure s.nd publica"' 
+---------'l'o'l:-ffl'l-11"l-'F-----'¥Tl"ltie"~-. --'lff'-1. BHI.Il'lflf'OH:UHii!~c-. -NJM&merie.l wh i oh B~n-'P.Maka pre.sen-t&d--t,e·-------
the Emperor tha.t the attention of the world was drawn to 
Jrrpan' s grano1.oae dreams. Baron Tanaka, who had become 
premier as the leader of the a.e;gres.eive Se:l.yukai Pa.rty, aent 
his Memorial to the Emperor on July 25, 1927. It he,d been 
prepared following a confet'ence in Mukden which was attended 
by all the civil and military officials of Manchuria and 
Mongolie.. Fo:r eleven d~;~.y"s.:. the conference discussed Jape.nese 
policies in these two ooun·triee• Some months later the 
Memorial was published by Chinese publicists with the expla-
nation the.t a copy had oome into their ha:.nds. Though 1 ta 
contents caused a grea.t deal of surprise to those who were 
Unfamiliar w1 th the history of the Far East, 1 t did not 
contain anything not advooa.ted. by the m111 tariste for 
yEHtrs. 20 
The ple.n laid down 1n the Ta.naka. Memorial by which 
Japan would first conquer Manchuria, then China, then the 
Philippines and Southaa.st Asia and aP.Joining terri to~y ira 
well known e.nd need not be discueeed in d.etail here" What 
is important. however, is the Je.paneee frame of mind ths,t 
would permit the militarists to embark upon a course of con• 
quest which had been laid bare before the eyes of the enti~ 
world. The rele~se of the Memo~ial showed that while the 
+---------~~~~~~~-Japan-talkad-peaoe the l~~orce prepar=e~d~f~o~r~--------~---
20ea.:rl orot"• 4,'maan~~ ~ea,~l.Q!. V(qrlS}~nrs~re; J~~ 
'J;'&ne.k~ Mqms~:~a; (New York: Harpt!!r and :Brothers, i94l • P• 18. 
The a.uthot- soae into detail to show how the Tanaka Memorial 
was s1mpl:y a restatement of many of the beliefs of prominent 
. . . . • . ple te tienct 
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'l'he Tanaka t•1emol:'1al w·as the sole exception to the 
steady decrease in p:t<est:tge of Jape.n' s mill ta.ry clique dur-
ing the 1920' e. Army influence continued at ~- lo\\r ebb 
I 
during most of this period. Other !oroea were cbeok1ng, 
temporarily, the tra.di t1.onal potrer of the army. The old 
powE:iil:'ful ola:n lea.dere of the Oamp t'lho aa.rliel." he.d moulded 
govemment policies ''lere e:l. thar dead o:r talt1ng a lese aetive 
role in domestic and foreign fJlff'aii"s. 
Aa has been mentioned b:t"1e:f'ly 11 Jape.n W'ae swept by the 
post ... war surge of democracy and. peace.. 'l'hi s waa made doubly 
evident in 1918 when Ta.lta.sh:t Ha.ra 11 p:raaldent of th~ Se1yuke.1 
Party; eeta.blished thE3 first true uni ... pa:rty Oab:!n.et in 
Ja.pan•a recent histo:ry. True, there were many CabinetA~H but 
none ruled accord.ing to the Englieh principle of :r.aspon~d ... 
biltty to the :Pa-rliament. During the ao• s the:t'e were to be 
six one~party Cabinets in aucceaa1on. 21 To many, the nation 
appeared on the verge of. e.n era of responsible government, a 
government in whloh the milittary would occupy a proportion• 
fluent1al poai"-"'t"""i,.,_on .... _·_.__. 2_2 ________________ _:_ __ 
21F • R. Dulles, f,q:t:t:l Ylat*1 £lt 4ttHS!i;\<H&11·~a.~fl:qes& 
!li.~l;\~a:Qt)! (Boston* Houghton""M1 flin Company 11 19~i~, p. 184. 
22~. • p;t · 181. The author goea to some length to 
ehow the r!"Bi of the demoore,tio spirit within Japanese 
polities fll.tld how this spirit r.aad.e itself felt 1n govern~ 
• _ one for 1.ts 
f




'J.'ll~ f:11.neEri to Oa.oinej ,2!.12i2: Mos1i f.!£er~l .2Jl 
JS.]illl!Je~~. f'l~,~~Prl• In 1929 the Mi.naei to O~binet ·took office. 
This we.e the strongest. and moat ·liberal pa,rty government to 
'hold offio$. in Japanese h1!11tory. . It ea.me. the nee.reet to 
es:tab:i.ishing.demooraey in. Nippon •. It also.had to meet the 
first onslaught of the military forces. In the story of 
Japan r e poli tiee,l d.eveloJ?ment, 1 t thus rep:r<esents a. eri tical 
turning point of unusual signifioa.noe. :23 
The Minsei to Cabinet ''~as liberal but by no means 
radioa.l~ It was, 11';1 rea.li ty • a government of big business. 
Its liberalism stood out mainly .in 1 ts modera,te foreign 
' 
ptilioy, whieh contrasted sharply with BfA,ron Tanaka.' e 
••posi tive policy... A d.1.ecussion of the Cabinet's liberalism 
is included ln the aeot:ton of this pa.p$r devoted t9 the 
la&b~~SUh and 1 t takes away some of the luster of the moder-
ate policy. 'l'here .is no doubt, however, that the M1nseito 
. . . 
Cabinet we.s opposed to war unless all other means failed. 
,-
1 
The M1nseito Cabinet was made up of distinguished 
-+------------,l-e-a-4ers .• Amons them mare H$.maguohi, the l?rem1En:• ;--Sb11iaha-ra-, __ ·. ---~-­
the Foreign Minister; e.nd :rnouyell tbe Minister of Fina.noe. 
The Oa.binet labored. bo\..rever; under a. fe.tal handicap, 
f:}imilB.r to the.t which oonfron~ed President Hoover in our own 
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country; f'or it er.ttered ottioe in July • 19291 at the height 
of the post ... 11rar boom. The Wa,ll Street crash and. the $pread .... 
ing world depression followed immediately. The sctlfift change 
in eoorJomic co11di ti ons during l t.s p~n:·iod in office had. much 
to dn .wi tb the final overthrow of tht& Minse1 to Cabinet. 
Hamaguoh1 and his Cabinet aides began with a g~eat 
victory on the issue of the tQndon Naval Treaty of 1930. 
This treaty $Xtended limitations to oruiaers and destroyers 
a.s well as to oe,pi tal ships • The Army and Navy lee.de:r!\1 
opposed it e.nd opposed. 1 t bitterly. '!'he people and the press 
supported the Cabinet • s fight for 1 t. On October l, · 19;30, 
the Privy Council ra.tified the t:reaty. The Cabinet and the 
paoplE)i! it aeetnE1d, had wo11.; 
:It a.ppea.:red that the Army and Navy were finally under 
eontt>ol. . This was, 1 t transpires, just an illusion. The 
wax--lords kept to their suns e.nd preached tbe ooot:rines that 
had he.unted Ja.pa.n for yee.ra l h~}qjo 1Qij•t&• l)1u!Q19.Q, k,gdq• 
and the mi sa1.on of' Japan to rule the world (I The depression 
+-------wa!.l3--±n---+.-l~.-----aw.!ne;, anG-----the-----l.-!-b~O-lio-1--e--B--O:f-th~l!«ins, ... a.1t-'*'oiJ--'----~-­
Gabinet were not 1noreae1ns tra.de or shortening the ric~ 
lines. The m111tatoy pointed to th0i:r periods of control and 
bos.sted with pride of' the booming facto:r·iaa, increased 
exports, h1ghe:r starHlard of living, and better economy that 
i 
In. 19'30 Pr.9mier Hamaguohi wa.s s};lot by, an assassin who 
wa.e apona'?red. by the, milita,cy * W:t th him d~.ed demooratio 
sovernmsnt 1.n Japan. The wa.l'\-lords had sqrved notice that 
anyone who stood 1n thai r "~:fay or opposed tb~m would be elim• 
inatea. Damooraoy in Japan was dead; &nd th$ war-lord~ 
danQed their dana$ of death ovsr the p~oatrate :t•orm ot 
rep~eaentattve gove:rmnant. 1J!he mili tariets once age.1n ~on• 






The word J!ib(?.jf!lr! means nmoneyed sroup, n It gener-
ally raters to the :Sig Four f'ina.noial combil1tHl of Ja.patH 
Mi tsu1. M1 tsubishi, Sum1tomo, e:.nd. Yasuda. Howe'\fer, it is 
also used to include. the other· la.rs~ trusts and combines in 
Ja.pe,n e.e \fell,.· 
In Japan the ~~~b~!sy represented a conoent~ation of 
financia-l and economic power which wa.tll unpare..lleled anywhere 
else .. in the world. 1 '.l.'h.e relative pos1 tion of the l'U. tsui and 
M1 ts~H>ishi concerns in the life of Japan was so important 
that., -Qomp~1::r·eH1 to them. the role pls.yeQ. by organizations 
. Q 
like du Pont e.no. Standard 011 seem small,~ These vast, 
monopolistic enterprises dominated the financial, indus• 
trial, ancl ~ommarc1al.lif'e o:f Japan. 3 Most experts agree 
that the B1g Four controlled more than one third of the 
total deposits 1n priva.ta 'be:nks- seventy per cent of tb$ 
+-------Q~~Hi!--a..-\i{-]i----l.n-~.!.---=iLH;!\~i--CJ:.omYa:n.; iJAe;}t· all._ ,.---and-o-nELt~~~----------,--­
fore1gn trade of Japarlt 'l'heae mammoth oombinea also 
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dominated the stra.tee;io sections of . ind~et~ 11 with control• 
ling amount a of ca.pi. tal :tnVf:HJted in. ah3:pp:t~s. shipbuilding, 
aviation, engineering• mining, metal wanufaQtur~, ~nd 
othera. l3tDoatH~e of their int.er ... +oc:lking. ootrtro:t over bank· 
1ng11 industry, and commerce, the ~~~~s.~SM were able to 
exEu•oie$ indirect control over many smaller banks 0 indUS• 
tries~ and trading enterprises in addition to those which 
. 4 
they operated directly. . Beee.uee of the financial pressure .. 
they were a.ble to exert on the government, they were in a 
pos1 t1on; not only tQ infll~enoe the government • s industrial 
.polie1~.u;t 1 but a.lso to· secure subata.ntial subs:td:tes 11 fiscal 
protection. and .. profitable war oontl:'acts •... How did the 
.. it&'tua:trua ms.ne,ge to gain anQ. oonsolidate such a. grip on the 
·. eoonomy of Japan, and to what extent did they collaborate 
with or oppose t.he militarists in their aims? 
§!~tsra: .Q.t !h,e la~f>~l':I!?H• Japan's mod.$:rn business 
ord.er matured under historioal ciroumstanoas giving it a. 
special oharactel:', different in many respects from l!featern 
in the faot that J:a an 
4Thottuas A. Bisson 11 ~pan•.~ War foongm¥ (New· Yol'kl 
Illt(u•na.tional Sacl~ate,rit:tt, ~iist1 tute o Pacific Relations,. 
194$), p. 35. M~. J:Ueaon is recognized as one of the fora~ 
moat· authorities on Japanese economy, particularly the 
_ _ • · e of hie. 
mater a e-botfi--Tn-tllla wor-J.t--ana--fftner-works--wnioh-wilt--be-
listad in la\ter footnot$s. 
61 
wh$%-eas · the West. has experhHl(Hr;;<t the long atru(t:gle o:t' ·a 
e;row1ng middle class, first to throw off government· fetters 
on· its freedom of economic action ttnd tht'm to ta.k~. over 
go·vernmEnl·t a.nd remol·d 1 t in a d~mooratic fra!ll$'tTOl"k. What 
'bulks· so large in the 'vest ill missing or et1re.ne;ely d.lstorted 
in Japa11.5 
Japanese oa1)1 ts.li~m wae a lata product, t:ttnergintJ 
d.ir~ctl;r from a faudal. society tha.t suffered dissolUtion 
only 1n the 1870's. It had 1 ts rocrts in feudalism and was 
formed while the influence o:t' tha feudal society i:rae etill 
strong •. It rested, moreover, on a relatively weak t:md 
vulnerable· eoonom.1o foundation of' natione,l resources, tech• 
nioa.l dev~lopment, and. world markets. Japan • s mod.$.:rn 
business life, as represented by the ,l§,b,~~!Y system, was 
therefore adjusted to a special background, in which feudal 
customs SJtill pr$V$.1led. .In these co:ndi tiona, new forms and 
pt•aot:tces t-1e-ra appropriatEsdJ indiVidualism least of 8,11., 
The reascn':le.ble~ese of pr1 vi,l¢ged status t\Ta.s no less implioi t 
ec(iss;tty for autoot'at1o power. It was natural 
tha:t. the .I!~Bfl;j!~ cottibi.nE'Hlt a:J.ong witll .. Japan's newly 
adopted il'lt!lti tutional oha,ngaa in geners.1. should display 
both :features. 
____ . ~- ----~------ • . . . . .· . . . evelopml@e'l1n~t,.'!!...' ------~--
t-----c--- .t'f!tzWl (Ithaca. a oornelf--un1v~-rsfty--P-ress,--:c95UT;---P~--74.--- ---- -- -- --
We a.ra all famil:tar wi ·th ·the development of industry 
in .IL"u1~pe a:t the beginning o.f' the Gignteerrtb century. By 
comparison, Je.pan as recently a$ the e~rly nineteenth can• 
tul:'y remained in a stage of eoonom:lo development hr.1.rdly more 
adve.nced than tha.t of lfaete:rn Europe in the l~~.te Midd.le 
Agell. 6 Of b$l" ·t.wenty..-eiglrt t~ thirty million people, the 
overwhelming tt'J$;j<:.a•i ty were unfree, poverty .... stricken pea.s• 
a.nta. They lived mot:rtly in sal:r..-aufficient rural Villages • 
. 1-?he foundation o:r the economy and chief aouroe of wealth was 
the <rt.1lt1'vation of rio$, oarried (Jn by primitive methods 
little change<l over the oo.nturies. 
This ag:r>$.rian base supported S.ll aristocratic <ruling 
hiera~ehy of some 270 territorial lord~ ot\ p.a~l!J~9. and the 
·wa:r•;r1o:r ola~a or L~!4Pit&. The fo:t'trle:r had l.ong held feudal 
away 1n their territorial fiefs, while acknowledging nominal 
alleg1anoe to the Emperor in lf:yoto. Si11oe 1603, however, 
they had. been actually und.er the dom1ntUlC.Hi~ of one of th~ 
s~eat military families. the ~okugawa elan at Edo, now 
+-------Gi~~~~.. Some forty p(-:;r cent o;r more of the peasants' 
produce waa annually appropriated by the ~~!~~Q. and the 
!hru:ma for tbe auppo.:rt of themselves and e. vast army . of 
. 7 
~assals and :retainers numbering upward$ of two million, 
+-----------
'!'he remainder barely su:f't'ieed.. to sustai:n the population at 
1 ts existing level. . .An ea.:rl.ier growth in :numbers a.:Msocd.&,ted 
'd th an ex};)ansion of' the oul tive.ted. area. in the a~V$:nteenth 
ceritu:ey had. been ar:rentad despite the pera1stenct9 of h~.gb 
' 8 
fert111 ty pa.tterne. Therea.fter a. preoe,r.1ot~s eQ.U111br1 um . 
between population a.n(l. food supply ~tla.s mainta~ned on~y by 
fami.ne, disease~ abort5~on, 1nfe.nM.eid.e,. 1.-e!l', by Qs~ of all 
the Malthusian checks save wa:r: and th1s was :resorted to 
before too long. 
Aooompe.nying t~he. growth of ci ti.es in the seventeenth 
and. eighteenth aentUrifi:le fU'ld toetered by the pea.oe and. unity 
of Tokttgfl\'ttl rule, was a. oonoiderable r.teveloptrHiH1t of manufac...: 
tt~ring. m:tning, o.nd lnterr~glonal tra.de. The .home industry 
of farn households came· to be eupplementaa by twrkshop 
productton organi. zed und.er clan. monopolies or craft gu:tlds. 
But 1nduetr1.e.1 out •.put, continued to be essentially h~.nd1c~aft 
in oba.racte:r11 and the artisans and. trs.d.esmen remained an 
interior class wi thot1t :poli tioA.l r1e;hte or social sta,tus. 
Manufactur:tn , waa dis ersEh'i throu h rural v,.lla $S or con• · 
oent.rated in aa.stle tmms and centers like Edo and Osaka 
where the wants of t.he aristocrats were met. Trade was 
predominantly a movement o:f rioe from country to city,. 
moetly in payment of feudal dues~ There was only limited 
.'1:1·· .r: .1-..~· 
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exchange of industrial products. Mainly these were luxury 
i terns. Commerce remained crippled by complete bane on 
toreisn intercourse that was one of the trademarks of the 
f'gkusawg. S!los~!l~~~· Through strict control over travel and 
tre.de as '\vall as over freedom of oocupa.tion and ente:rprise 11 
the Tokugawe. regime sought to suppress the gro~rth of any new 
foroes which might threa.ten the f'eudal•agra.rian foundations 
of the state. 
"This late feuda.lism, •• wri.tes E. Harbert Norman, 
-
":represents one of the momt conscious attempts in history to 
freeze aooiety in a rigid h1erarchioe,l mold. n9 11gnif1· 
oantly, neverthel~HIS; 1 t se~ed. only to stunt and not to 
stifle the advances in technology arid commerce which had 
received their first sharp impulse in the turbulent 
f'itteenth and sixteenth centuries. All"$ady 11 by 1750 and 
even ea,rlier, the institutions of agrario,n feudalism had 
been hea:v:tly qualified., The economic d.ieorder of the next 
one hundred years 1 teelf testifies to this fa,et. Much of 
e diffi oulty oa,n be----a.~-te-d-&!mply'---t-Q-th~~tne~s.s--toHf.----· ---~-­
an archaic military dictatorship in dealing with the result ... 
ing problema of population growth, currency. debt, and 
taxation. Only when Japan•s industrialization in the 
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twentieth century is seen as a projection of these.earlier 
· .tX>e.nds, now aoeeileratet;l. by .the. opening of the ~ountry to 
Western influence, can its speed and its technical. aoh.ieve-
mente be understood • 
. ',fher, g~ca,~ .21 :t;eyde.*3e~W• The modernization of Japan 
after 1868 has been 11k~med to the bursting of a. dam. It 
was the more violent because 1 t brought the relea,se of long 
pent•up forces. 
In part tt\ese p:t,'eeeuree we~e economic in ohe.ra.oter. 
The latter half of the Tokuga.wa. period, fro-q1 the ea.rly 
eighteenth o~ntury onw~,:rd, :resembled 1n certain respects the 
situation which has reeurred periodically in the long his-
tory of Japan and other Oriental countries • Consumption 
requirements expanded beyond the 1n~laet1c limite, of a back• 
ward and exp+o:l. ta.tive a.e;rarian socie·ty as a reE!ul t of 
population growth and the insatiable demands of a pa:ra.ei tic 
rt:tling cla.ee. 10 ~roduetion and distribution within the 
tradi tiona.l framework also became subject t<;> violent 
+---------~~~~nGaa~~ux~xrnm~~~~~~ruru~~~p~u=b~l1~o~------------~---­
f1r.t~.anoe • From 1750 on» the §)lQS!dDt\t wa.s in almoat constant 
finaneia.l difficulty, It eought escape by hea.vier te.xee, 
b,or)X)\dng, and disorderly deba.eements of the currency .11 
10 
•• • • -ro-.xrorru-Tffe-Ola:renaon P 
ll 
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in lesser degree this was true of many qa,±m~s who tr-ied in 
tu:rn to solve their pt'Oblems a.t the expense of the ;amY£~4 
and pea.aantlzy'. 1'h1 s time, bowevert- new and revolutionary 
forces were at work within the cotmtry. The tradi ti.ona.l 
1net1 tuti.ons ~f Japanese feu .. o.aliam were proe;resaively ttnae:r-
mined ~t. the foundations by the slow s~owth of commercial 
economy and. the rise o:f a new and ambitious class of 
tnet'ohants and townspeople. This new class was to form th$ 
nucleus of the ''*~~tiM• 
As in Europe, the old e0lf•oonta.ined. barter economy 
and the rigid patterns of· the class relations associated 
w1 th 1 t gt'adue.ll;y ox-umbled. under these meroe.nt:tle in:f'luences. 
The f!illlU~~~~ a. :rentier ctulta g became progressively impo'\Te:r""' 
1shed and in<:1ebted. to the merchants or S!bnn~n as t,hei:r rio$ 
. srtipenas p:roved 1nadeq\la.te to meet 1ncrea.sins money require.-
rnents. Attempts to extract l~1rger revenues from peasants 
only intensified the d.ifficult1es of the latter, who like ... 
wise found themselves exposed, to the 1neeou:ri ty of a growine; 
ey economy.. Ou:rr$ncy-4~me.:n-t-fmd.-cr-Qp--'V~a-UOO~a------·-",-: --
brougllt wide fluctuations in th~ price of rice 11 the one crop 
that was. the preoar1ous be,ae of the economy. 'l'o these 
unoe:rtaintiea t.he manipulations of merchant speculators 
----c---··-·--- -- - ·-----··---- --···· -------·---··-- ---·----·---·--·- - -·-·- ------ - ·------·--··------·-·-·--·-----·-- ----· -
further contributed, nol'r 1n.1ur!ng the fa.rme:r and no"r tbe 
city conauzner •. 12 
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~he c,nssig,i though expandi-ng their wealth and 1nflu• 
enea at the expense of the ~t.}fP.,lU:~L•· chafed under mul t1fa.:r-
1oue feudal reet;t-ictions· ()n in1tiativG and opportunity. 
These included restrictions on the. transfer of' land,. on 
foreign trade, on impflovemente in internal tra.nsport. s.nd on 
the manufacture of C(3rtain goods+ Most irksome was the 
eubordimite social status to which they \'lere' ccmfined by ·&n 
a.:rroga.nt military aristocracy. Prog:rEHHd.ve alene also sought 
to expand their revenues through promotion of new ma.nufac• 
turas and. of trade. Here dtveloped a new breading ground 
for me:rcanM.lj.st ambition. The energetic young J!.~m!araj­
buree,ucr$-ts who pioneered this development began to display 
a new spirit of capitalistic ente~~rise which could only 
f1nd full expression through a complete and definite break 
with the old regime. 
To the.se d1ff1ou1 ties and diaoontents were added· a 
+---------~~~-h~HM~~~atu~a~dieaete~~r;t~h~e-±l&.&trrt~e~r~~---------------­
Tokuga.wa years~~ The misery of the peasants in certain areas 
d.rove inct"'easing numbers . off tbEJ land in flight to the 












was reflected at the base 1n a ~eries of peasant rebel'"" 
;11ons.13 At the top th$re wa.$ a. stead.y deolir.te of the pcrwer 
of the ~bOS!if!ltal! and increasing defiance of 1 ts. author! ty by 
the more independEnlt clans,.· The whole process ctxlminated in 
a crisis of public fina.noe in the nineteenth century. 
Economic di soon tent wa.s reinforced in turn by other 
factors in the last decades of the Tokugawas. Soma were 
literary e.nd religious in character,. An intellectual ren-. 
a.issanoe led to a rediscovery of nat~ona.l trad.i tiona and a 
:revival of Shintoism, w1 tb 1 ts glorification of the }l;mperor 
whose traditional prerosa.tives had been usurped by the 
Qh2S!Ul~ It will be :remembered. that this same featurE!~ played 
an :tmpo:rtant pa.rt :tn th~ rise to dominance o:f the military. 
Effective power within the feudal clans now passed 
largely from thee control of the effete s~t!.!:'£R, tta1mleee 
nobodiEHi!u as w. E,. Griffia_oa.lls therp, into the hands of 
ablet .young ~m!!Yl7til.' of inferior rank. 14 By various mee.ns 
the ee men he,d steadily ~cqu1red. a growl ng knm'lledge of 
practical arts, and history. 
Through theme new learnings, coupled with expanding inter-
course with the Weat, the more fareishted individqals saw 
f'reah possibilities tor a national rejuvenat.ion under the 
aegis of the Emperor aa t<tell a.s new scope for pa:rso11al 
entef'prise and po,~er~ !~ora and mora 1 t seemed tha.t only 
th¥>ough such a course of a.ction waa nationa,l survival 
possible. The obstacle was the !lb!?.S!.U)!}~t,),. which nol'r .found 
:t tself caught bet-vrean the insistent dema.nds of the foreign 
pol'tera and the grmdng assertiveness of rebellious clans 
grouped around the throne. Unable to withstand the pressure 
1 t fell .• 
Po§~ ~~~tqrJ:...\121·• A0 ha.s been noted, in the 'l'okuga'llra 
era a Japanese third estate was developing strength within 
the feudal society and after a fashion asserting 1 tael:f. It 
had some leverage o:f ita own,. on occasion the 17~m~ra1 re• 
ta1nere or even their feudal lords might tremble before the 
economic power of this rising merchant el.a.sa. . Its leading '· 
rep'rea~mtativea, nevertheless, became eubor<'lina.te t:tsoal 
agents of· the .fdJl9iJAU~~t' not a rival center of pO't'{er setting 
15 itself counter to feudal absolutism, 
atments of the Restoration this 
pos1 tion was perpetuated with virtually no b:reak and an 
extre.ordina:cy smoothness of traJ:u.d. t1on. 10 P'or example, :tn 
-- -. 1611?~~-;--··-------·---··-·---·---··----· --------··- --- -·--·-··-·-----·-- -· ·-- -- --- -------- -----
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August, 1867~ the Mi teui hrjuse a.cted as agent of the 
SQQS_!antt'!(.! in the di atribution of . a new cu:r:rency issue; in 
October 1 t beca:me the chief quartermaster for t.be a.nti• 
~h~H?iU!J~t.e :forces. 'l'oltuga.i>~a. merchant families, the ee,me than 
aa at the time of the Manehtu•ian »zncident, •• joined by new 
~~.rggr~3; elem~nte tu:rrJed bualnesemen, clasped hands w1 th a 
' 
modernized dynastic a tate in 'tfhiob they pla,yed nn important 
but et1.11 subordinate role. Feudal ta.riff ba,:rrj.ars went 
down, le.nds became alienable, taxes were oentrali zed, :free-
dom' of qccupe:tion ~md movement established, e,nd mod$rn 
codes i.ntr<)duced. In short, all the basic requirements of a 
oe.pi talist order were m~t. All of the requirements, th$.t 
is, exe~pt equeJJ. ty ~.n governmental me.tters. 
Although the 1§!~1~~~ leaders toQk second place 
poli t1eally in the ao.rly Meiji period, their links with hie;h. 
gove!'nment officials, ae il:l Inouye Kaoru• a patronage of the 
Mitsui house or Okuma Sh1e;enobu ~ s of Mi t~n.l1)1 ehi, were 
17 I tightly forged~~ Through such intarple.y, the gro\<r1ng 
t---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_part, even if not.the domi-
~ant part, of the Japanese oligarchy and derived great 
advantages from the position so occupied. Government might 






with exchequer :tunctione in the collection a.nd ha.ndling of 
national mnd loov,l tax· mon¢ys. for r.u~ar•ly two decades. 18· It 
.could. confer other betlefi 1~s on th~ .oomb1nea but none so 
g:reat e.e this extraordinfu•y privilege of accens to cnpi tal 
11;'1 (An ere. of' bu~inese expansion, 1rhe government developed 
new factories or B(HlUired merchant vessels with state funds 
and then turned th$m over to the l!~;ba~e!a concerns along 
with some of Jt;tpan• s ri.ch~st mines, all at lo'!.>1 prices a.nd on 
' ' 19 easy tel:'ms~ if' not. as outright gift,s. F'rom early Meiji 
times. subsidies ~.nd other preference a were common; and they 
st;ea,dil;Y continued, ~nate power was being ttsed. in this way 
to make up for Ja.pan • a economic v:reaknese, end. the combine a 
from t,he outset held a poe1 tion that enabled them to banef'i t 
from the ~wts of the go·ve:rnmant. 1-'he benefits derived by 
the ~~~e~vfrl~ grew to such extl."emes tha,t . within fifty years 
from the l1:es~o:ration it was almost impossible to tell 
whe~her the government was granting subsidies to the com• 
binee or the combines war(~ gr~nting subsidies to the 
~ &n~·.~!ll BEf.S:l,Iaff,. ~ ll,fl;Ll\1 ~-~.. Between 189-, 
and 1919 e. marked. :tmp~tus 111 industrial expt::msion was 
afforded by two ware and prepa~ation for a third. The two 
wars that had been fought were brought to suooeaaful con• 
elusions. Both ware begun by the militarists with the 
blessings and sanctions of the Z§:tbS;tey.20 
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The conflict with China ( 1894·-95) produced an infla010 
tionary boom in Japanese \ctar industries, which oG.rried over 
into the latero years under the stimulus of oontin.uing arms 
expendi tura s. It also gave the nation and t)'le Je:il?P:tl!a the 
powe~ and prestige to resain Japan's tariff independence and 
won her an indemnity from China which went, almost in its 
entirety, to the 'a&bat~u for further expansion. 21 Customs 
autonomy made possible more effective protection of new 
industries, a.nd the Ohinese ind.emni ty provided her with a 
gold and sterling reserve with which she adopted the sold 
standard in 1897. Her public eredi t now solid1y estab-
lished, Japan pt>ooeeded to borrow hea..vily abroad to finance 
the purchase of arms, industrial equipment, and ma.terials 
for further induat,ria.l and military expansion. 
+-------------:lllil--'£rls-F---&H:e----.RruuHs3-Eefao-J--a;panua-\fa-H-l9~pa.ne-st'J----------,---­
industry bee;a,n to assume the basic pattern which was to 
characterize it for the next several decades. One branob 
comprised the metallurgical, engineering, and other 
20 
-~~'---------------------
industries. These 'l>~ere the industries essential. to mili taey 
strength; yet they war~ especially difficult to esta.bl:tsh i:n 
Japan baoauea of their hee;Vy capital X'equiraments and 
advanced technology. 22 
We see here the beginnings of the evil e.llianoe 
b$tween the ~a,!ba.~~!! and tho mili t~lry •. The military went 
into tbe:tr imperia.l:t stio wars w:t th China and Russia in order 
to promote their doctrine of bm:lfJ.tq, !Rh~!a· The ~~~l:>a!iE!W 
$noou:ragad them in these ventures in ord.er to build up their 
monopoly ill industry 11 trade, and finanace. The two worked 
together.; and 1 t is doubtful 1f ai thar t-muld hay a been able 
to attempt the expansion or Japan, militarily or eoonomi• 
oa.lly. tdthout the other. 
World War I saw a strengthening of . the al11a.noe 
betllreen the mll1_t~u·•y and the 2aibatsu. It came a.e· a bleae-
ing to both,. Through the deaad.a prior to V'lorld War It 
armament. and. 'ti-rar e:x:p,endi tut'es imposed a heA.Vy st:rain on 
Js.pan' s :t'1ne:no!a.l <H.tpaa:t ty. La:rge ... eca.le fore.1gn borrowing 
i 11 t.e.ry and industrial de'Velopment; but it also 
burdened. the country with increasing debt obl:S.gations 
abrcHtd* which brought growing diffioul ties 1.n balancing 
23 1nterna.tional accounts. . 
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J.~st .as ~apah seemed. headed, for .a $$:r'lous financial 
o:r1s1s. war broke out in Europe •. Almo~t ~~tun.ediat&ly a 
11m1 tlees opportunity developed for exports of Japanese 
manufactures, a~d the ~a~~~~~y were quick to grasp the 
opportun1 ty. \far ordere; poured in. Europee.n eompet1 tors 
d1$appeared from Far Eastern markets, and the merchant 
marine 1nher1 ted a large share of the world • s oar:rying 
t:ra<t~h Exports built up large foreign credit balanQes. 
\fhich ·we:ra used to sustain a rapid 1nfle.t1on of ered.i t and 
pr;ces at home. Japanese manuf~.oturing thus. erobe.r;ked on a 
period of unpreoed~rrted prosperity, and the J~aJla.te.Y 
thrived. 
IYU m§.t;n;it~. .k. ~~o!t&ua ··~-4~?l!'•. .!S!~Q-~· 
The la,ilt,Pt~liQ ruled supreme in Japan d.uring the 1920' s• The 
enormous prof1 ts tba.t had accrued to the combines enabled 
them to buy th~ir way into any pos1~ion of government they 
desired. By 1925 tbe industrie,U.ets or their repreeenta• 






the Privy Oounc1l and. the key posts .in the. Impe:rie,l House• 
hold Ministry. They were influential in the House of ~aera; 
1n the bUX'$a.uoracy, and even in the ~rmy and Navy. 24 
Qiane:rals and ad.m1rale could e.ctua.lly be found to support the 





policies of pa.rty gove:rnment. All .. the Elder Statesmen · 
except Prince Saionj1 11 the last ·of' the GenX'0 11 bad d1edJ and 
even he. being rela.ted to the sumitomo be.nk1ng house, was in 
sympathy with the oapi taiiatio outlook. · As Prince Saionji 
'ttas the Emperor's chief adviser on ·the choice of a new 
Premier, he occupied the most strategic position in the 
state B and. he made 1 t e. point to reoommt:md those men who 
were friendly to the interests of the ll&~e,.ts.,g. Techrd.oally 
$peaking* the Emperor could be cla~tts.ified a.e tit mtfmiber of the 
if!t'b~:~;ia since ·he poese.ssed ne·arly half a billion yen in 
stocks and bonds, nearly as much as the Zalt>,!~~~ fe.m1l1es. 
Me would, therefore, be sympathat1.o to the intaraets of the 
,!~ib,a,t~q beca,uee their inte:r~urte would. be the eame e.s his } 15 
. We see here tbat thEJ 1&1me114£U! bad the Etttpero:r and hia 
moat trusted advisor on their si.de~ \'that other .fe.ctors were 
in their favor that ene,bled. them to .gain so complete control . ' 
of governmental machinery during this pe:r•iod? 
Firet, there \fer'$ close :personal ties b~tJtween th.e 
··e of the combines and 1nf'luen-t-1~~-e-ln--th.s.-------_j_ __ 
gov$rnment. While employees of different combines refused 
to mix eooially • not Erven pe.t:roni zing the same restaurants 
or entertainment houeee. no such inhibi tiona existed among 
0 
the top combine families. A good example ia offerEJd b;r 
' ·.j 
Baron Iwasaki H:tsaye., he~td. of the Iwe,eaki family. that eon~ 
trolled the Mitsubishi combine~ His second son married the 
do.ughter of Ilteda Seihin, a leading M:ttsu:t executive. Ikeda 
bald such poei tions as che.1rman of the board o:f' M:t t$ui Gomei 
wb:toh was the predeoelt!so:r of M1 taui Honme,h, top holding 
company of the ,M:ttsu.1 combine. He we.e also mana.ging di:r.."H~• 
tor of tha M:t tsui Bank, Minister of Finance in the govern• 
ment. governor of the Bank of #a:pa.n, a.nd a member of the 
Pri.vy Oouno1l and the Houee of Peers.. Baron l't·.ra.aaki t a 
sister married Sh:idebara Kijuro who s«:lrved a$ Premier of th$ 
country • Baron Iwasa'l:t:t • s niece m~u:·ried V:t aoou:ot Sh1 busawa 
Ke1 zo, bea.d of another l"~~~'lt!!Y house e.nd Miniete:t• of 
. F1ne,noe in .. the Cabinet of Shid.enara,., 26 This mEllthod of close 
t1aa bet,,.vean the i,~~b.~t,~ta and o:ff1c:l.als of the govarnm$nt 
. 1nsu~d. the Ztt~b.~'tf!H that thtay ;;..rould, .ha:va the inside t:rs.ck 
on a.n:- benefi ta to be der:tveCI. f:rom the government. 
Another method used by the l!~b!?i1UlY to coerce the 
government t'll'EU~ through their control of the m.oney and ba,nk• 
· .n1.zaMons of the nati.on.-AS-i~_.,.a';j:Jp...,a.n...__ ________ _ 
imported t\1eatern financie.l maoh1nary & a oantra.l bt~tt'lk. 
commercial banks, trust. companies • stoalt exchanges, gold 
re{l!Je:rves~ All oam~ over the sea intact.. these names are, 
however, mislee.d.ing. 'nley a):'e misleading beca.use in Japan 
. ,. ~.J :n J(. • ,." r '1" .. \'.1. ·w t-----------------------. _______ ------------------ _ 
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th$re is not a group of. indu.str,1,a11st.s and another gt"o\.lp of 
bankers. each doj.ne; bl:'siness and each jook.eying with the 
other, !n Japan the in'J.uat:r·ie,liats apd the banltere are the 
se.me people • 27 'rpe gl"ea.t indu$trial interests a.ptua.lly 
owned the great private. banlu~. Referenc~ was often made by 
Japa:neae to the lUg ~ix Japanese banks which cot~trolled. 
nearly half o·f the nat1.on• B private ba.nlt deposi te. The 
first four of the lUg Six :aa..nlts were M1 tsui, Mi teub1sl11. 
taeud.a:, and. Sum1tono••the same Big Four of the i~A£a~fUl 
combirn~~. 28 
lt a.ll boils down to thitn Since the f!1bi~S,U, eon-, 
trolled most of the .industry of Japan and at the same timo 
most Qf the banking- ~apaneae capital was ha.rdly mora than a. 
l"EtVol,,ing fund among the big combines. It. was· like. taking 
money fl?om· on$ pocket and putting it into another. Doth 
pooltets w.era on tb.a same pair .of pants, and the .la.~&f!~IU! 
war$ ~~aring them. 
As had been noiHi~d, part,y S.nfluence ''~as growing in 
+----~~~.J---l'J~---J;tH,.1 a t1me-..----------aow$V~:t\, thro\:lsh tha-!-~h-th>Be--------i--­
governrnent and through the it tmmense wealth, the ~!l.BS.~!:iU. 
were a.ble t.o take over the majo:r political pa:rM.es 1n Jape.n; 
and thte they did. Miteubiah1 interests were 1.1nlted with 
the lUn~ei to Party and. Mitsui \V'i th the Seiyt~kai. 29 
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. ll$1 1925 manhood euff:re.e;e was adopted. Instea.d of 
lessening the influence of the &!!ibat&\h thia aot strength• 
.ened it because 1 t meant that. the members of the Diet wer0 
forced to spend mora money on aleetioneering; and the onl;r 
people that had enough money we:re the ,Za,~'bateta• During this 
period. 1 t wa.a almost 1rapoeeH>le to be elected to the Diet 
without the support of the la.1R~~€*ll• They·had the money and 
money won elections. 
The poet't~Tar 1noraaae in ~e,.!.pf1.t~t.a political influence 
is best indicated by tho Kato government o.f 1924•25, ltnown 
in Japan as the "M1:tS'Ub1sh1 Gang •. '• Both Premier Kato and 
i'O:r$1gn Minister Shideharn W$l"a related by marriage to the 
:Iwe.sa1d family which controlle>d the Miteub1eh1 in.tereeta. 
Two other members of the Ks.to government were d:l::r:•ectly. 
associated \id.th Mitsubish1 while the remainder of the 
Cabinet was 1nd1:reatly linked \d th thfi f1nanc1 al and indus• 
+------~~i.----f.:lhtd''thlJ~~h!.-.-l:Ho. ~~It can be saf'$-.~.l~Y-'-s~a.:lil1!.(;dl;-------,--­
that Ml t,sub,.ebi th:rtved d.uring this government• e tenure. 
1----------- -------------- ---·----------------------- ---- ---- ---- ----------------
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Wha.t waa the foreign policy of tbe Mineei to and 
Seiyt~ka.i parties during the rzo• s? tvere they pac1.f1st1c or 
m11i ta:ristio in their goala or did they have (lif:tarent 
so ala? 
Both the ~U:nea:t to and. Seiyuka:t parties t~ogreed. otl. tho 
~inal goal of their policies, but they differed in how the 
fit1e.l goal was to be r,ea.ch~d.. The Minaei to party believed 
that te:r:r1to:rial ·expansion and gains mhould be t:lchieved by 
using all. means short Qf foree. Economic penet~a.tion was 
their 't..reapon. Of course. 1j~· eoor10m1c penetration failed., 
.them force would be the only a.lterno.tive. 31 
The Saiyuka1 party, on the other hand, b¢lieved in 
the use of force t'irst •. a "positive policy. n Dominated as 
they were by the Mitsui combine, they saw their f'uture in 
the taking over of China first ancl eventL1a.1ly e.ll of Asia. 
Their policies were directed prime.:rily e.gainst China and 
Russia~ but their lone ra.nge goal was the financial and 
industrial control of' the world* ~2 This waa made 0Vident in 
-+------'-------'ttf:~e---aemE!:-£-H.-&'b-Fa-&3:-sH----.)Oa-:fl:------c' Ba-Jm~:aa.ka, Who wae the h~-e-1r:-_,a.ill---------­
Seiyukai Cabinet. u~ laid dotm the plt:WS tor the achierve-
ment o:f' th$ goa.ls of the Mitsui ol9Jl.33 His theory of a. 
3ll!?.!i• 1 P• 76. 
32 
-- -*- ----- ------------------- ------- -------- -
"pos1 t1.V$ policytt should have warned t.he "mr1Jl of the 
intention of the ·~*R~ftSJ:l a.nd the tl)ilitari, f'?t,g• but 1 t went 
unheeded. 
Both parties, then 11 agreed on the fine.l goal of .. 
Japanese foreign po:Ucy. 'they had di.ffer.ent ideaa on how 
80 
. the e;o&,l was to b$ reEtched; but if it~ oft,me to a. showdown, 
they \vould be found standing side by e:l,de • 'to:r.lting together, 
they set. the stage for ·the '-lvents which culminated on tn~ 
evening of September' 18, 19;!1 • 
. Q.tS{iJl~~*O:~:t.~~ 2t lh! .l~t,qt.}~SU• In the preceding pages 
\'Je he.ve seen hov1 the a.noiE'nt and the modet-n blen4ed in many 
diffe:t>ent '~.trays to form the ~~~Ji~ta!tl system. so it wa.e, too, 
in the mo:re technical matte:r of the combine structures., The 
fusion of' old and new elements .created a ool"pora te entity 
that d1ffexoed iu easent:taJ. reepeet11;3 from its W'eatern pr<:rto ... 
. type. 34 one face shcn~tTed a. modern oo:rpo:ra.M.Qn. the other e, 
.family et.,ynasty which, \'lith i 'tHs ms.ss of loya,l :retainers,. 
ruled over a va . .at bus1neas emp1:re. The ap1:r1t xoepresemte 
d it i,e, therefore, approp:r:tate t 
attribute full s1gnif1canoa to the old.er elements in this 
a.maJ.gam daspi t.e the modernity of its outt•tard appaara.noe. 
Old and netrJ" in comb1nat1on, moreover, added grea.tly to the 
strength and oohaaion of the Jape:nase corporate type. 
_1} .• 't .. · ·, •ril"'~i. .... ~~-------- --------------------------------- ------------------- -;---------------- -- ---------- ---- ---------------- ------------------
-- - i 
The economic sprea.d of the Zaibatsu represented a 
oruo1a1 structural feature. Like most other elements of 
combine structure, 1 te origins lay in the past. Economic 
divarsi.ty stemmed from ea.rly business a.ot1vi ties of the 
l!tJu;;t,a,y families, who were engaged in :re:mified banking, 
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tl'*ading, and semi .... ma:nufaott~ring operations long before the 
Restoration. When ind.ustey and mining, previously reserved 
almost entirely to the clans and the Sl:Jge;yn~~~~ wet'e fully 
opened to pr1va.te business houses in the seventies, the 
Za~ba1}s!;! moved into this area, aided by the 1n1 tie-tive of 
the new government. In a decade or two, the combines had 
brought 'dthin their scope virtually every type of oomme:r-
o1al" 1nduetr1a.l, and financial activ1ty.'5 
Down to 1900 ff;\lw legal r•eetra.1nta eltistad to hamper 
business leaders aa they set about expandine; old eom'b1ne 
l!ltruatures and build.ing new ones. Their patrons in govern• 
ment v iewad. business in the light of Japan' e political 
requiremente••the need for rapid a:ppropr:l.ation of' Western 
+-------~~~~~~~~~·m~~~~h~~~t-~on~o~~---------------­
oentra.li zed author! ty, 3o Economic oono~mtra.tion meant 
strength and eff1oienoy in an era whf:m both were required by 
ea 
the "catching up" pr-ocEH'lS ~.n which Japa.n was engaged., That 
· such a monopo11st1o oombination was obJeotiona.ble business 
oonduot would hardly occur to them-.. The same outlook pre~ 
vailad in the drafting of the new Oivil e.nd Commercial Cod.EH' 
at the end or the century p~rrn1 tting the combines to opert:J.te 
freely without fear of local oheok 11 to continue their rapid 
·srowth, and to spread their networks over the whole 
E;~oonomy.'37 
The economic spree.d of the combines enabled the 
!fab~t.ll!. families to bulld structures of bua1n$st po>twr 
unsurpassed in $iza a:nd strength,. It also created an 
organizational problem of sorna diffioul ty; one that could be 
defined H1 various waysa integrating widely cU.varaa and 
often entirely unrelated anterpr:laee, establishing e:t':f'eotive 
oont:rol from one· guiding center, or boldtng in check saO$$• 
sionist tendencies of gi,ant operating eubsidittriae. · J$pan'a 
bt.:U!liness leaders solved th.e problem by combining modern 
oorpora.te techntques with the ancient sanctions of' hierar-
e loyalties, 'nle ift~!l!fA~mM-nes bro~.eo-1pa.Jl~awy-------­
evary device of oorpore,te practice developed in the West, 
but applied ill~ to a ei.ngle business organization. It 
also drel-1 on the fea.lties of. en older e,ge to link $Xecutives 
and employees into one body cnd.ng e.llegiance to tbe qont:rol• 
ling ~~~q~~s,y family. 
Dete.ile of· corpot-ate ore;ani2;a.t1on in the do :ten or 
mol"$ larger ;e~batmLJ combines varied widely, "tith the newer 
ones departing furthest :fl"Otn the norm<~ ln the combine 
structure as a. whole, however, the . simila.ri ties outweighed 
. the di~ferenctHh In the big6est oomb1nes ........ M1.tsui, 
Miteubiehi• Sumitomo, and Yasudn•-the differences were 
min1me,l. Their dominant position Justifies a discussion of 
the et:ruetural form concentrated in this group. 
The baaic structure ot the,se four combines had :fou:r 
levels# the li~!l.f!.~m~ fa.mily or famil~es, .the top boldine; 
company ·usually termed bSUUWtl:• the major op$rat1ng subs1d1· 
aries, and the underlyin~ corporate 1,1ett-mrk of leaae:r· 
I'!Hibsidie.r1ea. · It was through tbess four d1ffe;roent levels 
ot organ! zationa.l structure the.t the Z!lb!?-~;~ mans.ged. to 
consolida.te and hold their dominant poai tion in all phases 
of ma.nufaotur:tng, commerce, and fina.nce. '38 
~-
+--------,--'------;'E~~Mlfi!.;o!.i!;~...------.!.H---tH.J .. ~tr-w&-~-~H3S bu sina$ .... S~-----~-­
$Ut1t1ee, even if they were not legally incorporated as . 
such. 'l'be :M1 tsu:1 law, ~ls a.dm1niete:rad by the house council, 
governed t.he business titnd personal lives of the eleven 
Mitsui families in detail. Members of the house could not, 
_._. ____ .._ ------- ---
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on their own private account; engasa in business, hold 
aacurit:tea. ox- ta.ke oompa.ny of:f'1ce:rsh1pa. 1'be house council 
detet'mined all personal matta:t>s of the family members af• 
:feetins mal:'riege and succession. !t allooatecl the ~9IU!b(\ 
dividend to a joint house :reeer'Ve fund, an indiVidual 
l"esene fund of each· member family. It controlled pa;ymenta 
from ei tber the· joint Or the ,.ndiVidUal reserve funds. l.ee$ 
than ten per cent of, house property wae veetad in the 
f'atn1l1ee individually; the. reet l'm,s held colleot:tvely with 
t:t tle vested jointly in the eleven families., The jointly 
held portion of the house wealth we,s cUv:tded. :tn the prt.tp():r. 
t:t(Jn of 23~ to the pe,rant house, 11.5% to each of the :five 
other families· of the parent houae, ancl -,.9% to ~HlCh of the 
fiVe branch tam1lj.e $. Breach of the house latv- or unbecoming 
a.ots 1 by decision of tb.e house aounoil, might viait on a 
family menibe:r suspension f:rom the counGil or :fo:rfei ture of' 
his share oi' the business aaaats or joint property. These 
taots ahcrt.r the extant to \'lh1ch the individual :families par-
39 
+---------~~~r4.~~&-t6mbi~~------------------------------~----
lhi. "'~tsu~ 2alllb1r)!• Tbe oo:rporate network cl.asa1f1• 
'Cation ot the &aibattfUJ is worth a study :tn 1 tsalf', but we 
have to ba content with a brief summary of thai~ Ol:'€Sanl. ~a· 
tion,. The Mitsui oombi.ne. is rEHlogni~ed as the leading 
I 
! :. ' 
figure i~ the 11&9at~g, eo 1t is only fit~1ng .that we 
examine 1 te et:ruotura a. 11 ttle more closely to see the scope 
of its 1nfluenoe. 
~fost studies list the brea.k-dolm of the M1 tsui inter-
ests durine; the 1930's a.s followat 1 llSllf3Jlil or top holding 
. o<:>mpany; 22 desj.gnatad, that ir,, me.jol" cpere.t1ng eubsidi .... 
e.rias of the pqnf$~;. 48 o:t;'dinary aubsid1ar1ea of the ~r.tel:J~J 
27 sube1di9.ries of the bQ!lib! ...... ordin~.ry subaidia.):"1tH~3 ·.· .. 
. •; ··,_, ..... 
81 eubsidiial:'ies of d.fJ~~Jignated subsidia.rie s except Trading 
and Mining; 12€5 subeid.ier:tes 9f !U tsu1 Trading; and 'l 
smbs1d1ari.ee of M1 tsui Mining. This gives us e .. tot~1 of 
:556 companies the.t were directly under the oontrol.of the 
40 Mitsui family. 
This ta.bulation gives some idea of the scope of the 
Mi taui combine, though perhapa not enough to ahow tht,lt, liTi th 
it's three million amployees~t 1t was the world's greatest 
business orga.n:t:ze:t,:J.on. Its itlt'luence extended to many 
Jap~rnesa oompanias not listed a.e aube1d1ariee, re~u~hed out 
-t------'6fltwe.p;f--~:J±~~1-a-l;>---mftl~ of th$ ii'a.r E~a.st, s.nd.-radia'Wd 1nl-\l.t ...... o_jm1Jllo~· eC-JtU-. ___ _____,_ _ _ 
other parts of the world.. Major operating subrd.d.iaria s of 
the big combines, as with Mitsui, we:r~ often holding eompa.. 
· n1ea themselves -with an even larger arra,y of subsidiarit!'H:\ 
. t,han the bqlJ!b.t\• 
,""*f~-~fi(·li~--i:,'iii.~Tf -·. ·:·;-r~~P-141f. $11't ,,-------------------------------
'l!he avera.ge oontrol by the M1 teuj. family among 1 ts 
various enterprises was 63.4%. This e.saured the Mitsui 
di:reot control. . Indirect control was exero1se'd over many 
other companies through the placing of combine man on boards 
I • 
of.oontrol and through m1no~1ty investments. The position 
. of the ;a1ibat,f!!J we.s, to say the least, solid. ; . 
:Now for a.n even closer brealt•~own of the. M:lteui com .. · 
bine., At t,ha peeJt of tl:l.e py:r$.m1d ttlae the·Mitsui Gomei 
. ' . 
Kaisha, the fe.m1ly holding eotnptltny which averaged a capital-
'·~atinn of' ·th:ree hundred million ;ren during most of the 
thirties. :Ben~ath this mammoth catchall, the Mitsui 
S.nterea'<Jts ran the fh'la,ne1al gamttt with the great Mi teu:t Ba,nk 
wh:l.ch did 5. ?>% of Jap,:nese commercial banlt1ng., w1 th the 
Mitsui Trust Oompany.wh1ch did mo:re than 17% of the trust 
busineas; and with the Mi taui Li:t'EJ Insurance Oompa.ny which 
did about 2%' ot the insu:re;nce buaine as • 
Mitsui ran the .commere:ta1 e;~mut with the largeat 




and exports. TOe r.rosbin :warehouse Company did about 19% of 
Japanese wu•ehousing. The Mi tsukoebi Department Stores 
handled 32% of all department store :reta,,11ng in Japan. It 
could even be $f!1d that the Mit.sui combine was "ohioken•feeau 
·---------------
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because they con·brolled the gi.a.nt Nihon Mi<xe11 I>oul try l:l"eed 
Company • From international ba.n~1ng to feeding chiokans!41 
•tera is a pa.:rtial list of some of J.I.Utsui'a acttv·itiea 
td. tn a peroent.~.ge of the ~otal, Ja.panase business in. ~a.oh 
indt~stry a. Kanega.fuohi Cotton Spinning, 14%J Toyo Rayon, 
15%; Oji Paper• \<Those subsidiaries. included ~: neat of. lumber 
~M1d PttlP companies t:md. th('$. grea.t O~tuitka Ma.1rtiohi. Ne1-rapa.per• 
78%;onada. Cement, 17%; M1teui Mining, 17%; Shibaura 
Engineering i4orks, 5%; Hokkaido Collier-y and steamship, ll%' J 
Mitaui .Eleotro•Chemcie.l :tnclt.astey, 5%; N1hon Wheat Flour-. 
25%~ Tropical Produce, 28"';.and Dai Nippon Celluloid,.4%,.42 
:tn a<.'id.i tion to these, M1t~nti was the controlling 
factor in the following industries; h~mp, vee;etabl'$ oils1 
tobacao, cotw A.nd 1 ta seve:ra.l b;y•produots, chemical dye a, 
pharmaceuticaJ.s, synthetic resina. rayon and other a:rM~f1• 
oie.l fibraa, oat~stio soda• eoda ash, fish otl, soap. lubr1~ 
o~.t:tng o:tla1 synthetic oils, oa:t:>bon biau,l;fide_ carbon 
sulphite, e.mmonia sulphate, sodium ail:i.ct:~.te;~ flotat:i.on' 
: . . . . ' . ' 
,.,, . 
products, carbol5.o p:t'oductfll, crud~ oil :r.sfining and by• 
Pt:Oducts, brewing, .cold storage plants, ooal, bauxite, salt, 
lea.d• ~inc, e;olct, sulphur$! mica., copper. silicon, b;r1olt a11d 
u __ 7_. mu o- - --- ---------- ------------- ---- ------
sa 
porcelain cle,ys 11 phosphorus, em$lt1ne;, refining• :real este.tEJ, 
general contr.aot1ng, enginee:r1ns, conetf'uotion l'rorks, 
mortgage and. loan businesses, shipbuilding, ship t-epairing 
and marine engineering, ma.rine tre.nsport, ma.ohine tools, 
light and hea.;ry industrial machinery • farm tools and imple-
ments, automobiles, radio sets and instruments, vario.._e 
types of :rubber goode, eleot:rio furnaces. air conditioning 
plants, buying, selling, exporting, forwarding, and 'tlfare .. 
hot.ud.ng. 43 This does not complete the list, but 1 t will 
give an indication of the sweep of the Mitsui combine. The 
only way • however, that one oa.n :realize the power of the 
lf:'!.~£a.~fl!3 is to see the manner by which they used their 
position to buy, three.ten, cajole, a.nd intimidate political 
parties, the Diets, and pr~miere to obte.in their desired 
ends. TheBe "ende" were destined one day to bring the 
,la,~b§W)SU houses tumbling down like tbe proverbial houee of 
cardth 
4JAlon~o L, Baker, ~•'l'he Influence of' the Divine 
ltmpe:ror Dootr1ne upon Ja;pann (Doctoral D1sserte.tion• The 
Un1i1e~ei ty of Southern Oalifornia, Los Angeles. June, 1948) • 
• a .. --::sao. 
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CHAPTER VI 
In 19~1 Japan came to an irrevocable turning poi~t in 
1 ts fora 1e;n policy,. Lat~e 1 n 1929 the Ne"r Yorlt eillt me.rket 
had. collapsed, bringing acute distress to the Japanese 
o9untryside which depended heavily upon cocoons as a cash 
crop. . The m111 tary leaders became. concerned lest the 
eoonomiQ orieie cause dissatisfaction in the army; '"'hose 
compos1 tion and outlook \'tare largely agrarian. The situa• 
tion also presented them with an opportunity to gain the 
political dominance they ha.d long sought and to d1sc:.red1 t 
the c1V1lian moderates, durine; whose briaf' ascendancy J81.pan 
had subscribed in the treaties concluded at the Wnehington 
Conference of 1921•22 and the London Naval Conference of 
1930 to policies of self ... reetra.int toward China and to 
lim1 ting na.v nl arme.mants. Mil1 ta:cy propagandi ets denou;nced 
the parliamentary pa.rties and big business for allegedly 
ational interests 
assailed the Un1 ted Bta.tee for discriminatory treatment of 
Japa.neae and for erecting tariff walla against Japanese 
ma.nuftMltured goods, declared that Japan as a. ha:ve•not nation 
must expand in order to survive, and proposed a program of 
ism, and of a strong and irH:lependeim·~ foreign policy. The 
l-
aacendaney e.tte,ined by the army .in the goVt'lt>nment and the 
role of the mil:t taria:ts in the formuls.tion of foreign poJJ.oy 
t~aa thEil key to Ja:tHitn • a interna,tional x-alationa during the 
''d$o1a1ve decade" from 19'31 to 1941.,1 
'!be poli tio&l and intellectual libera.li:am of the 
1920 *$• whiob was discussed earlier~ tft:tS :for the moe t part 
1$-mi ted to the larg$:r oi ties.. Faa.eanta and residents of~ thE~ 
thousands of villages and srMtll towns# who still constituted 
the bulk of the popul$,tion, looked on at what \'las happening 
in the cities with wonderment and often 'tltith di.aa.pproval; 
and certain elements among the more ed.uca,ted classes 
r~gardea the 11ber·a,1 11 sometimes radics.l, po11 tical theo:riee 
of the city inte1l.igensia w1 th g:ro,dne; hostility and reeant ... 
ment. ~ Al'!Uy a.nd Navy officel:'s, rural landowners, lo\vEu~ 
middle class o1 tizen$ of the smaller tol'me; a.nd many petty 
government officials found it quite impossible to e,eoept or 
even to tolerate the growing challenge to eeta,blishad. polit ... 
1oal and. social authority. 
-l-----------~R----n-------+.-t"t-n-:-m;E'fre members of ~on 
and prod.uots of the new educa.ttonJ but with them the hea.vy 
nationalistic a.nd militaristic indoctrination of the achool 
Yorkt 
--~------------------ -------··- - ----·--
ib&q., pp. 1:36· 37. 
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system had weighed more heavily than the opening of new 
horizons and thEJ influences from abroad. !Ibey "t>tera in com ... 
. ' ' 
ple·te symps;thy with the autho:ri ta:rian rule e.t home a.n<l the 
strong expansionist progra:ro abroad of the Me1J1 leaders, 
~e post war 11bel"o.lism and 1nternat1onal1sm seemed to them 
e1gns of weakne sa and Xler'IHU .. s1on. l'i':rom the Mei31 leaders 
they ha.d 1nher1 ted a compelling n~lt1onal1 stio urge to malt$ 
Japan even stronger, but too mueh na.tional1st1c and m111 ta ... 
rietio indootrinration had :robl:>ed them of the b:raadtll of view 
o:f the Me1j1 leaders they sought to emula.te" 
Ultra-nationalist and militarist sentiments from time 
to time -found expression in political parM.es; but theae 
easentlally reactionary el~nnente; w1.th theit' inherent. dis• 
trust of representa-tive government, -leaned more to direct 
action through private p:reaeure groupe e,nd ext;ra ... legal 
Cliques than to politicr:d acM.on by means of the ballot box. 
Ultr$-natione.list1c $EH3i"~t eooiat1.es quite nature.lly 
developed as one of their me.jor forms of poli tice.l exprea ... 
+---------,-i~~.-----~fiDee----&o!"'!-'tVJb~e:H. e:Hei:t-. -ee~x~e~ted eon side rah3:e l nflueneEr-·1">-. rt. ------~'---­
Je.panese poli t1os by . terroristic rtctlvi ties and v1o.lent 
p>:lopaganda attacks fAge,inat tbeir opponents~·3 
Viewed in this 11ght, the strange mixture in Japan of 
wha,t bave been tra.d.i tionall.y oona1de:red anti the tical forces 
..-,- r., •• l,.joll_f'l! n jli! ·wa; of ·~_.w uH-1 ---------~--------- --------------------
of left and right takas on e, new !ln'ld sinister meaning., We 
have, in recent dfH.H.tdes, bacome e.ll too·familia.:r with the 
toteli ta:riml perversion of egali ta.rian ideal$ and eoientific 
knowl~dge in the more baohrard parts of Europe, Japan, · ae 
the mdst adve.need oount:ry of Asia, we.e the first to show us 
that this terl"ible patt$rn could· also appee.r in Asia. 
These d:\.atrubing tendencies grew elowly and almost 
unnoticed du:rins the l920*e~ then, in the <ila:rly 1930*s the 
blatant mili t.e.rism; :fanatical tlationalism, and e.nti .... liberal 
and. anti ... democ~·~!tt1o p).'>f)jud:tces of the younger Army ~md. Navy 
officers $,nd other reactionary groupe Sl•rept over Japan in a 
fi\!Uo.d$tl :rever~al of the dominant trends of ·t.he · p~·t:HH~'1i.ng 
decade. The pa:r-11a,mEmttl:t'Y coa.l1't:l.on of' the bureaucrat$ and 
poli tio:ians, td th more or lt:1se active support from the uroban 
middle elaeses, htld been tha first~ eucHJesso:r of the Me:tji 
olige.rehy,. No'(lr it ;;.re.a pushed aside by the mili t.a:ri ets w!l.th · 
t1he noisy backing of the ult;ra ... na't:l.onaliet:tc BO(d.eties e.nd 
4 the te.oi t support of the rural population. 
$ reaction e.gainst 
lib~ra.lism and d~tooQ:t~e.cy "re:re certainly influenced, if not 
<l&te:rmined. by outsidf.l forces, just as the :t•e.pid growth of 
liberal tenaenc:iea httd been· fostered by the externt:ll factor 
<H' t4o:r1d Wa:t? I!~! F'o:r one thing, the world ... w1dn 
1---~ --- ----------------------------
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(tisillusionment with d.emoc:t."e.oy, which follov4ed soon e.:f'ter the 
war and helped to erf~Htte totali tat•:tan reglm$S elsewhere •• did 
not go unnoticed by the Japanese. Many of· th€lm we:r~ 
1mpl'4Htsed by tjhe vaunted super1o:t"1 ty of tota.li te.r:tan govern~ 
mente and the1.r points of agreement 1-r:t th tra.dltional 
Japanfiee concepte of authOl"'i ta.r:ta.n rule. 
Another outeide influence 't!a.s the \'70l'ld widt't depx-es• 
e:totl of 1929 and. the :resultant collapse of interne.tione.l 
tr~lde~ Japan started ita clepression lot1.th a bank ct'1a1s in 
19~7 1 but 1 t was of 11 ttle cotlsequence tl'u·oughout the world 
as a preliminary 9.ffa.1;r for the 1929 depres.aion. The "big 
bust" seemed to apell ul t,imate disaster fo:r Japan • s foreign 
tJ:>ade. The busines sman'.s program of eont.:lnUEld economic 
expa.naion and. p:rosper:t ty through e, growing export, tracla was 
suddenly revf.llaled. i•o be dangerot.;ely dependant on the goocl 
, .. 1:1.11 e:nd tole:r·tmce of foreign pm.ta:t"a. flue;$ :poli tioal units 
like Russia and the United States could rida the storm of 
'¥'rorld depx•ess:lon 11 for they had tha~.r own sources of supply 
-t------,f?.;~YiU'I..,...,___,.nwr--m-J~~~xm•jh.a:r~,ll--lls~aw,n.r:dl--+t.t-.hct!:ie+i't'll"'>-On<. wt~k.!fc~eA-'tt.1B111-c.;;---~BHU1~-t~t.--------~--
a smaller unit, like Je,pan* ll<thich depended on othe:r le,nds 
for much of i te :ratt materials and on China, India, and th$ 
Occident for a vtt,ttl part of 1 t,e c'.meuming market S$em$d 
entirely at the mercy of tt1e tt:triff pol1c1.ea of' other 
In the early 19'0 • a ma:ny Japanese believed that the 
only .answer to r:talng protective tariffs in othev lands was 
for Japa,n to resume ita old program of colonial expansion 
and win for i teelf the eouroEH3 of r•aw mater•iale and the 
ma.rkete needed. to make 1 t self-sufficient and invulnerable 
aa a world pot<Ter,. The m:tli ta:r:teta ware there to fa.n this 
feeling to their own s .. dv anta.ge" To the m1li tariats and the 
reactionary groups this :raa.eonj.ng seemed obvj_ous. Those 
businessmen H.nd intellectuals who remained moderate and 
internet:tona.l in their vie'"S· were not. 11.ble to refute theee 
argument.a to tjhe eat1.afr!-ct:ton of the ma.jo:ri ty of the 
J p.,pane ae pub 11 c. 
There was a gradual awing of popular support to the 
m111ta.:ry expansionists. As these eama groupe also stood for 
a.uthori ta.:rfan rule 'd th1.n Je.pan* much of' the support for 
1mperialiat aggrandizement abxooad ree.dily became popular 
backing fol:" the attack on demoora.t1o inst:t tutions at home. 
The incipient ~ra.pan~.HMt total:i tariaus, however, did not wa1 t 
,----
+-----~~~~~~~~ea~puu~laa~r~su~~t-sb~~ns-tb~ictory at•-----+l---
the polls.. That might never have come; and. in any case 1 t 
tft.t~ a mer:me to pOt'lfU' t>thich t.ney, as a mfltter of principle, 
repudia,ted. Instea.d, they 'bf)gan a direct, frontal atta.ok on 
liberal beliefs e.nd democ;ratic institutions,. They had no 




Communists 'to ldn power. The attack was mad.e piecemeal by 
1nc11 vi duals or small org~mize.tions, but it was a.lmoet as 
effective as the better co-ordinated efforts of the 
tota.li tar,,ans in Europe.5 
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Scores of small g~oupa of fanaM.oa.l nationalists 
stirred up vo:pular support for the mili ta.:rists and hacked. 
away at the foundations of parliamentary e;overnment. Occa-
sionally young hothea.ds ''~ere inspired. by their rabid elders 
to commit political ~ssaaeinatione, which not only elimi-
nated their unfortunate victims but, through intimidation, 
silenced lt:arge numbers of other potential opponents. Most 
important of all, the Army on 1 ts own authority embroiled 
Japan in foreign wars of conquest. This• while forcing the 
nation back to the strategy of military conquest, also 
~roused_. the na.t1ona.l1et1o emotions of the people and thus 
won their support for tbe authori tar! an a.s well as the 
imperialistic aims of the military. 
The ease with which the Japanese to tali ta:ria.ns 
+-------A'!'i+'t"-'Hll'1"1-~~:M'il'Tbt"''rl"t--h'f''---f't;IIM'fh~ra~,r-in Japan--1-H-ua-t-ra-te-d:---tb--------+------
obv:tous fa,ot that the roots of liberalism were still ahal· 
low. It also revealed certa.in specific weaknesses in the 
5aerber·t Feis, ~ .!tQ P~;rl Harbot (Prinoetona 
Princeton Untvarsi ty Press, --r950 , P• 167. 
1---------------------------- ________________________________________ , __________________________________________ ____;_ 
democratic mecha.n:tsm, attJd.butable to 1 ta author! tarian 
background and haphazard growth.6 
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One be.sio flaw in the whole Japan(;!! sa political system 
had. been deli'bera.tely fashioned. by the Meiji oligarchs and 
carefully prese:rved by the pa:rlj.amenta.ry groupe of the 
twenties. until it. contributed to their own undoing. This 
was the mystic position. of the Emperor as a demi-god whose 
per~wnal will, in thEiJory, took p:reoedence over all law. The 
Meiji leaders, who had oome to power by championing the risht 
of the Emperor to rule,. had ore&-ted and fostered th1e tradi-
tion since 1 t gave them, e.s men who surrounded the throne 
· and spoke for the Emperor, far greater a.uthori ty over the 
.people than they could he.ve achieved otherwise., By building 
up an elaborate state oul t of Shinto centered. on the person 
of the Emperor and the Imperial line e.nd by indoct:rinating 
achool children with fane.tice.l devotion to the Emperor and 
blind fa,i th in all statements said to :repres(mt his w111, 
they s&oured for themselves the unquestioning loyalty and 
c------~VW"~~~O---\;IL,£.---v+,le'Q'--pf.,#'e:ll-'o;.~:~p~l~a...., ..c----J'Ch.e,_par~ta ry le ad.a re whcvO--------,---
suoo$eded to power chose to perpetuate this system; for it 
seemed to give them. too, an unassailable position of 
a.uthot-1 ty as spokesmen for the Emperor. Consequently, they 
o_r ___ ----------
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parmi tted the tdldest sort of utterances by members of the 
ltUle.tio fringe of the militarists, beca.usa they were couched 
in te:nns of devotion to the »;mperorJ but they vigorously and 
ru.thl.essly eupp:r.e.eM1d e,ll :r·adioal thinkers who ch~dlenged 
the validity of the Emperor con.cept.7 
Th.e parlia.mente.ey leaders me.de their fa tal error in 
failing to see tha,t the m:t.11tlitriste presented· the most 
1mmed.1ate thres.t to their continued supremacy, a These 
. groups neatly ·turned the tables on . the · oi vil government· by 
claiming that they, not the government, represented. the t~ue 
Imperial will.. Tba claim in the case of the Army had a 
certain validity t for in theory the ar-med forces ware the 
personal .Army and Na.vy of the Emperor. enjoying under him a 
status of equality with the oivil government e.nd, therefore, 
equally qualified to speak for the Emperor. l?ro:fi tins from 
this ·break in th® solid front of government e.uthori t.y and 
taking e.dva:ntage of tacit Army approval. individual extram ... 
1~ts. we:re able to go even further in olaim1ng Imperial 
se:nct1on for their pera(Hla.l view~ecf,)efld~g~. ------cf..t\.~ie-HtM:e~o~f'----------'---~ 
agg:re~sion abroad and at home, acts of oi v 11 d1sobed1enoe, 
poli tiee.l murders, and open m~.tt1ny were e.ll ~1lH!5ti:f1ed as 
being 1n accord with the true will of the .B:mpe:ror 11 l-thoae 
7~·---P-~-_191_._ ___ , ________ -------- -mnmmum __ _ 
v1e\1St 1 t was ola.troed., were mia~presented by . the corrupt 
politicians around the throna.9 
Confronted ·w1 th this monstrous perversion Of their 
own policy, the weak•knaed parliamentarians failed to take 
drastic me8,sures or even to eta.nd firm. and un1 ted. Instead, 
they all but openly admitt$d the justice of the charge by 
remaining ~!lent. and by oompromieipg Tfti th their attaolters. 
The more liberal elements in the urban populm.tion. while 
dismayed, t-1e:re too weak po11 t.S.cs,lly and, for the most pe.rt. 
t()o timo:r.oue to fie;ht back. The general rural 8.nd small· 
town populat-ion accepted thaae acts of supposed devotion to 
the Imperial will at. their face "Value and c.reatad an atmoe ... 
phera so sympathetic to political aeeaea1ne and other 
extremists tl:Hlt, such offenders were usually given only 
absurdly light pun1shment. 10 
Tbue, the theory of the Imperial will was a, fatal flaw 
in Js.pa.ntEJ politice.l structure; but- the m111t,eJ:•1st~ (:ould 







publie contt>ol a.nd a.utonomy within the government. This was 
ano·thar ser,,ous cons.t1 tutional flaw. Pi&t control over the 
Cabinet 't>rae never fully eetabliehed ~ven in the 1920' a 
d> 
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be.ca.uee the Diet never won full control over the purse 
strings. If the bude;at was rejected by the Diet, the 
Oa'binet had the right to continua in force the budget of the 
preceding year; and the Army controlled the Cabinet through 
' 
the policy o:t' nomine.t1ng only aotive duty officers to the 
pos1 tion of War Minister, off'10$X'S li'ho would abide by the 
will of t.hs l'1ar lords.. This ruling permitted the armed 
forces to destroy Cabinets or prevent "undeeirablett l.eade:re 
trom ·taking the prem1a:reh1p ·simply by ~fusing to let any · 
qualified officers aecept portfolios in the government. The 
militarists not only established their independence of the 
civil government but they ~ton a virtual veto pot-1e:r over the 
Oab:lnat. The '~:ray was open for ·any action the Army wished to 
take. and the eyes of the wa:r·-lo:r•ds -were on Me,nohur1a. 
Mansln.u;la,. # A b,t4~g. b§gl$eitStUJQ.• During the yea.r 19:30 
a.nd th$ opening months of 1931 11 although evidences of grotlf• 
ing hoetilty between Ohineae arid Japanese res1d$nts in 
1-ia!lcht:~ria t<~ere not :ta.cltingp the official l"ale:tions between 
r-------~~~~~~~~n-ta~nusuall~~b.~.--------------­
This l'Tas largely because of the fa.ct that Baron Bhidebara. 
as Minister of F'oreigri . .Affai.rs for Japan., had ma1nte,ined a 
policy consi.stently friendly to China; advocating among 
o.ther things that the eovereign r1e;hta a.nd terri tor1.al 
t-------------JlL_ --'-'---- ~~----'-'--·~-· ----~J--~_._ oo __ _m_gJ;_l'l_1;!!_1rtf)_d;_~ml_th~E! __ J'rlnciJ;>_l_e . _Q_f__· ---- -------




adhered to, the.'t relations in oonformi ty with mutual soli• 
dari ty and economic oooperatio.n should be .p:roillotec1. a.nd that 
. . . 
the :reasonable desires of the Chinese should be l"€Hlognized 
lw1·th sympa.thy and good will and reasonable assistance J>en ... 
de~d for their :realj.zat1on.11 This polio; '<Te-s aleo 
euppqr.ted by such p:rominent sta.teemen as Ha.ma.gucbi anCI. 
;Inouye and by many of the principal hanks and. business 
houses of ,Japan. The ulte:r1.or motives of theme elements 
. will be d.1scussed later b.ut suffice to· say that active 
agg:t>$es1on was r1ot. one of, thetr aims. Had this ;policy of 
Shidehara been adhered to, the eubsequent ·chrontcle of Sino• 
Japanese relatlonships might ha.ve been a very different 
story; and (Tapan a.nd Ohina, indeed the whole world., might 
have been saved a multi tude of sQrrows. Such a pol,.cy • hotf• 
ever, did not meet with the a.pp:rova.l of the mili tar1ots,. 
'l'hay felt that the policy of Shidehara wa.a not bringing in 
the dee:t:red raeul te, Emd they "tttere 'Vocal and vehement in 





Ma.nQhur~~a ,.,here Mtn•shal Ohe.ng Tso~lin and l~;tte:r his son, 
Chang Heuen~l1.ang 11 had pursued a policy of competi M.ve 
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$Oonomic development designed to build up Chinese 1:nat1tulll! 
M.ons· and to break dmm foreign monopolies, which weve 
tna1nly Japanese. An outstanding fea.tura of this policy of 
the ObEtngs "ras an &.mb3. tious program of raS.lroa.d const:ruotion 
whj.ch offered· aJ~'l effaoti ve oompeti tion t·o the Ja:panEHte*(fW!lEIH!l 
South P~aneburian Ra:1.1wa,y. Such a program of ra.il:road 
development wae not a"t all in keeping 'lfrith the tdshes and 
aj.ms of the Jape,neee. Another disttrr'bing faato:r '1aa tbe 
em tr-y of Chine.· :tnto the d.E.ntelopment of :Manchurian :railroads, 
and this bece.me e. ma,tter of grave concern to t.ne Ja.paneee 
m:t11. tariste because :tt was leading to irler{~Hudng friendship 
between P~arshe.l Ch~mg Heueh.,.;tiang and the Nanking government 
of Chiang .Kai ... ehek. A rela.tionmhip of good will a.nd 
cooperation between the st,rone; me.n of Manchuria s,nd th$ 
oantral govel:'nmant of the Repub11o of Ch,.na. was a tM.ng. 
unwant$d and frowned Upon by tbe Nipponese miJ.itarists.1' 
In this ma.tter they. ba,d abotm their hrmtJ., though perhaps not 
intentionally, in the summer of' 1928. Peking had at last 
+--------'!OOHeap-:l..tulatecl to· the Nat1-onaJ :tst Gmta:rnment; and the ·:reign of 
the Kuom~.nta:ng ha.d l1een inaugurated throughout all of Ohi~a 
south of t,he Great ~fall,. Na,nk1ng 't-le..n malting overtuX<es to 
the Young r~a:rahe,l Ohang Hauah"'liang, who in turn ~as on the 
point of throwing 1n hie lot with the newly established. 
1------------· ...... ~1 _....._,..._...,,_ •...,.,,. _________________ , _________________ _ 
I 
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Na.t1ona.liet Government. Into this piotul"$. of approaching 
Sttab:tl:t ty a,nc1 trnificat.ion stepped a specia.l envoy from . Tokyo 
Who itlt'Ol"med the Young r~al'•sba.l in no uncerta.in 'irlOl'dS that 
eucb a..etep '"ould no:t b$ r~gard.ad with favor by the Mikado•s 
government, and p;reeeu:ra so strong •,;raa. brought to bear upon. 
him th&.t :for six moni~hs he \faVere<l~14 l'erbaps wh:Lle he 
wavered hie mi~d d'~elt{ upon the violent dea,th that ha.d over-
taken hia fa,ther who was killf:1d oy an explosion, l..rhiah 
vtraeked the train upon which he t'las :riding.. Gu~.l t of the 
o~hne has never been discovered" but all evidence pointe to 
the theory thrtt tba Ja.paneae m~.11 ta.risto were the plotters 
because the Old Ma.raha,l had ~fuaed to conform to t,h~ will 
of .Te:pan :tn tjhe matte~ of railroe.d development. 15 The Old 
Ma;;rshe.l played the game o.oeording to Ja.panass rulett~ and 
loet. The Young Marshal remembered,. Finall]T,. Chang Hsueh-
liang took the step; e;nd on December 29)1 19261) he raised the 
flag of Nationa.liet Caine. throughout Ma.nchUX'ia Stnd pledged 
:toya.ltyt,o the Nanking Governnlt:mt. That be <Ud so and at the 
I 
'---~-
+-------Q-l:~~t..ima n:nzealed the attempted coera,on fr-Olll-'.rO:.A.kif-YvO-WJMat:!..~S--,------+----~ 
something. for \'tb:l.cb ,fe,pan neV$r. forsava htm • 
. ~~ 1tl8;!Jla~QQqa.nltf..f.8:!t• In a le.nd whe:t:>e such rival-
ries and. a,nimosi ties eJ(iet fUld where both parties to long 
standing disputes are supported by large bodies of armed 
rorc~3s~ there if3 certain to be no laok of incidents capable 
. . 
o :f' e.ffo:rdine; a epa:rk sut•r:taient to eat off t.ha p(n.rde:r · 
m~gazine. Manchuria. in 1931 wa;s no exception to thE:J g(l;rnera.l 
rule. ln A:pril, 19:31, at ~fanpaoshan, e. point, a.bout sixteen 
miles f:t"om Chane;chun, e. Chinese middleman lea.sed :f'rom a 
group of Chinese farmers about f':tV$ hundred acres of :t~J.id, 
which he· in turn eub~lee.sed to a group of Itore~n ft!l.rmere., 
aub~equently P tbeee l~HH!!&es u.ncte:r.took to dig nn it>rie;ation 
canal running f:t>om the lo:;used. land to a. point on the Ituns 
RS:ve:r· eight miles away whE>re they alao Pl"'oceeded t.o build a. 
dam. This ca.na.l trave:rE~ed. la.n.d owned by Ch:tneae~ some~ but 
·. nott all, of whom had lee,sed their land to the Chineae eon• 
tro.ctor. . Claiming thf'J.t thi,s irt•igati.on pr-oject \'lOUld 
obst:ruot. ns:vigatd.on on the !tung River a.nd place some six 
thousand aot'es of la11d in dt;J;nger of being flooded, the 
Chinese farrilere p:rotettrtutH.iJ and l!l.s their prot.est we:nt trn,.. 
heeded, &. mob of some five hundred Ch1neaa, acc()mpe.nieo. by a 
1------GI'!-~'i--+--ff'E'-----{:;i-l"PI--'!'*~~---'~"IA-:tc'l"P.C-Re-=-11 ----flOr~l ~ f1lle d ap a pftf'"llt---flof~tt.~ll'M::se~---~--­
oanal.10 Japa.ne se police sent out f;rom Cha:ngcbun appeared 
on the acene J ·there w~s some exchange of shots; more 
Ja:panese polic~ and soma Chin4H~e troops ware s~nt to the 
spot; argQmEmte rand lnte:rmi ttent hosti,li ties continued for 
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severs,l days but quieted down after July '3. Subsequently, 
the Koreans completed their project under Japanese protec-
tion,. Report.a of this affair, greatly exae;gere.ted, appe~.red 
in the newspapers of Korea with the result that widespre&.d 
and violent anti ... Ohineee riots developed in numerous Korean 
cities. According to official Japanese estimates, 103 
Chinese were ltilled, 75 were eerlt)Usly injured, e.nd 26 
. 17 
slightly·. hurt. The a.pparent 1nactiv1 ty of the Japanese 
police and the fact that the a.rroy was not called out led the 
Chinese to charge tba.t the disorders '"ere encouraged by 
members of the Japanese mi11 tary clique.. China demanded 
that Je.pan accept full responsibility f'or the c:Uso:rders and 
pay an 1ndemn1 ty to cover Chinese losses. Japan expressed 
regrate, voiced the intention to indemnify tbe Chinese 
families wbo had au:f:fereC::t losses, but refused to accept the 
reepons1b111 ty 1'or the atta.oks. While diplomatic negotia· 
tiona drag8ad on, a vigorous anti-Japanese boycott commenced 
to develop within China which in tu:rn forced some of the more 
r-~------~p~aoitist eJementS-in-dapan to dftmand that something be done 
to alleviate the s1 tuation. 
~~ Nakamyr~ Affair. Suddenly• in the middle of 
August, the Wanpaosha.n e.nd Korean affairs were entirely 




of the Imperis.l Japanese Army, so the repC);rt :ra.n, ba,d been 
summarily executed. by Chinese soldiers in. Manchuria. 
Although this E:rven1i was thought to have talren pla.oe late in 
June, 1 t had not been immediately discovered; and, even after 
1 t had become know~, news of it .. had been for a time sup ... 
pressed by the Japanese Foreign Office. According to 
accepted reports. Captain N.aka,mura and three companions, 
tra.veling in civilian clothes through \festern Me,ncburia, 
were arrested by Chinese sold.iere. Upon 1nvestigat:ton it 
was found that N~kamura possessed a Chinese passport issued 
at Harbin but tba,t be had conces.led hie 1dent1 ty and. mili-
tary statue and was representing himself as an educator 
ene;a.ged in a geplosical expedition. Tbe Chinese mil1 tary; 
after a. full 1nvestiga,tion, oond$mned Nakamura a.nd his 
18 
companions as spies, shot them, and cremated their bodies. 
Owing to the ta,ct that Captain Na.kamura had misrepre ... 
sen ted himself as an educator, 1 t was suggested by the 
Japanese· Foreign Office ·that his m111 ta.ry ,status be kept 
+---------~~~~~~~~~~ggaation, however, was reJ~e~c~t~e~d~d~e~f~i~an~tl~J7~--------~--­
by the. Jape:nese mil:t tary authori tles who, in the face of 
strenuous protests from the Foreign Office, published the 
full details of the oase. 19 Now the struggle of the liberal 
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~U.neei to Government against the aggressive measures ad.VO•· 
ce.ted by the mil1 tary group with _rega:r;d to .. Manchuria, which 
for months bad been going on under cover, came out into the 
open. The attempt of Baron Shi.dehara to negotiate a settle ... 
ment was made especiall1 difficult by the fact that 
:tnveatie;a.tors sent out by the Mukden author:\. tiee reported. 
that they found no evidence of the alleged murders. The 
mili ta.ry clique, on the other hand, <iee:trins r<tJvenge, 
exerted themselves to the ~tmost to inflame public opinion 
and sought to dictate the policy of the government by a. 
threat of independent punitive actio~ in Ma.nchuria.. 20 
"Japanese lives," thf.ly proola~med. loudly, "must be protected 
a.t all coste. The Japanese A:rmy must rise and strike 1n 
"21 $elf• defense. 
On September 121 Colonel r10ihara, Chief of the 
Kwa.ntuns garr:tmon's Special Service Corps, reported to 
General Kanaya, Chief' of Staff, regarding a concrete plan 
~ot- measure a· to be taken against China; which had been 
+---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f~t~h~e~K~wantung Arm~----------~----­
T.he action to be taken was thereupon carefully worked out bJ 
the General Staff s.nd the W'ar t'eparttpemt; and instructions 
were wired to Ganera.l Honjo, Commander of the Kwantung 
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Garrison. On September ll~, Colonel Doihe.:re, J.~ft Tokyo for 
Mukden al'ld immediately after hie arrival ieeued mobilization 
orders to all Japanese troops in the area in the same manner 
as at a time of actual 'Ytta.rfare. 22 Thus, the stagtJ was set 
for a major conflagration·. Only a epa.:rk we.e needed to set 
_ :1 t off., and it t..ras but a. matter of a few days before such a 
spark ~t&s furnished. 
Anti!.· "ln.S~dent. n Save for tho fa.ot that there we,s a 
sp1r1 t of expeete.noy in Je.panese mili tacy cirolea and a 
ten~eness on the part of those who had :reason to fear that 
Japan was planning a coup• all was peaceful in the city ot 
:Mukden on the night of September 18, 19'31. Moat of the 
3,nhabi tants had already retired., For others, the gay night 
life was in full swing. Suddenly the peace and gayety o:f' 
the city was shattered by the news th~a.t serious hostilities 
had broken out between Chinese and Japanese troops a few 
miles away, the.t the Chinese were being driven baok 11 and the 




plaoe tJn'ld had damaged a few teet of the tra.alra of the South 
Manohuria.n Railway.. '!'his damage, which the Japanese 
described as e. nblowing up•' of the ra.:tlra.od, actually 
-I-
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ootlsieted of nothing more than the ttora.cking of the fish~. 
" ' ' 
.. plate at the ,juncture of two rails, damagirAe; .the rail flange 
tor t\'10 feet on each side of the junction• and knocking a 
fet-r spl1nter;s off a w·ooden tie. ~-2'3 The Japa.neae claimed 
that their railroad police had a.ctual.ly w1 tnessed Chinese 
soldiers engaged in perpetrating the act; the Ohineee denied 
the a.oouaatlon, oha.rging, on the contra.ry • that the Japanese 
themaelvEJs CH'lmmitted the deed. Furthermore, the Oh1neee 
etnph$e1zed the fact that t .. he South Manohur1a11 Railway wa.a so 
thoroughly policed by the Japanese ae to have made it prac-
tica.lly :tmpoeaible for a.ny Ohinaea, more especially 
soldiers, to approa.oh olosa enough to the tre>oke to commit 
such an act. The truth :wiJ.l proba.bly never be known. and 
perhaps 1 t makes 11 t:tle dif:f'arenoe. \IJhoever wa.s responsi-
ble, the incident wa.e not of sufficient importance to 
justify what follo1tred.,. ifapan' s militarists -w-ere all set to 
eweep :into action, and thi a seemed to them to be the r-ight 
time. F'or yee.rs the Ohineae ~md Japr:meee ha.d ltnown that 
;- -- ------------
+---------~~LO~~~~~~~~·hns~·-Lforma~ wond~~~g-tub~eY~----------~--~ 
could atall it off 11 the latter how soon they dare ring up 
the curtain. Furtherrnoroe., almost every observant Westerner 
living in the Ori~nt knew that sooner or later the day would 
L ___ ----------· 
109 
come;. 24 Only the gentleman :tn the swivel chaira at home 
b(!ll1eved that the pea.ce of th~ Fa.:r Ea.st wae secure beee:.uae, 
forsooth, Japa.n had set her hand, wi tb eight other nations. 
to a treaty of peace and good 't~lll. mo. after all, to know 
who fired. the shot that was he~.rd e,round the. world :ts not so 
very important,. The important fe,ct is that immediately aft$r 
the explosion detachments of both Chinese and Japanese 
'roops had appeared on the·scene• and the :t:ighting bad 
ensued. Some four hundred Ohinese sol(liers :f'rom the nea.r ... by 
bar:ra.oke of Pei ta.ying had come to .the aeeiata.nce of thei:r 
comrades; and with the a,lmost simul tam)ous arrival of la:rge 
Jap~.neee reinforo$mEHlts, hostilities had assumed serious 
:proportions. The und$clared 'Vrar was on. !righting continued 
all night. By 2&'30 a.m. the Japanese hall tal-ten possession 
of tbe l?ei taying barraokat and by 4i30 a.m. they wer~ in 
tJomplate Qont:rol of the o:t ty of Mukden, T.he fllmoo·thnese, 
rapid1 ty, and efficiency with which t.hese opera tiona were 
carried ottt led to the Ohi:neee contention that the attack 
I= - --
s premeditated, 25 Mor--e~w~~~Ul'll.l------.-----~ 
Mukden that the Japanese were ready to strike., Word was 
flashed over. the wires f:trld through the ether to every 
n . . U . 
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Jape:nese army commander on the Asiatic ma.inhead. By day .. 
l+ght _of the nineteenth the Japnnee.e garrison in Korea was 
mobilized and troops were en route to Manchuria. Befo:re 
dawn Lieutenant-Genel:'al Shie:ru Honjo, command~r of the 
garrison of. Kwantung; Ja.pan • s leased ter:t•i to:cy in South 
l1anchur1a, had transferred his headquarters from Port .t'U'tbur 
to Mukde~, a move of 146 miles. W:t. th him, in oro\vded troop 
trains and rapid tr:a:n£'li t lo:c·ries, \·tent the infantry and 
a.rt';illery stationed at Fort Art.htn". Both he and his troops 
arrived in Mukden ·thttt morning. A squad:ron .. of Japanese 
bombing planes took the air in. Korea and shortly tharea.fte:r 
la.nd$d nEHJ.l" Mukden while in Jn.pan several brigades of 
1nfantey, ca,.•a.lry, r;~,nd arM.11eey v-rere mobilized and \'1ere 
waiting to erose the Yellow $ea. by midnight of the n~ne ... 
. teentht only ·twenty .. fo.ur hours· after the incident had 
ooourrad. This ·tends ·to show that ~H. ther the Japanese were 
m:lr~culously well-prepared or kne.w tho.t, somat.hing. was going 
to he.ppen, The trend of well-informed opinion seems to be 
.e.nat1on. 
On Septembat• 21 China appee,l~d to the League of 
. Nations invok1.ng .Ar·M.cla XI of ·the Oovenanti> In response 
tba league Oouno~.l addressed to the governments of· both 
OhimJ. and Ja.pa.n oommun;toat:tons urging both to refrain from 
peaceful B~tt.lament. China accepted the recommendations. 
I. 
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Japan stated that sba bad al:ree,dy ta.ken steps along the 
linee sugg~ated • tlv~t ,Japanese troops had been w:t thdra:wn · 
w1 thin t.he ra,:tlway 7.one, and that the Japanese <Jove:rnment 
intended to continue. wi thd.ra.wing as soon as ti"e.nqui11.ty was 
:restored. On September 23 the Japanese Government issued a. 
... communiqUE? in which it stated: 
·. · It. may be eupe~fluous tq ~pe&,t thEl..t · the Japanese 
Government harbors no terri to rial designs on · 
Manohtrria., Whe:t ''~e desire 1.$ ·ttnat Japanese subjects 
shall be· ena.bled ssf~ly to engage in v.arioue peace• 
· ful pursuits and ba given tha opportunity to 
partio:l.pate in the development of the.t land by 
mee,ns of capital a.nd labor.~ •• The Ja,pa:neee 
Go'llernmetlt, true to its established policy, is 
prepared to prever1t the pree$nt lno1det1t. from 
developing into a disastrous situa.tion between 
the two countries a.nd. ·to \'fO:r1t out such oonetruot1ve 
plane as "rill onoe and for all "i~clicate a.ny 
causes for future ft>iotion .; • • .Q 
While the JapB.nese were stating to the world 'that 
their only aim was to atabilize ·the ai.tua:t:i.on in Manchul:'ia 
ar1d to strive for pea.ce w:i t'h Ohin~ 11 the armies of the Mikado 
'ltTfH'e S"t-1ing1ng far and wide throughout the oount.ry. 
On" October 13 tha L$a.gue Council convened at Ganev.a 
+---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~T~~$~ed,~s~t~at~e~s~-~------~---­
tnen expreeaed surprise tha.t Japan bad not wi thd:rawn her 
forces'" On October 23 they adop·ted a resolution ca.ll:lne; for 
the immecH.e,te in~ tiation of a prog:t•eesive evacuat:ton by the 
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. Jt:apane sa to be completed 'by November. 16. At thie meeting 
'·the repreaenta.td.ves' o:t fou:rte~n nations we:re present •. The 
f:tnal vote aho,v-ed thh"teen m:ltions \Toting in f~a:VoY. .of the 
rasolutj.on and one, Japan, voting against 1t.~7 
Japan ane~n:n"ad this action of the League Opuneil by 
e)ttanding hex- occupation ('}f !>1a:nohu:rla. On November 18, tw() 
days after the date. set by the League for complete evaoua• 
tion, a strong JIJ.panese force took possession of Te1 taiha.r, 
o~p1 t,e.A of the Heilung-kiang Province • no·t-tr1 thstand1ng the 
:f'aQt that this c1 ty w~s several hundx'ed miles to the north 
of any po~tion of the South Manchurian Railway and far out..;, 
stde the zone of the treaty :rignts lrh1ch Japan cle.imad in 
Manolnu."ia. On Janua.xw 2 .• 1932~ in spite of' vigorous 
p:rotaste by the L-eague of Nations and the State Deptu•tment 
at 'fashington, Oh1nchow was seized by Japaneli!e forces; and 
1mmed1a.tely therea:rt,a:r, tJ;'la terri tory bl9twa~n Ohinohow and 
· Sha.nhaikwe.n ,.ras cleared of Chinese troops. 28 ,Japanae$ eon• 
trol \faS thus ext~nded Soltth to the Great vtall~ On 
J------/ill1'-9ebcv-.~Fruary 5, Harbin, tbe great cmnme~ ..... l-o~a~n~tw;;.e~r:.:-...t~....wni----Ut.~.~h.ao;z___ _____ _:___ _ 
n{)t'th 11 tft\S taken o·var 'by vapanesa troops.. Japan's military 
Oi'.H~Upe:titon of Manchuria t'fn,s now complete. 
bh~ng the §c~n'le! 1¥1. JSrllan. A clash be tween the 
milita):\iate and the o1v111an branches of the government 
broke out in Japan immediately following the n1noident." 
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The Oa.binet' s view was that the aitue,tion was local in 
nature and could be handled t.hrough normal diplomatic 
oha,nnels. The Cabinet asserted 1 tself by :revoking an order 
sent by vtar Minister Minami calling for troop reinforcements 
to be sent to Manohuria.a9 
· The m111 tari eta, however, put all the blame for the 
"1neidenttt on China s,nd stat.ed that the world powers would 
not intervene for this rea.son. They tfould not listen to 
Oe,binet pleas that the armies be removed from Manchuria in 
order to fac111 tate negotiations. In fact, after l~ar 
Minister Minami's order to eend troops to Manchuria had been 
killed by tbe Cabinet, the mili ta,:riate, under the leadership 
of' General Haye.ehi Senju:ro, too~ the responsibility for the 
$19t1ding of reinforoementa on their own. The rsin:foroett~ente 
t-tere sent, and the Al"llly progra,m for the occupation of 
anchur:ta wee ca~rieo out t-lithoU~a,.__3_0 _____________ ~ 
The struggle within Japan continued for weeks# and 
finally 11 the A:rmy emEtrged tr:tumpha,nt. It bad succeeded in 
29F$1S, aR• S1l•, P• 201. 
30 
114 
what it had started. out to do and had shamed and ridiculed 
the Cabinet by, its refu~aal,. to abide by the wishes of· the 
. '· 
civilian component of' goyernnu~nt 11 • O.iv~liap autho:ri ty was 
us.elees, powerless., s:nd disoredi ted~ From this time on• 
the major decisions. of Japan i:n foreign relation~ were to 
be made by the militarists and those in favor of their 
progra1n, ' 1 
The Minseito Government fall in December, 1931. It 
could not cope "td ~h the ever inoreas:tns power or the mil1""' 
ta:ey. It had been presented with an aoeompliahed fa.et in 
Manchuria, e.nd 1 t was forced to assume ra sponsibili ty for 
the actions. It eame under atte.ek from 1nt.arnal forces 
bEH)EUH3!51 of 1 ts l~lok o:f ~nthusiasm for mi11 taristie achieve-
ments and externally beo::U.1se of 1 te 1na.b111 ty to cope w1 th 
the wa:r;..lords,. The mili ta:riets ~ere one step awa:y from com'"' 
plete control of Japanese domestic affaire. 
Pe.:rty government ~ad one last chance in Japan. After 
the fall of the Minseito Governm~nt, the militarists cam• 
+-------~~wo:u~~-'-----Cl'o--f"ll,IJI-J~mant~aLwouJ d be----fi>-a\'QJe~. --~oi.hf"-. -.~oP~a,...r""'.tl3-y----------­
poli tics. The campaign failed. The new e;overnn)ent ws.s 
formed by the vetere;n Seiyukai lea<Jer11 Tauyoahi Inuka1, 
under advice of Prince Sa1onji, the one remaining elder 
a~atesm~n. This action involved party auooesaion rather 
'z'ZI\"'f . ·'----'!!h"'--'---_1~~_j_!__, __ ~· -·I -'--''·----'--*------------------------ ----- --------- ----
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than the assumption of internal pplitipal. power by tba army 
laa.d.ers., The Se1yukai, however, had always been e;n a,dvooate 
of .~ stronger foreign policy thru1 had the Mins~i to e.nd thus 
could be expected to give. more vigorous support to the 
Manchurian policy of the army leaders. For that reason 
their reaction to, 1 ts establishment mtUit be thought. of in 
domestic terms l"S>ther than in those of fo:reisn relations,. 
Elections for .. the Diet were. held 1n F~it)t'UtU'Y J 1932 3 
a.ntl since 1 t controlled the elect ton machinery, a Seiy:uka1 
niaJori ty was returntiid to :replace that of the M1nse1 to. 'l'he 
etz-uggls to overthrow the party system of government ~as 11 
therefore, r>esumedl, :EVen before the elections on 
F~bruaey 9, Inouye. former F;1nance J.U.n1ster, wae aseasst.~ 
ns.ted. About a mon.th later Bs.:ron De.n, head .of the M1 tsui 1- ---
1 
interests, was shot., 1h1a was only the beginn~ng. 'rbe e.rmy i 
I 
laun()hed e. oe.mpa1gn of terror throughout Japan. As_e$,ss1na-.. 1 
,_ 
I 
tiona, attempted aseass:tnationsp bomblngs, speeohes.. i 
pamphlets, rabble• rousers and demagogues were employed. by II 
T----------+-~~hH~~~~aerve no~1~~a-m~ Jiba~a-l~e-J~e~m-e~n~t~s~------~----
1 
that their e.dvice and coun$el were no longer needea..'32 No I 





The Mq 15 inc! dent. played. ·an importe:nt. role in the 
con.aoli<lation of mil1 tar1st1o powers. . As tTohn M.,. Mald .. 
· statas; 
The a.seasaina.t1ona1nd1cated that no prominent 
civilian was safe from attack by &xt:remiete either 
1n or out of tha aarvicea. Th~ conduct Qf the , 
tna.ls of the men involved :l.n the aasaeeirtat1one 
showad t,hat aotual and potential victims of assial!H'l5.ns 
not only la.cked the proteeM.on ot law, but that public 
opinion was definitely against them •. The a.ttack on 
the oap1taliets mea.nt that it was not healthy to be 
eitbe:r a businessman or a spokesman for theprotection 
of the interests of big business. The attacks on 
poli'tical party haadqua.rters and the attempt to 
involve the parties in the corruption of the business~ 
men a.lso indicated that pa.rties \qere in a po.s1tion 
where they could no longer play a dominant role in 
thEt· politics of Japta.n,. · The t~dst.ack on the groupe 
td thin Ja.ptul the,t m:1.ght possibly eta,y the sweep 34 toward powta'r of th~ mil:tt.ar~.sts was bearing fruit. 
ll'he assassination a continued, and w·i th them. developed 
an OVfH"lV'h$lming fear on the part of most influential· men· in 
Je,pan to do anything oontr~:v.'i.ictory to the wishes of the 
1n111 tacy • A.ssa,t:Hlina.t1ons, howe"~ter, were just one method 
used. by the m111 ta:r1sts to solidify their. posi t1ons,. They 
also inoraa.sad t.he already at:rone; imper-ialistic e.nd milita• 
T---------~~~~~~d~e~cttr.r~i~n~ati~-G%~~eopl~~tb~h-e~3r~b~e~s~t------~---­
to whip the llH'itesas up to a. frenzy of na.tione.li stic fervor.,. 
They coined the phrase unat,.onal crisis • tt a.n tmdefined term 




encouragement of e.nti-foreign p:rajudioas, a.nd the people 
we);"a taught to look.upon all foreigners a.s possible spies. 
On top of all this, the militarists issued hundl"eds 
of vehement pamphlets l>lhich furthe:r 1nfla.med the people 
age.inst the United Ste.tee~ Ruseia .• Engle.nd, the governmente.l 
~arti(fH3, the liberals~ China, and every ooneeiv~ble person, 
country, or thing, the diecreo1 t1ng of' which would ,enhs,noe 
the position of the clique. Ja:pa:.tl be3tUl to s:paak freely of 
liberating the people of Asi.a from the yoke of colonia.li sm. 
The people of the Western. powers laughed. this off, but the 
3a.pe.nese e,ocepted 1 t completely a.nd ca.me to believe tha:t 
Japan was the champion of the downtrodden peoples of ft.sia. 
and would ~ome day free t.hem from their \'lhi ta oppressore.35 
On the home front, th1.ngs not to the lilting of the 
mili ta.:ri ate ware termed un•Je.panesa and, 1f possible, sup-
p:resatJd. Liberal educators were forced to resign, leading 
statesmen \1-Iere driven out of po11 tiee..l life, and threats of 
death were passed out liberally. Smear techniques were 
erfooted a.nd uae<t with sld,l-l. So~~~i-tte-~-------'----­
to enter the ears of the Ja:panese citizens waa news praising 
the m111 te.rists and damn111g their opponents,. The o~ponenta 
didn.'t have a QhancEr~, 
J.l9 
lierhaps 1 t is only :f'i tting the.t a l:>l"'ief sentence be 
' ' 
inserted here ste,ting ·t,hat in 19~:3 Japan. und.e:r the domina.• 
·t:ton of the mili tariAts, re jectad the League of Nations and 
lett Geneva., The rea.son fo:r th~ refusa,l of t.he t.eaguat m 
eugg~stlons by (\J"apa:n was e;:tvan by General .A:ra.k1 S&deo. \'rho 
\'tept in front of t.he Lytton Commlss:ton and stated that they 
('the members of. the !J?Jasu¢l,) didn • t. see the true apiri t of 
Je.pan towa:t'd China e;nd the rest of As1e.~ That if the tl"Ue 
sp1:r:tt t-rere seen by the W$st$rn nations, they would pra1s~ 
and app:t•ove of the men of Japan who had such bumani te.:rian 
ideals. The Wast was eondemnEJd by the Jape:neea for some• 
thing that was f..mtiraly the do~ng of the m1B.ts.ry • a.nd the 
true cu.lpri ts. the ali que • walkerl off with honors. 
In 1933 a new Cabinet headed by Admiral Sa1 to toolt 
of:fice. .Although non.,.pa:rty it did include three represent"" 
ativea from the Seiyultai an.d two :from the Minsei to, thus 
making it partie.lly acceptable to them~ The tttro most 
important figul'es in the new. Oab:tnet '\'tere Gene:re.l Araki• the 
+-------..........._...~...__.~»ii-___,.,._,.._.............._.. __ ,,, .. s.;'----"~i-a;a.,.~.-r_M~S n Later and Kore k1 yo Takahashi. 
e.s l?inm1ce Minister.. This. Cabittet was of short. dul .. ation and 
did not contribute much to ei the:r the continuing :r:tne of the 
a:rmy or to th9 bolstering of the foundations of civilian 
government.. It aoted ae 9. breathing spell for the mili te.ry 




Relative calm thus reigned in thEi. internal' po11c1EHl 
of .rapan until ·the bag,.nning of' 1936. Ths new leaders of· 
the army a.nd the navy had apparently reverted to the same 
typ$ of alliance w:l tb the oa.p1 tali at and pe.rty forces a.s · 
that which had existed for t~wo deca.des after 1900 to whieh 
they had auoh a strong revulsion. Ho\rever, the eleot:tona, 
which were held. on February 20, :1.936• and which seemed to 
.-e.ugur a ratu.:rn t,o eo.rlier condi tlons* rlil3pret1anted the last 
of the calm before the storm. 
,k f.~2t.u~~t:;t .ti 1!1.~\sl~~t,. As a :result of the .elec""' 
tton of lSrJJ6. the M:lnaeito regained its position as tbe 
leading party in tbe Dic:~t ,,r1 th the Se:lyuka.:l second. The 
return of the. Minseito to control of t.he Diet probably ha.d 
somethtng to do \\r1 th the resumption of assassination aa a. 
pol:tticti!,l met~hod .• :36 The threat ·Of such direet a.ction had, 
htnieVer, beEHl oonsta:ntly present durine; the prececling yeareo 
Then."e had bt:)en no revulsion of popule.r fealing against. the 
. earl1eJ:> t..1-S$aesd.na; in :fe.ct, th®ra seemad. to be a;n a.eceptanoe 
+----------<"rl"--Ri. ttS:t-a.v Ecl~~!Hibs-e-~1-en--t-~~ien in •lapan---~-­
"· " • is like voting.. Things g~rt settled. The peo~ple get 
too much of' f.H">tnething and someone is t.uu:m.ssine.ttld., n31 
.. ~w------------------1 
l2l 
The high po:tnt of the sasa.osina ca.me during th~ 
Febl:'Ut;tr·y 26 Incid~nt. Th5.s \-;as· more like t:r ama,ll seale wa:r 
than a minor uprising. It took plac~ early in tba morning 
or febt>ua.ry 26 when appt-o:xima.tely 1500 young 'Al"'rr!'Y and NaV'f 
officers attempted. t.o ovff):rtbrow the government and for three 
days vi:rtually had the oi t.y of Tokyo in their erasp.. These 
a:l:'!UY un1 ts oce~pied. the Metropoli te,n ~olice Headquartel"SJ 
the l'ta.r Minis.t:cy, a.nd the Diet Build!r16• Many of the mo:re· 
liberal :ne'Vmpapere we-re t;,ttaoked rutd bu-rneei.· 
The (.l.aa:t.h 11 st was appalling a.nCJ 1noludec1· G&rll!.(re,l 
'lf1e.tanabe Jot.a.ro, !nspecrt.or-f,;et'lere,l of I-1111 t~try Education; 
TaJr.e.heu;~h1. Kot>ektyo, Finance lJU.nister; e.nd. Visoount Sa1 to 
Ma.koto, Lord 1\~&;per o.f the. l'rivy See,l. This .is the same 
Sa1 to· who h~td. bes,de~. an earlier government. and wae referr$d. 
to by Amerie&.n n~:n\fs;pap$ra a$ Japan• s. ••e;rtmd old. man,. J the 
same Sa:t to lf.rho :ln 19!5:? had t;'Jaid., "Evexw· th1 ne; t-til:l be t1ll 
r~gl:lt as long ae "re old. man· are he:re to put on the brakes. u38 
Whe-t happened ·t,o Sa1 to• s "old. men*'? Some bv.d the sam~& fate 
+-------~~~~~~~~~~~·~-~~~~~uhm.~j~ttme~d~--------------­
wea.ltly ·to the will of the mili t,ari sts.. l~cn\f there was no one 
"to put on the brakes. n 
. In sp:t te of t,he fr:tct thtAt the F~eb:rttary 26 Inc:ldent 
was 'begun by :r•a .. d:toa.l. army off'lo$rs. th~ mi11. te.:ry did not 
. . 
-----,-------------- ------------- ------ -·------------------
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los• praetig$ in the affair. They put seventeen of the 
radHH:tls to death and absolved themselves of' any blame by 
$tat1ng that the cause of the revolt lay outside of the 
army, that is, in civilian life and tha.t efforts must be 
tak~m to insure that such a thing never happens again. To 
accomplish this the militarists proposed two poi.ntst first. 
a olarifioa,tion of na,tional policy which waa desie;ned to 
attack lvestern ne,tions and oustoms e,nd. to •-purifyn Japanese 
beli$fa and second, a stab:Lliza.tion of national life which 
was a thinly designed program for putting the country on a 
war and eXpansionist footing. The Cabinet, sa.id the Army, 
he.d. to be strengthed while the author! ty of both tha Diet . 
and the Privy Council bad to be lessened,. 1his may seem odd 
until one remembers ·t}lat the Army held complete control over 
the de .. binet. This 1$ exactly whet bappeneo. 
In 19:37 the Al!"my toppled. the Hirota Ca.binet and 
refused to srant a We,r ~~inista:t> to the new propsective 
~ramiar. Lieutenant General Ugak1. Thi~ prevented the for-
at1on. tlf a Cabine--t.--"by Ugak~v.e-n--thQUgh he hM--t'b,.-~~~~~~~-'-----~~ 
Emparo:r-' e sanction, the backing of the people, tlnd the 
loyalty and respect of many genera.l.s 't.rho would he,ve gladly 
served \vi th him. Ugaki • s v1&\fB were deemed too liberal by 
th$ clique; a,nd the premiership finally went to General 
19~1 and sent tlf'Oops to Manchuria over the protests of th$ 
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Jremier and Cabinet members. There could be no d<>ubt as. to 
whether Army wishes would be followed with Hayashi in the 
driver's eeat.~9 
The first seven years of the third decade of the 
twentieth c~mtu:cy saw the military men of Japan aJ~:pe.nd on 
the Asian continent by the conquest of Manchuria~ At home, 
they had. <1enounoed the League of Ne.tions e.nd gotten away 
w:t th 1 t. They left the League e.nd promoted itppal"ialism. 
They denounced the London Naval Agreement and resumed the 
building of a huge Navy and the strengthening of the Army. 
They controlled the Emperor an<.'!. the os.b:tnat. · Wha.t was next? 
ln the decade from 19~1~19141, the foreign policy of 
Japan 't-Tas dividEJd. into dealings with three nations; China, 
Russia, and the Western Powe:ra, notably Grel!lt Britain and 
the Uni tad. State e., The dea.l1ngs ,.,i th China he.ve a.l:ree.d;y 
'been discussed e,t some length. :tt 1a interesting to note, 
however, that during this decade there were over 300 
i_ 
different diE;~putea bet'ltreen Japan and. China, Most of these 
+-------f~!lT'ttl~~'W'H'H+'i"'l",&d in North Ghi-n-a--fmd~!-~c-V±e-1-n~hft-------, . . 
Manohu:ritln bo:rd.er.. There was actual l:-¥arfara over Jehol 
Province, which was settled in 1932., Otha:r disputes in ... 
volved smugglingt narcotics, Japanese suppression ot 
student demonstrations in r-l!anohu:r1at; revision of textbooks. 
I 
,~ " -Tr-lnt;--;--- -~-,_T~-:--~ r-f-4~~~-:-;,~--------------------- ---- - --------------- ------------------------------------------ -- -- -------- -------------------------------; 
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and the harassment or educational leaders in Manchuria, and 
en1p1ng by soldiers of' both sides. Although nona of these 
disputes brought the two countries into full scale combat, 
they paved the tray for the events of the. summer of 19157. 
In 19'35 Japan a.gain presented to Ohina demands which 
were somewhat s1m1lt:tr to the Twenty•One Demands diaouased . 
earlier. Although not s.e comprehensive a.nd .as thorough tae 
the T\itenty•One Demands •. t~eee t-rere equally insulting· and 
\'lara kno'\>m as the Hirota Three Point Frogre.m. 
U!m~e.r' ~ In:r;e,! lfo~n~ j!;rocu;!!m. In october 19:35 
Foreign Minister !told Hirota of Japan presented to General 
Chiang Tso-p1n, Chinese Ambassa.dor e:t Tokyo., his demanda 
which stated that there had to be (1) poet1ve action by the 
Nfllnking Government in cooperation with Japan in t.he e:xtermi• 
nation of all a.nti•Jape.nese aot:tvi tee in Ohinta. t.U1d. tbe 
realization of positive Sino•Japanasa economio cooperation; 
(2)pos1 M.ve pol! tical ooopera,tion, itleluding Ohina.t a 
reoogni tion of' Manobukuo (Ma.nehu.ria.); e,nd (3) mili ta:ry 
~-------t'tf"ltrperation bet<treen Ch1na. 11 Japan,. ar.Hi--l~Q~l'l,~-------:------
1ng the spreo,d of. Communism in .North Oh.ina.. 40 It was 
l:'eoognized 1n Chit'la that the signing of any suoh agreement 
would place the nation in the position of a colonial 
,.· 
1~5 
depenc1enoy or pl"oteeto:.ra.te of Japan. The first principle, 
under the guise of suppressing anti•Ja.panese aotivitif.Hl, 
whutd put Japa.n in control of China's police administt"atiQn; 
the second would, of course, end in China's reoognition,ot 
Manahukuo 1 and the third \orould make China partr to a 
m:l.li ta.ry alliance w1 th Japan against the Sov:t.e·t Union. >, ~fl 
Oh1neae. refused to sign the a.gveement, and the m111 tar,. sts 
hesitated in calling ·a. full neal~ war against the Chinese. 
They had other matters to olea):' l1P first • 
.&;:l;.~1t,;lgn~ t!~ll i~tJ&1«:. .Ja,pan and Russia etc>od on the 
bx>1nlt of war sevara.l time.s dtn•ing the mid ... thii'tiea due to 
incidents along the Manchurie:n ... Mongolian bo.rdel":. This was 
not surprising, since the frontiers had .not been olee.rly 
defined aft~r the conquest of' .Me.noburia, by Japan, The 
'RtuuUana e,sse:rted that tha Manchurian.siberie.n frontier had 
bean '"ell de:f3.ned by trae.ty a.nd by a.ooompa.ny1ng ma.ps. Tba 
da.pa.nese. however, insisting on a new demarcation o·t bound· 




dieputes of e.t lee.at a minor sort ware oli1r.tain to continue. 
But \'that began as a. series of mtnor incidentr1, wi.tb 
1nd1vidua.1 eentri.as and patrols sniping at ee.oh other, g:raw 
progressively as the border foroea.on both sides were 
-I 
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major clashes in 1936.41 Such a major incident on the 
Mongol-Manohurian border Februar,v S-10, 1936, brought a 
crisis when several hundred Japanese and Manohukuoa.n troops, 
using truoke. tanks, and planes, penetrated some six miles 
into Mongolia. In the encounter which followed, the 
Japanese, definitely worsted, w1 thdrew behind their own 
boundary. An even more dangerous crisis was reached on the 
frontier in the latter days of March, 1936, when a Russian 
force of about 4,000 men faced a mixed Japanaee ... Manohukuoe.n 
force of about 2,500. A little 1nd1eoretion on the part of 
either commander would have probably committed the two 
. countries to a war for which neither was ready. Things ~rere 
at a stalemate. Japan accordingly gave up such provocative 
tactics and resorted to the safer strategy of probing into 
Ohina rather than into Russia.. 
On March 31• 19,6, a Pact of Mutual Assistance was 
signed between Russia. and Outer Mongolia. which sta.ted that 
an attack on outer Mongolia by Me.nohukuo, supported by 
+---------~~~~euld b~id~~~~~us~~s.ia~----------------~ 
itself. This def~ne1ve alliance ohecke~ Japanese and 
Manohukuoan aggressions. At the eame time; however, it pro-
vided Japane ae militarists w:t th further arguments 1n their 
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efforts to secure larger appropr1nt1ons for m111 taey 
p~:rposes .. 
Faced with the Ruseo~Mongolian Treaty. Japan's·war-
lord.s decided to make a, treaty of their own; and .tbe result 
was the Anti .. Oomintern J?a.ot of _November 25. 1936, between 
Germa:ny • Italy, and Jt?:pan. 'While di:recte.d against the 
policies of Russia, this pact also fur>n1shed working pol:t ti-
cal relationships between Berlin and Tokyo a.nd. gave Japan 
the basis of association with Italy, This collaboration of 
Japan with two strong European Powers on the hl!l.eie of 
hostility to communism helped to immobilize the Soviet 
Union and to weaken the vigor of 1 te opposition to cTapanE!ee 
policies in the Far East. The. militarists a,ga.in emerged on 
top* The Anti ... Oominte:rn Pact emphasized the words of 
Gene:ra.l .Araki when he said: 
Japan must defend h~reelf against those wolves 
Which are sharpening their tangs, and castaway eats 
showing their teeth tor attack. In one "TPray or another 
sooner or later, Russia mu.st be destroyed. 42 · 
Re~atitQn,ff, l.'l1.1m ~be Yn.1Je~4 §~a~eg ~ g~~~~ 1!£~~~1n. 
In this case, threata·and intimidations took the place of 
actual fighting, although seV"ara.l times \\far was closer than 
the great me.jot>i ty of people imagined.· The Japanese war-
lords knew that their policies were directed towa.;rd an 
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eventual war with the W'eatern Po'l,lrers. Al,l they ha.d to do 
was choose the time. and plaee. They even want ao :f'a.:r e,e to 
openly predict the coming catastrophe ltno1d.ng full '"'ell that 
both Gretl.t B:ri tain and the United States would look upon 
their threats as only idle bol3.sts. Throughout the thirties 
these threats trtere commonplace.. Lieutani.mt Fujita d.eola.:rada 
.. Great Britain i a in the t'Vtilight a.nd an Anglo-Japanese war 
will· J~ead. to GreB.t Bri t .. ain* s setr .... de struction. "4<3. One of 
the highe at ranldng m~mbers of the mili t,a.rist clique • 
Genere.l ·. Sa.to, dE:H&tined. to become Foreign Minist,er in the 
latter thirties decla,;red that; 
Ato~rican desig!ls threaten our existence, the. 
future of our country, a.nd our posterity. :tf wt' 
do not thwart those designs now·, ttta oa.nnot die in 
peace. A Japan-American war is inevitable. We 
emphatica.lly c1eo,4ip"e that America is our open and 
immediata.enamy. . 
1~eee then we~ the warnings given to the Western Fowera3 
but as the war-lords predicted, they went unheeded- Even 
actions fe.iled. to a.:rousa the ire of America to the extent 
that she would declare war against Nippon as wae proven in 
the iana:L case • 
.i3Jlg.•J.tl?ille sa te 1, a,.t iSHli a 12l§.-J:yl~, 1.m. One 
source of dissatiafaotion among. the Chinese people with the 




to aome ex·tent to Japanese pressure rather' them attempt 
nnationa.l salve.tionu by toesiatance even to- the ultimate 
point of war. In other wo:t•dst while Chiang Kai ... shek was 
attempting to get along with Japan by negotiatins settle• 
mente of issues which e.rose or were oree.ted, the Chinese 
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were stead11y growing more a.nt1•Je.paneae in sentiment., This 
was shown by the proclaimed objectives of me.ny of the 
in:flu~:mtia,l parties and individu~ls in Cbil'la during this 
time, There \'le:r>e striking indication~ of the growing anti-
Japanese sentiment among the Ohinaaa 110pUla.oe. These 
· oocu~red. at euoh widely aepara tad places the,t the feeling 
must be considered to have been national in cha:racter.. A 
·Japanese druggist wa~ killed by a. mob at Pakhoi in Kwangtung 
province.. A consular policeman wa~r killed. at Har1kow. '!he 
Js;pan~ee consul at awatow reported the d.:l.ecove:ry of a bomb 
in a Japanese restaurant at tha.t place. It was alleged that 
a J~paneee officer and hie orderly ha.d bean a.ssaul ted e,t 
F'engta.1, a short dista.noe out o:f Peking, Three Japanese 
+------~'*~~~e p;t~nm-~i-n--the Internetio-:tla . ~.---------~ 
Settlement at Shanghai, a.lthough the al"$a was beyond Ohineee 
juriad.ict1on.45. 
The Japa.neee rea.ction to these outbreaks w~ts to 
increase their forces which; in tjurnt al"ouaed even more 
45T,. A. Bisson, lft.RGsll In.· Qb~.n.'! (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1938 , P• 9. · · · 
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:resentment among the Oh1nese. Thim resentment manifested 
itself in further outbreaks, which brought Japa,neae flepris-
als. Things, seemed to be hea41ng for a ehowdollm. Thera was 
a period of comparative quiet about the tim$ of the over--
thl"t:n'l of the lii:r•ota Government in Japan. It a~emed thRt an 
agreement might ba reached,. but Je.panese ina1atat'.lce t}.1at 
their armies ba allowed to moile independently within China 
quenched this hope. The m1li tarists, made eu:re that no, 
agreement was reached. They had pla,nned for another 
ninoictent1 " and it was soon in eomi'ng,. 
1\i. .~YGQ9.q1~ iD914~A~· On the night of July 7, 
19~7; Japanese garrieon troops at r .. ukouohia.o held an ~nuaual 
maneuver and 11 alleging that a. Japanese soldier \'tas m:tae:tng., 
demanded ~ntr-y :tnto the city of Wanping to conduct a. search. 
Fighting broke out while the Japanese complaint was still 
under negotiation; and on the ert.4!!:rnoon of .:ruJ.y 8, the 
Japanese lasued an uJ.t,imatum for the surrendel" of the city. 
Xn th~ battle which ensued, the Japanese forces sustained 
cas and 10, a truce was agreed to u~on the 
proposal of the Japane ae command$r. 46 
The incident might have been regarded as closed. but 
that waa not the Japanese intention. lfithin 'twenty ... :four 
,.,!:4< ~ ' ' . t t . f 
., p. 15. Bisson giVes a oare:tul review of the 
--o:t:roumatanoee surr-ouna1ng-tna--1nl.riaa-nt-1n-Ohap"er_I_o:f-tb1s _______ ---~ 
work. :tt is probably the most :faotual and accurate account 




hours of the 1n1 tial conflict. ltu•e;e unite of the Kwantung 
Army b~gan to converge upon the scene of the fighting. 
Reinforcements having reached North Oh1na. new demands were 
made for the wi thdra.wa.l of Ohinase forces. On July 13• the 
Army General Staff decided tha.t, 1:f Clhina se troops were sent 
to North China., :ra solute steps would be talten to meet th$ 
e1tuat1on.47 In default of compliance with the new Japanas$ 
demande 11 fighting was resumed at Lukouobiao upon the follow-
ing day. The war with Chine. had bee;un. 
The incident at Lukouch1ao was the culmination of the 
Army•e scheme for bring1ns North China under Japanese rule. 
Plans had been made-nrontns-befora-.- -Now th-ey-we:re-r~dy- t-o--
be carried out. 
The war itself is of such recent history that it need 
not be carried into sreat Cl.eta.il. Suftice to say that the 
militarists me$t a strong set•baok in the refusal of Chiang 
and his government to give in to the overwhelming super1ori• 
ty of the Japanese. Instead of a quick victory, the war 
+-------AA~'P'i-f~l!arttraeefid-'into a stalemate. Al---1i-h~tH~-t-r~a-d--"tMh'tt:e~-----,---~ 
plt?.ns of the milite,rists, it enabled them to ga.in an even 
stronger strangle-hold upon the Je.p11nese nation by their 
1ns1stanoe that production be diverted primarily to war 
materials., More important in fact than the purely trl111 tary 
~------........ ~-~~---.... --iii!i'ii'----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -
preparations of 1937 wa.s th~ degree in, which the Army had 
achieved the :realization of 1 te broa.der scheme to mobilize 
the entire strength of the ~apanese nation for.wa:r. By 
electing to :renew the \'Tar in Chine., the .Army had seen. 1 ts 
major schemes adopted by government and nation with a read1~ 
l'HH'HS soa.roely possible of atta.inmemt in t,1me of peace.. The 
!la.tion was united behind the m111 ta,riste, and they were 
un1.ted in their determ1ne.tion to brins the doctrine of. !1'1-JslsQ 
\Qb&u to fulfillment. 
In Japan itself, the nation wae placed on war footing 
all through the latter thirties. 'lbe Army placed ita 
pel"sonnel in charge of the newspapers ll p:ropa.e;a.nde. outlets, 
and even in the schools. The Diet was purged of member$ who 
refused to aec$pt the m111tariate• schemes. The f!tRa2~Y 
were eourtad and won over to the Army side.. The Empe:ro:r was 
issuing Imperial Reeo:ripts prE!lpt.u•ed by the war-lords. 
Cabinets came and. went, and. every new Cabinet et~ngthenad 
the poei tion of the mili taey by the inclusion of more and 
! 







ore rabid expans1on1sts.48 !h~atern Power$ w~~o¥pe~n~l~Y~-------4---­
denounoed; and the United States in particular was damned, 
&specially after July llv 19,S, when America placed a moral 
embargo upon aircraft and war materials shipped to Japan. 
-~{London; George Allen and 
49 !W•• P• ll:S. 
49 
The handwriting was on the·wall, but the diplomats of the 
Wast basked in the $bJ~atz sunshine of pa.o1fi sm arid neutral• 
1ty. 
~'apanese fotreign relations during the period f:l:"'lll the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese W!itr until the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor can be ~oneolidated into her dealings with the Uni tad 
States and Great Britain on one,hand and Garmany and the 
Soviet 'Onion on the other. Her dealings '.'tith China. at this 
time were wholly militar-y as would be expected, so we will 
confine our scrutinizat1on to the above mentioned nations. 
~~attgns ~. 2$tWSlD¥ !US! ..1tJl! ~ov,i~~ U.n1~!l· Japan 
had been asseptially on the defeneive agairH~t the Soviet 
Union, at least after 1935, when, Japana ee pre seu:re had 
affected the ea.la 9f the Russian interests in the Chinese 
Eastern Railway to Manoh~kuo. After the outbreak of the 
Sino-Ja:pane se confliot, the Sovie~ Union, which viewed with 
concern the prospects of the e.beorp~ion of China by Japan, 
gave the Chineee government extensive aid in the fo:rm of 
+------~~L--IR~'------el~i.N--~~'"-J.I.~·e.obni-oe.J.__adllica and by her m1-llta:ey--------,--
d1.spoa1 tione along t~he bo:rder 1mmob1H.2'.ed. in lJ!anchuria a. 
considerable part of Je.ptat'lt s beat troops.5° An armed clash 
:ln Ju1y 11 19,8, betwee~ Soviet and Japanese forces at 
Oha.ngkufeng lUll led to t~n days', f:tght:t~g, anci. another 
clash· in 1939 along the l4ongolia~ border :tnaugu:re.ted 
extenetve hosi tili t:tas lasting from May until September. 
The Army and war-lords, knowing· tba.t a conflict was !nevi ta-
ble, ware powe rla sa to resort to force due to the boeti11-
tia e in Ohi.na. As a. means of checking the Soviet Union, the 
Japanese Army, after the outbreak of the. conflict with China_ 
worked actively for a closer tie with Germe.ny than that 
l4ff6rded by the Anti ... Oomintem Pact cone luded in November, 
1936. Garm&ny,. which had extensive commercial interests in 
China, ~ra.s none to pleased with. Japan • e program thff}re e.nd was 
willing to consider an alliance only if it assured Germ~ny 
of Japan• s support against Br1tain and F'ra.noe.51 · J·apa.n'e 
leaders opposed making commitments \vhioh mie;ht involve 1. t in 
a. Eurppean we.r. In May, 1939, Baron K11ch1ro Hiranuma, who 
in .January had auooeeded Konoye am premier, undertook a 
trash initiative tot1ard an alliance. sua.denly, on August 23, 
the conclusion of' the German ... a~v1et Nonage;raee1on Pact was 
+-------fuu'!VU~u:np.;c;.>.::;eu;.;dt-...-·-\ilae~rmany' e a.ct1on without giving prior notice to 
Japan and the fact that the plea for an alliance had rested 
on i te expected value age.inst Russia Nsul ted in the dis,.. 
crediting of tbe pro~German po11c1ee of the K1ranuma Cabinet 
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52 . and forced it to resign.· · l'ihile 1t is true tha.t the 
German..-Sov1et All~.ance arouse~ th~ ire o:r .tha. militarists, 
i't also enabled them to spur the people and government into 
even mora fra.nt.io attempts to prepare for \-rar. It gave the 
mili ta.rists an even tighter grip on the nation. After the 
German attack upon the Soviet Union, ties between Japan and 
GermatlY grew evan closer; and they l'tere united .in a single, 
anib1 t1ous. m111 tarist,ic • expansionist pi"ogra.m. 
B!!~at~.Qnf! '(IJ'i~h, t.lt~ }.Tn,~!e.S ~iav~i· From the outset of 
hostilities in the Sino-Japanese War, the. rights and interests 
of. other powers in China suffereo from Japanese acts. 
Bri ti ah property :tntere sts in China. were granter than those 
of any othe;r power, but Great Britain was largely preoccu-
pied with the orisi a an<l the eubsequEimt \'lar in Europe. 
Consequently, :tt we.~ chiefly the United States that led in 
efforts to ~strain Japem. On De.oember 121! 1937 t Japanese 
. atroraft bombed and sank the U,S. s. :Par111t in ~he Yangtze 
River under airoumatance.s which pointed to either a del3.ber-
r-
+----------n~1e~·~d~1~s~r~a~s~a~r~d~. ~o~~~~~or ~~~~~e----------------~--~ 
responsible person. The Ja.pa.nese government called the act 
unintentional and made a prompt settlement consisting, of an 
expression of regret, aasux·anoes th'!t :neasures would be 
taken ae;ainst infringement of the righta a.nd intar:ferenoe 
J------------......................... _.......,.. ___ --------------------- ------- ---- -- ------------------------------- ----------------------------- -' ------------------'-
with the interests of the Un1 ted States and other pcrw-era. 
di sc~.pline.ry e.ct1on a.s~d.net ·t:.he ;r~ r!ponsible commanders, and 
indemnification amounting to $2,.2141 007.
53 Hillis Lory 
states tha.t the s:tnldns waa. done on purpotJa under the direct 
o:t-ders of General Hayashi w1 th the hope the.t 1 t \'muld lead 
to a declaration of war by the Unit$d States.54 The war-
lords were prepa:red to engage in actual warfe.re with the 
Un:t ted States as early as this.. To the disappointment of 
the mi11tar1sta, wa.:r. w~o. n~t declaredJ and they resorted to 
t1me .. b1d~ng. 
The Jape.nese :f'ailu:ra to keep the assu;re.noes given in 
conpection with the Pe.nax aettlement tmd the vain efforts by 
the United States to obtain t,he diseontinuanoa of and 
redress for Je.panese violations of' American rights tJ.nd. the 
oeaeation of indiecrjJnina.te bombings :f~om the a.ir, which had 
oa,used the death of tnany t.houaa.nds of' Chinese civilian 
populat1on a:r1c1 \'ffJ;t'Ei jeoparct1 zing the lt vee of thi:rd-powex• 
nationals, eventually 1nduoed the United states on July 1, 
l.9~8, to pleoa a moral embargO--U-po-l'l-the-a~:Lai-l"C..'aft-----'----­
and aircraft equipment to Jape.th On Octobe:t• 6, in oonse ... 
quence of the Japanese government's continued fa.i lure to 
5~dw1n 0., Reieohauer, ~: ~ 1\Uq, Pi!seQl (New 





fulfill its repeated aseur$-ncee to oh~~rve. the pr1neiple.of 
equality of commercial opportunity, the UniteCl. St~Pttes 
addressed to t~he Je.pa.nese government e. oomprehaneive note on 
its discrimina.tory practice e and interference w1 th .American 
rights s.nd asked t.hat these be et1scont1nuad promptly.. · The 
.Japa:nese government' a reply, on November 19; . was a.n open 
che.llenge to the iifastarn powers in the aesex~tion of Japan's 
:pretensions to the domine,tion of China; a.nd it oonsti tuted e. 
repudiation o:f the treaties concerning China. 55 The note. 
etated in pa.:rt that Japan was devoting her energy to the 
establishment of a ne1>t order based on international justice 
throughout East Asia, the attainment of which was indlspen• 
sable to the very existence of Japan and was the foundation 
of the and.\U"ing peace and stab111 ty of that region. The 
conviction 'tltas expressed that 1n the na't't eituat1ol1 fast 
dErveloping in East Asia e.n attempt to apply inapplicable 
ideas and principles of the paat would neither oontr:tbutEil to 
the ast,ablishmen·t of a t'f~al peace i.n East Asia. no:r solve :the 
Since the Japanese note contained no satisfactory 
assurances for an a.melio:ration of t,he si tuat1on, the United 
$tatas on D$camber 31 delivered to the Japanese government 
I 
a.nother note expounding more fully the Ame:d.ce.n position~ 
No reply to that. nota ws.e made. on July 26, 1939. the 
tJnited States notified Japan of. :tts. desire to terminate the 
Treaty of Commerce s.nd Navigation of 1911,. 56 The tTni ted· · 
States raasone<l th~t the treaty was not affording adequate 
protection to Amel."'ican commerce either in Japan or in 
Japa.neae ... oocupied portions of Ohirm., whila a:t the same time 
the opera tiotl of tha moe t fe:vored nation cle.usf!) of the trea-
ty W8.e t:t bar im t.h~ adoption of retaliatory measures against 
Ja,pans sa oomm(fn-•ce. r.!'h;ts notif:loation came tlt a junotUt'$ 
When G:rea t :Sri tair1 was bal.ng subjeeted to pressu ra. through 
& partial blockade by Ja.pe:n of the Bri tinh a;nd ll':rench con• 
eassio:ns a.t Tien·tsin, to surrender to a local Je,paneee 
oontx-olled court four Chinese whom' the Je..pane sa hall accused 
'' 
of eomplioi ty in the murder of ~l. :puppet Ch:lne se official. 
On August 18, hcn'l'eve:r1 the Brltish amba.asador informed the 
JapanaE~a government thf:tt Br.i ·te,:tn would be unable to 
ooneid.er, in a conference with Japa,n a.lonet p:roblemr~ affeot-
+-'---------.l~'r--\lf.j,l-Q-..1,~· ...,_· ..~r' ·..,.__,.d~hi rd pOl'lte rs. Thfl___lt1ar- J o rds---tUlW-:---tb.t:J·--------
disuni ty of the l'lestern pcn<~e:re and were quiok to take 
advantage of the sa:me. 
The a1tuat1on kept deteriorating steadily.· The 
mil1 tarists refused to answer l!lSny American protests let 
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a.lon$ accede to them,. F'ina.lly, concU tion.s b~c$me so bad 
that a new· Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kio~isabttt~·o JITomura, 
was sent to the United Ste.tes to discuss with Preetdent 
Roo·sevelt and Secretary of Sta-te Hull means of :lmpl"'ving 
relations bet\'10em the tt>to countr1ee.57 Arabassador Nomura . . 
was assured by Secretary of State Hull that the United 
States '\'las ready and w.ill1ng to di souse any and all· means 
for alleviating the Fa:r Eastern crisis. This marked tbe 
beginning of the negotiations wbiah l<Te!'e to oont:tnue down to 
. December 7t a period of eight months. 
During the time that these negotiations were be:tns 
carried on, Japan allied herself even more strongly "':tth 
Germany through a strengthening of the. Axis Pact and e.t the 
same time signed a non ... aggress1on pe..et tdth Russia. 1'h1s 
a.ll lent added prestige to the militarists who had been the 
guiding hand behind. the two diplomatic e.ch:tevements.11 Japan 
wa.s now olosel.y attaobed to Hitler's Germany '\'thich was 




Soviety Union.. The war-lo:rd.s could now concent:ra.te entirely 
on the Un:tted Sta.tee .. 
The die ,!! ~· Orl October• 17 the inevitable 
happened . ., The army took over the govel"nment in name as well 
_t!J_~~-..,, .. _ __:_ ---.,.!L~L· ._ :- __ L . __ I 4---------------------------------- ----------------------- ----------------------- ----------------- -------------------
· 57 Gayn, ai• ~·, p. 149. 
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as in action. Hideki Tojo ass~maq, t~ha P;remiarehipli kept the 
War Ministry, and 8AilB.mned the Home Ministry~ F'or the first 
time in cent uris e pol1 t1oel., military, and policE! pol-IS r we%'$ 
concentrated :tn the hands of a. sir,tgla man"' '.t'he mili·ta:r·ists 
ha.d decided th$. t 1 t was time to shO't>f their true colors- and 
this they did• '!'heir policy, known ae ''a:rQJed diplomacy,n 
ranted, raved~ tlt'Jd threatened. 'l'he clouds of war g~w 
On l'Jov~mber 5, hope for maintaining peace in the 
Paei;fie rose when the Japanese Government dispa.tohed one of 
1 ts moat able diplomatef Saburu Kurusu, to w·ashington to 
a.eeist Amb~'lesador Nomura in the negotiations be:tng carried 
on. Hopes soared but in vain. The aims of the militarists 
had been made clear several times. n1ey had been reiterated 
periodically.. They were in such direct disagreement to the 
stated aims e.nd pollcias of the United States .that it was 
now apparent that war w·as almost inevitable. Experienced 
observe:rs sent their words of warning, but many Englishmen 
+--------&HU---ilE!.I~e,..,;r:':ii;-(;Jo:-aa.-Hn-as-l¥11·1are eo G~e-thought of wa.~cA&-'t'.t-------'----­
they laa.ped at any sign or indication tha:t peace might 
preve.il while disregarding the blate.nt 't>le.ets of the war 
lor<l.s" 




~"~hat is it going to be, a wa,y to peace or an 
approach to war? Japan ha,e chosen to speak for 
peace. At the aa.me time, abe makes 1 t pla.in and 
ugly as a tank tha.t she ce,n take care of herself 
and her neighbors and will brook no threat, 
intimidation, encirclement, or blockade, or other 
acts near war. Japan does not go to America or any 
nation with hat in he~d, but stands conscious of her 
power for peace or war~ The enc1rcling nations can 
have 1 t either way. Lest there be misunderstE-lnd.ings, 
people everywhere should understand clearly that 
Japan 1 a not tu~king favors, rather she i.e ready to 
confer them. Her people do me.ke dema.nds :for 
cessation of various f'orms of hoet111 ties; which 
must :not be interpreted a,e a. weakness. \'leak na.M.one 
all'm.ya plead in vain. Strong one a demand, and. they 
get, their rights, as this country intends to do. 
This Empire ie nobody'e tool. It understands with 
full clarity the implications of any combination 
8 against it_ arising out of a world-wide v1ctory.5 
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On November l, 1941, Domei News Agency declared that Ja.pan 
was completing her war preparations for an armed cla.ah in 
the Pacific, "Which now seems inev:t table a,nd can be averted 
only if. the United States alleviates economic pressure on 
Japan • .-59 On November 10, Finance Minister Kaya declared 
the.t it was Japan • s aim to " • ,. • force Britain and the 
United States to retreat from East Aeia."00 These threats 
oould.n' t be any blunter or clea.rer11 and yet they were almost 
wholly ignored. The Western powers thought that nothing 
would happen while the special emissaries of the Emperor 
. . !58otto D., Tolisohus, ~of'o ~cgrd (New York: Reyna.l 
and Hi tohcock, 194~). pp., 27 - .0. 
9 . ·-·- -·-· ·----···--- ----· -··-·-·-·-----------··----- --·-·-·-----·----------- --+ 
were in t'lashington w1 th proposals of peace. Just what were 
these proposals. Tolischue lists. themas,;t'ollowe: 
l. All military and economic ai9- to Cb~ngk1ng must 
cease. . · . . · .... .. ... ... ... . _ 
··---2.-0hina must be left "tree to dea.l with Japan," and 
Chungking must be advised to make pea.oe with Japan. 
3. Military and economic encirclement of Japan must 
end. 
4~ Japan' e "Ooprosperity Sphere" must be acknowledged 
and Manchukuo. Ghina, !ndo .... Ohina, Tba~land, the 
Netherlands East Indies, and other states and 
protectorates must be a.llowed to establish their 
own poli tic~l and economic relatione with Ja.pan 
without interference of any k1ndo · · 
5. Manchukuo'must b~ reco~ni2ed; uNobody will undo 
what baa been done there. 
6. The freezing of' ·Ja.pa.nese and Chinese assets must 
be ended unconditionally. . , 
7. Trade treaties must be resto51d and e,ll restrictions 
on shipping and commerce ended. 
With proposals such a.s this, it tvas apparent that the 
mission of Kurusu was doomed to :failure. It is now clear 
that this was what the militarists were re~lly after. All 
of t~eir planning and their efforts ha.d been directed to 
this end. To Tojo and hie assoc1atee, it seemed the.t the 
time had come for them to rule, ,not only Japan, but the 
world. ;§ak}So tg,b~Y ltas the principle that guided them. The 
way of the Emperor was clear. All that was needed was 
another "incident. n This "totas prov_ided in the early hours 
of the morning on Sunday, December 7, 19.l•l. The war ... lords 
struck, ancl the world was a.t war. 
1---------· -61---·-·---···-- ------------,-------------- .. ·'-·-·----------·--·------·,--·-
·~1~ •• p. 287. 
OH.AP'l~R Vl I. 
The :rol$ of the ~!!'gat~Ua in the ten yea:rs from 19;>1 
to 191n might fall into th$ category of ~·a. riddle wrapped in 
a myetery 11 inside an enigma, n lbera ara mtl,ny c11fferent 
views v.s to the aot!lftl :pe,rticipation of the eombj.nes in the 
:formulation of imperialistio and m1lita:riat1o policies. Ons 
school of thought agrees with the statement of Joseph B. 
Kennan, Chief of the Int.erna.tional Prosecution Seet1on 11 when 
ba said a '*No evidence haa been unearthed to sho\'T that 
businessman were responsible for the war; n that industrial-
ists e.nd oapi tal1ets helped the militarists only nat the 
point of a. c~un. nl This group would absolve tne ~a.~l?i.1H!,~ of 
any guilt at all in th$ ~eponsibility of Japanese -v1ar 
plans. 
'.t'here is a.nothe:r group, however, whiah aoousf)e the 
~~ipa~~y of guilt equal to that of the militarists in the 
g to Pearl Harbor 
Professor ~r. A. Bisson states; 
At all. stages of' J'a.Pan•s modern career, the 
!li~~~~~ combines were closely ti~d to th$ 
Alonzo L. Be,ker' a .,The Influence of the . 
n 
t--------...Uni v a rsi tyo-f~Sou tl:iC.f:i:'n-Cfaiifcfrnf~;--tom--Knge letr; -Juna;-'1948 ;-~------ ----------
P• 242. 
m1l1 taey ... bureaucra ti o elements that planned and 
exeouted
2 
the st:r-ategic phases of the expa.nsionist 
program. 
144 
Willard Price, another member of this school, wrote, "Mitsui 
(largest of the Z~ib~}tay) car:t•ied the amy in its pocket--
except occasionally 'tthen the army slipped out of the pocltEit : 
and carried the Mitsui."' lt seems that most students of 
Japa.neee a:f'faire during ·this period agree tha,t if the 
~a~bl}tSij did not actively endorse tbe policies of' the 
militarists, they did nothing to obstruct them. It 1e on 
this premise that we continue with our inveet1sat1on. 
On the surface it has often seemed that the ''aib.at§JiJ 
were the chief opponents of the army extremists in the 
political struggle of the "decisive decade." this is only 
partly true. These two groups had been the stroxlg~H=!t, 
political forces in Japan.. Thay both sought to win tbe 
bureaucrats and public opinion to their si d.e, but they were 
in complete agreement on many ,pointe. 
The Za*ba~!Uh as well as the mili te.ry, ·ware interested 
en advantage of it 
reeul ts. Many of them favored the ~4anchur1an invtil.sion. 
beoa.ur!!e they saw that it would give widespr-ead social 
-c--~-. _,W111i:!.rd-Prfoe~--~~i 19. Je.~ap. (New York: : The John Day , 
Company, 1946), p. ,6. 
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discontent in Japan a safe outlet •. Bu:t a:t. the. Sf!!.me ti.me, 
the Z~tqfa~ay tended to be more catrt1oua than the a:rm;v· lead-
ere· in foreign poli.ey. They d.id no.t want tp te.ke risks or 
to plunge raaklessly into a big war if' the chances of 
success we:re slight. 
Even ort the home front, there was a.n area. of agree• 
ment between the army extremists and thf3i business men. Both 
wished to m~in·tain their ruling poei :tion aga~.nst the threa:ti 
of a social :revolut~on. Tne Minseito government took meae-
.uree to at~:MJlP out revolutionary groupe· as ea:t1y as 1829-30; 
the height of ndemoore.t1o" go\7ernment in Japan.. There -was 
full agreement on :reg1mentat1ot1 of this kind, but the 
Z!3rbaygy bitterly opposed the army• e ef:f'o:rte to taka over 
all political power or to seize Qontrol of their business 
. ' . 4 
enterpriseth 
Keeping these general thoue;bts in mind, \VEl, oa,n tum 
to a cons~dera tion of the bib~~~~ in the ''deois ive decade." 
i2£Hl~~~S ,qgpf!e,gue;~ss .2! .Jal,! .;.a.~q~tsu. Any full 
.J--------1iPJ~t.l.l3cfU_nl:-Jjhe economic consequences of the J~lUL~~Y mus 
te.ke into account an extremely b~ad range of value judg· 
ments. So much has been said of t.he social evils latent in 
monopolistic aggrega.tione of wee~ th. and financial power 
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that 1 t is easy to o'Verlook other .. cons.iderations.. Market 
struotura and busine ea pl"a.ctice must ba judged in part at 
least by their etfeotm on lo~g"'"run economic. de:Yelopment. 
:Beyond the question of profits is the question of hO\'r they 
are used'• And the ul tlmate teat of efficiency is not any 
particular structure of entel:"pr:tse but whether wide scope is 
allcn1ed. for in1 tiative 1 whether steady improvements ta,ke 
place· in products arJd px>ooesaes, ,.,ha.thar output grows a.nd 
diversifies with 1ncreasit1S m€:'l.turi ty and falling oosts. 
whether the_ system wot•ke for or against economic. atabili ty, 
and the wise use of resources. 
Looking back at the b¥'oad histoey of ~apan in the 
p~wa:r .era. one cannot fail to be impressed w1 th the con• 
struct:tve 1~ole of the JapanetH~ combines in teohn:l.ca.l 
progress, espeeie.lly in the earlier d$oades. The ~at,'tf@.tt:}y 
were not merely political tdra-pullere or financial 
m.anipt~latprs or even :renti(;tr investors.,. They performed M· 
essential function in la:rge•ecale entE~rpr:lse "'hieh could 
be State an4 not 
nem;,ssar:tly wi tb greater public benef:t t. If they rea,ped 
fabulous gains. as they did; they continUed to plough baGk 
the, la.rger sbe.ra in entrapreneur:i.e,l ~.nvestment in neW' and 
e~panding activity. The new is always \U'lcerta1n; and as 
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ward off oompeti t1on 1 e apt to be the condition of euoceee-
ful innovation, especially where large outlays are at etaka.115 
Very likely the concentration of control was exces-
sive in v.arioue fields. even tak;ing efficiency alone as the 
criterion. Yet the combines were able to risk major under. 
takings of a combined eba.raoter bee au sa they were large and 
to gain substantial profits from new products and new 
pr~oeeeee even if rival firms subsequently copied them. By 
virtue of their resources, they were e,ble to command and 
tre.in the best business s,nd engineering talent to staff their 
companies. Their operating companies pioneered many of the 
major innove.tions in banking, le.rge-scale industry_ a.nd 
tradet ce,p1 ta.l1zing on the frettelom and support extended by a 
solicitous government. 6 In so doing they built a new frame-
work within which their top e~aoutives reign$d ae oligarchs 
but '\'there millions of small businessmen also found new 
opportun1 ties for productive activity. A good deal of 
;a.~btlt!Y aot1v1 ty 1 teelf $ it is true, was centered in 
n 1 nower of 
Japan more tha,n her national income 1n goods and ser-vices. 
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Fortunately for Japan, the dangers .of restriction and 
~tagna.tion latebt in monopoiistic ooncE!nt:rations of power 
were held somewhat in check by one o1roumete.:mn~ •. Thi$ll was 
.·.the countey. a continuing depe:Qdenoe on imported materials 
and machinery, which made for vigorous competition in many 
domestic markets. Ja.pan was forced to import all of her 
oottcrn. silk, wool. rubber, and aluminum; moat of her iron1 
lead, zinc, tin, a~d petroleum;. and le.rge amounts. ot 
machinery • me.ohin~ tQols, vehi olea~ .and equipment. More .. 
over, the combines with their numerous a.ff111ates were apt 
to be heavy importers as well as domestic producers. ~fuere 
this '!rras true, they had a consumer. interest irl bish quality 
an(t lotf pri<Ha•, perhaps also a. m61rcha.nt' s and shipper• s 
inMa~eat in a large trading volume. The torce of inter-
national compet1 tion could be moderated by tariffs, govern ... 
ment buying, and aube1dy.7 Sometimes it was entirely 
excluded. Through a very wide range of producers' good.s, 
~owerver, it could not be eliminated \d thout blockading the 
dustr1al expansion. 
Andt"ew Roth ha.s pointed out that this inadequacy of 
the interna.l market provided the shotgun which, was present 
a· 
at the wedding of the l§tia~s,M and the militarists. T.be 
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. . 
wages pa,id to the '"orkere 1n the factories and to the 
farmers was not tt.n1ough to enable them . to puroha.se .. the 
products of the .ittbst~!a ple.nts. The combines, therefore, 
.round it necessary to link bands with the militarists in e. 
driv·a for territorial conquest by force of tu·mrh 
Against the technioe~ achievements of the ~~~batsy 
as capitalists and. innovators in prewar Japan must be set 
the mo:t'e repugnant social and political features of the aye• 
tam, Extreme 1nequalit1ea of W$alth and income· oharacter-
1zed. Japanese capitalism f:rom the beginning. Under 
different forme, this per-petuated the inequality of status 
~nd oppor•tuni t.y which rune ao deeply in JapanGJae history 
and tracU:tion. The actual concentt-e.tion of economic power 
went ~11en beyond the eonoent:ration of property ownership, 
through the wide re,m1f1ee:t1ons of economic and political 
influence exercised by financial magnates. 
, The inequal:t ty. of wealth oe.n be shown by the. follow-
ing example. !n 19:30• half of Japan' a 12.6 million hoUSEil• 
r-----~-;HTIHH~~e±~~HHHmJee~s~bae~lo~l~1~4~Q accounted for a 
qua~ter of the aggregate household. income,. :t.'J:HB eeoond 
quarter went to 28 per cent of the fam111e.e in the 4oo~aoo 
yEln range. The remaining half e.ocrued to the most pro$per• 
ous 16 per cent of the nation. 011er ten per cent was 
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p£~tople, therefore,. was below. the 1.ooo yen laval while only 
1.7!>9 families enjoyed 1ncomaa o.f 50,00.0 yen or mo:re,.9 Of 
these 1, 7:59 f'am:tlies with .incomes of more tht:m 50,000 y~n, 
.only tw$nty he.d inoom(!}s of 300,000 yen; and al.l of these 
twenty fam1les '\t.rere members of the Z~~~atay. 10 This small. 
select group a..ooounted for over 2 per cent of the ent:l.t'$ 
nation~l ~.ncome of .. Japan. . This is surely 1nequal1 ty of 
'real tb at 1 ts :woret41 What maka.s i:t even mor.e terrible .is 
the f~tct that tax laws we.ra directed towards the people· e,t 
the bottom of .the soc :tal pyt>am 1d. The i!1b,a~m,~ were pe~ 
mi t.ted to keep almost all of their income '"hil.e ·the man in 
. the street, needing every yen he earned, was fot-oed to pe.rt 
with n1uoh of his income throush the te.x sy.stem., 11 . How was 
this dont.a? lt we.s done thr9ue;h "lee;i tiraa.te•• means, of 
course • The Diet and the. Oabinat passed lawa which regu ... 
la.tf!ld the ta.x system., This sounds fine until one ree.11zes 
that the ·liaJ?!:t@y_ either controlled or had e. le.rge say in 
' \:1, ' .. · • 
. · T · twood,· ~~i~ ·~~!i9~mi!l~ $! 
,Z&l.JJ!Jll G,rgw.)Ja !f:J;ld ~lJMSi!dX'I~ ggy;W~ ~a=:2~~Px-inoetona 
Prinoet,on University . :reas 11 95 41 P• 273: 
10aake:r, U• SU•$ pp.290.-9l • 
. 11tocltwood• J!lh s.ll•, ·p. 274. lockwood heJe probably 
done ·the most complete and author! tative survey of the 
industrial growth of Jap.an. Hie book covers all of the 
aspects of ind.ustrialism from the Meiji Restoration until 
l$1 
the operations of both the Diet a.nd. the Cabinet. !t ()an be 
assumed that they would. "rrownn upon a:ny move to increase 
·their. taxes, The ·combines m~de. the profits ·an(J then mad.e. up 
the la.ws. saying who $hou14 pa:y the .tax.. .An unbeatable com"" 
binat1on in any leag~e. 
Aside :from ~he .obviou~ evils o:r sxooae dispa:ri ty 
bet~>Teen the. wealth of the few and the .poverty of the me.ny, 
there \i'ere other social oonsequenoea of profound signifi-
oa.nce. 
~e ex:tstt.-n1oe of great e.gg:r-~gates of financial power. 
· reinforced by pol1 t,ical influence, tended from aa,;rly times 
to discourae;e the growth of a sturdy middle class, 1 ~e., • a 
broad mio.dle class of independent businessman endowed with 
suftioiant cap! tal and freedom of opportunity tl!o the,t they 
could develop madium•.ld ze~ modern enterprise (f:f'fioie:ntl;r ruld 
t>n their own. Equally, the power of the lt!'9ii~.§M concerns 
in the labor market •. where they were careful to maintain a 
common front~.~ helped :to stifle the growth of a vigorous 
h$r obatQolas to trade 
unionism to be sure.-. ... the pressure of popula.t1on, the 
p~valenoe of female la.bor in factory 1nd.uet:ey, the wide 
disper-sion of emall enterprise throughout the countryside• 










pt-og:ress 1n factory and sootal le,gisle.t:ton, must be attrib· 
uted to the int$nee Ol)poa:t tlon. .lad by the 1*\&~~~~u, which 
greeted EIV$ry proposal tor advance in these fields. What-, 
ever the business r:i,e.lt-1es of. the IRt~~it.tU!• and thfl}:ra were 
many, th~y olosed ranks and presented a solid front !n th•. 
faoe of .any and all· reform rnov$mant$. 12 ln the political 
realm, as well, the exi.stence of eqncantratecl business po~l' 
retarded the growth of democratic movements at home while 
. ' 
providing a pliant instrument for m11i te.t\V e,ggresaion 
abt>Oad. 
1his eXplanation o:f' the rqle of the li~ba'lfrau in the 
eoonom:'lc l:U'e of Japan was cited to show that in order to 
maintain its position the ~~~MQY had to exploit the people 
.and deprive them of' the fruita of e, demoora.t1o government. 
The people had to be }leld in line. This was done b;v a 
collusion between the ~i!l?.,~~~S a:nd the Arrny. They were the 
bro et:rone;eet g:roups• and they Joined their force$ to hold 
clown anr attempt by the people to voice tbei:r aantiments. 
e of the ma.tn pointe of e.e;~ement · 
bet~.taen the ~l.i."~~~sy and the mili te.rists we,a the recognition 
by the combines of the-fact that.they needed the militar,v to 
ma1nta.1tl "order" .at home •. J\6t'$ement here led to further 
• 
tte;:reement in the field of d1plomatic relatione A.nd 1n the 
expansionist policies :ravo:r.ed by ,both fac.t:t.ont.h 
The case of the Z.t&&9~:ieJ~!i in the economic aspect· of. 
Japa.nase life has been closely .f<lllowad and studied by 
Professor !1\ A. Bisson. He .summarized the problem a.s 
follows.: 
Altnougb the .za~J>(!tiJY case was not l~~oking in . . 
el•mt!tnt~ of strength, its weaknesses were fol?m1dable. 
The incidence of the IG*'l?AriU. ey. st.·em '"'as tbe po1n.tt 
above· e.ll• on which 1 t stood condemned. It offerEn'.t·· 
no real protection to the worke;r, the f'arm~r, and 
the consumer. Its· spokeamtn cooly weighed the 
adve,ntage of nav1ng a poverty stricken farm populo .• 
tion that provided· a surplus labol;" force to hold 
down wagest Employe:t7e, who m~ght reta.in a· sense of 
paternal responsibility for their workmen, neverthe .. 
lese invoked the police a.rm of the st,ate to restt>ict 
independent labo~ organization. Glaring ext.ramea of 
wealth and pc.werty ff:Xistea., and little o:r no effort 
tfa$ mad.e to m.i tigate condi 'tiona by welfare mea.euree. 
The sooiet;r f!tS a whole l'ras marked by g;r-e,v~ il1Steb11"" 
itias. Ancient sanctions of hierarchy and statue 
end.u;rE~~d. .in stl"angth, yet an increasing roaasuN~ of 
overt force and rep~ession was :required to keep the 
;ruling caste in its seat of powar.l3 
This, then, is the role of the l!~'b!!:f:.U in the 
:-- -
economic 1~.fe of Jap~J dominating, cruel, and p<n·terful. 
~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-=hae-nto~r~a~1~g~n~a~ft~a~.1~r~g~~~f~----------~--~ 
Japan and. the degre(\t J!Jf theil? oo•operation 1'11 th the war ... 
lords. 
l1ll !i41alJttf!~ rtn9. tqt.re~eill .t!;\it&Qll~· !loth ste.ta'=' that 
ttThe l~~~!t§ij was just about as peaceful in 1 ts :foreign 
policy as 1t was democratic in ita internal policy. ttl4 
Historical events have pro'Ved this statement to be true. 
~a1b~,t§Ia leaders .. in the main, were firm supporters 
of the principles of bak)So ichi!a e.nd kodo .15 Their disa-
greement w1 th the wa);\lo>lorde was not over the ultimate ends 
of the policy but how the ul tima.te ends were to be achieved. 
They a.ttempted. their me thode during the ttliberal n twenties, 
but the world wide depre seton of 1929 forced a cancellation 
of their plane. 
§fteql .at the de;e:re1s~g~ g! ~ .2.!! the Z!;tbatsu. 
Most stud.ents of Je.pa.neee politics agree that the depression 
of 1929 disor$dited the great combines. Opposition was 
especially strong from the military~ who disliked the 
policies of the dU'ferent ~a.ib~ttu so'tTerl'lments whi oh a.dvo-
oa.ted "pea.oe:ful penetration" of China and the mainland 
through eoonom:lc cha.nnels. The war-lords favored the 
"positive policy*' as eat down by Baron Tanaka in his 
infamous Memorial. Again, the );"$a,der muat remember that the. 
f------me-'lill'Tru~.----t"lftt~hhee-. ~gttJOOJ. a!.t:lt-;11;-1JW~$re the cause fox· thi a d1 aagxoaement. 
At any rate, violent, e.ttaoks we:re ma.de on the itdbtf£Eru 
on the ground that, in promoting their own :fina.ncial 
p:rosper1 ty, they had jeopardized the inte.rests of the State 
a. 
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and had done great harm .to .the· .peas~mts and the small 
producers and traders. These. atta.cke oe,ma' to. a head 1n May, 
1932, with the asea.ss1nat1on of :aa,ron Dan, the ch,.ef execu .... 
M.ve of Mitsui, at the han(ja of a "young officer" group, 
The ~ttib~~ey retreated. They tried to disa:rrn. popular 
~sentment by relegating to obscurity o:f'ficials who had been 
responsible. tor their previous bu s1ness policy. · Mi teui, 
which was th~ main target of c:r1 tici em, withdrew from trade 
in mi~or agricultural products and. sold. to the public ltlrge 
holdings o:f' sha.ree in some of 1 ts leading companiea, 16 It 
made a donat~.on of three million yen for the relief of 
distress, and 1 t established a. fund of thirty million yen 
for the promotion o:f. eooia.l services,. The ~aiba;tsy 
attempted to show. their devotion to the national interests 
by establishing, or investing in, new enterprises of 
.st:ra.tee,;ic importance, sueh as synthetic oil production; and 
thflly provided most o:f the ca.pi ta.l for a new bs;nk intended to 
fir:u.tnoe thoee amall trade.rs and ino.u strialists who wet-a mem-
r-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·o~r~t~Guilde.17 
'!his decay of ~~~.q~~~9. influence p:rovid.ed the mili ta-
riete with the opportunity they needed. They moved in to 
;r$oa.pture some of the pre atige that had been lost during th$ 
anti-war eentimant of, the poet World War I era. ~e first 
move.· they ma,da \!Te.s the creation of t,he l-1apohurian Incident. 
The oou:rsa of events followed by the m111 t&l"Y '\f&e noted. 
prev1ously. Now we will see how the ~~~qa;t,sS! reacted to the 
s:t tuai~:ton, a si tua.tion bX>ol,.lght, a,bout pr1m.~.ri1y because of 
the lees\Slnh'lg of. ~~;\:q~,¥~9. influence due to the raparouseione 
of the depression of 1929. 
l!l2 za*'bp. tllY ~· :tba Mana,nYr:t.e.n :&PQ.id,§Ul1· The 
invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931 \'ltUJ heralded by 
H1dek1 'l'ojo• the blatant trombone of ,Japanese mili ta.r1am, as 
"a hea:ven .sent toscin signalizing at home and abroad the 
epoch-making dawn in East Asia.. nlS ttow did thEt Ja3.ba.tS!!;! 
view the developments in Manchuria and the road to ws.r 
policy of the m1lita~1stet 
The ~~~~."~§.Lh. together \11th the government, was faced 
w1 th a ei tuat1on in ».1anchuria. that they oould do little about. 
!t'he oooup9,tion ot' Manchuria was completed be fore t~hera could 
m1l1 ta.ry eagmen·te in .Japan. It was a.lmoet a ease of take :1 t 
or lea.ve 1 t. The litba~tJ~Y could take ~.dvantage of the 
1noreaeed trad.e ~nd prof1 t.s bound. to come from the 
157 
Manchurian venture, o:r they could leave the bene:f'i te of 
.m111tariet.:lc alrpana:ton to othaX"a •. It seems that the 
,;a~be,tft}3 were willing to join with the mili tarieta in · shar-
ing the loot, but they. wexe atraid. that Je,pan' e lfar.-lor~s 
would o~rry them into a. major "rorld conflagration which tbey 
opposed. Reisohau$r surna up this feeling as followtH 
The average ~-~l,l§~!ll executive remained a:t're.id .. 
of the.:risk and expense of a major war, but he was 
not advcr;t>se to cooperating with the nd.litar1.ata.1n. 
m:l.nor colon1a.11~entures e.nd in the profits of' build ... ins an empire. . . 
, At the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, the 
1!1bta."f::l9. leade~a felt eu:re that tne Weate:r·n Powers would 
step in. and put an 1mmedie,te and effective halt to the plans 
ot .the militarists. This. did not happen. The att1 tQde of 
the ~~~9a~5Q leaders :tnfur1att!td many of t.he most povre;r:ful 
,tnilitarist,s, soma of whom harbored .11l ... feal:tngs towa:r~ the 
1ndustx-1a.l1sts bec~uae of the threat posed by the combines 
to army ~mb,. t io:ne. Tl'H~r$ was open talk of mass assa.se1na-
tions of al&!a~~~p .leaders. 20 '!'his d:td. not happen 
ely although the slay1ne; ot :Baron Dan~ leader of the 
H6uae Qf Mitsui, co.ul<l be traced. to military soux-oes. 






1:ndustria11srte be organized. . Th1 e g:roup tfould be in favo~ 
of any and all 1mpe:r1e.listio gestures by the ~rmy because 
I ' - ' ' 
they ·would. be orgatli~ed by the wa:r•iorda, and thai:r' 
oontirn~ad. e;2tistenc$ would depE~md upon army and ns.vy 
business.. This group of na'!'r induatr1al~sta had their 
baptism of fire '·n Manchuria and \'lar.e kntnm as the ShaD 
(New) ~e,~bta,~Q· 
k ,f!\li~ ~f!&bit~u lD f4~noJ!Y.tAf!:#. Wb~a~ ~ ~~1,:,: !Q. 
lib! .Si~Ulla4Jlei? Sines 19:31~ the ao oaJ.l~d nyounger" business 
st-oups rosa itl 1mporta.noe in Je.pa.n together with war indus• 
t:riEH£3. O:f theee the chief firm was the m1fi§!£m (Nippon 
Sane;yo Ka.isha) group under the lea,de:rsbip of Y. AUtawa. 
Aikawa. was a proteea of' Marquis Kaoru. Inouye ot the Mitsui 
ole-n a;nd beosxna prominent in Japanese business circles when 
he. took over the iuh8.ra Mining Company anC! th$t'Etbf prooeEHled 
~o expand hie activities by supplying tha inol .. oaaed d•mande 
of the militarists. 21 Apart from i te graeA:. mining proper,.., 
tie.s •. .lli~Hfll was rgapecia.lly 1.mport&..nt in the field: of. 
as held in e;X>Gat esteem by the 
militarists. 
ln Ma:nohuria, Jt1.~s,sq;g was given .the green signal over 
the Jitl!)?,,!M• Ae was mentioned, rugs~a~! fortunes were 
-. . - .. • " 0 
Macmillan Oompany, 
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wholly bound up with the promotion of J,ynsenJ~ i&,i!~J and 
the leaders of the !~s~san were t:unenabl$ to m111 ta.riet1o 
influence. The m111tar1ete had set up many business enter-
prises in Manchuria, and they needed the guiding hand of 
some ot the magna.t$s of Ja.pa.nese industry, \Vhile fostering 
new business groups in Manoht.u:•ia., the war .... lorda kept strict 
control over business act1v1t1E:Hit by means of the Kwantuns 
Army. Army persor.mel cheeked and doubleo~tchecked. all 
a.ct1v1 ties in Manchuria; and, as a result of this interven-
tion, none of the main objectives of industrialist and 
militaristic expansion were real1zed. 22 The State controlled 
South Manchurian Railway Company • in whose hands moat of the 
large scale undertakings were concentrated. found it 
difficult to rrd.se adequat$ capital to finance its ventures; 
and with the probability of war with China eminent, it was 
deemed necessary to revise the organization to produce the 
desired l'$SUlt. To further these aims, the Manchukuo Heavy 
Industries Development Company was organized,. In this 
t------C(>mp~f-r--.:ti'btliee-· --Jli!ii&#,!Jfti!\!Jlt-. --sg;proG.lUbfJp~be-e l-4--balf' of--th$ CHlp!tal; and-tl'lfa.e-------
~mainder was held by the Manchukuoan Government. 23 EvEUl 
this, however, was not enough. 
... . ..•. 'I! 
Brown and Company• 
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Much to the oba.gr1n of the war•lorde, 1 t soon became 
' . ' 
appe.r~nt that a. country the size of Manchuria, couldn't be 
tully developed without the oapi te,l which the huge oonoerns 
alone eould provide a.nd the.t the capital \<tould no.t be forth-
coming under the old system of :r1g1 d State control. . In · 
other words, the army wa.s forced t,o accept the l!4b§~~9 a.e 
full-fledged partners in Manchuria. The combines were more 
than '\d.ll1ng to Join in the venture one$ they saw that 
Western intervention would not be forthcoming. They saw the 
possibility of huge prof1ta, and the,- jumped at the chance 
to make the possibility a probability. 
Was there~ a difference between the ib1n ;a&t)ar$Y e.nd 
· the olde:r lt~'t1lit~sy fatniliEua? In all. probabi.li ty, no. 'l'hE~ 
alleged oontrast between }11£!!19 and the other younger 
industri~lists and the older families is more apparant than 
rt:~al,. 24 The faot 1 s that the holders of many of the shares 
in l!eq~; and its subsidiaries were members of the older 
families. as C:ouplEHi w1 th this 1s the fact that J1est~na wa.e 
oed to borrow $o-tley from-t-he old •19:&:9!~1!:1 elane in order 
to proceed with its program in Manchuria. Although some ot 
the banks 1n Japan were willing to lend money to lf~.rUl!lh the 
op-
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total amount available would not be enough ~o guarantee 
s.uocess to m$esa:o•~e ventures. . :Besides this, tbe bank~ had 
many other preoocupatione and could. scarcely supply $Uff'i• 
o1ent tunde for lone;.-.term investments outsid~ of Japan 
proper. Furthermore, the head of the lft!illl.l gX"Oup,. X" 
Ailtawa, had family oon:na oticma w1 th leading pe :reons in the 
Mi tsUbiab1 alan; and connections s~tch as· the sa are of great 
importance in Je.pa.n. The fact ia that most of the ttyoungeru 
groups had conneotione of one kind or another. with the older 
Ja.t'q4:lHU3.~ An example of this is the Ildori group of the ~ 
.~Sb.E11HUa which had o1ose family oonneoM.ons with the Yasuda 
clan, one of the Big Four of the .• ~].'le.~al! group•26 OntJ 
author statGea 
. As :f'ar as surfa.ce ind1eat1ons ~, the iA£¥,BfttQ 
interests are 1ndEJpend&nt of the older" e;roup, 
but fitt.Hlh personal connections would be far from 
likely to preclude interrelatione, not necessarily 
open bE1tt'teen the "younger_. f1nano1a1
7
1ntereats and 
the uold.ertt tina.noe capital groupe.2 · 
:rhomas Bisson states that events have demonstrated; 
,- • • the absence of any real di sM. notion between 
The old• 
$Stab1isbed Z§ib§~§!a combines, owever. ranged 
mora widely over the whole of Japan's expanding 
terri to rial sphere, a.nd, when 1 t cams to Army . 
2fSN. Xasuo, "The New and the Old Combines, n !191~~2 




contracts, could hardly be sa.id to play a.2aol$ eeoond · to that of the newer and lesser oombines. · . 
''l'h1s seems to indicate that ~en' the membe~e of the old 
clans and. their sympathiz$rs b1ame th~ ~ ~~~·~~~sy tor 
supporting the military, they are, in :rea.11ty; 1ndiotins 
themselves. If, as all infqrma,ti.on seems to indicate, the 
~§il.?t:tl!Y supported the. military, 1 t 'liTas the "old" J!~ba~f!Y 
a.e well as 'the '"new. n · 'lhe shadow of guilt hEu'Jgs over tham 
all. _ 
' 
;e~ll~lHl!l .. Mil'~~l:l§l~ su~~crs~~~~~sm 1n Ma:runuu:~.R:· once 
1 t was clear to th_e IJ~·lla,~~~ leade:r<s, both old and young. 
that the United States and Great Britain would not intertE~re 
in ~1anchuria they proceeded to work hand in glove with the 
military. 29 This co•ope:re.tion was to continue thXloughout 
tbe thirties, right to Dec$mber 7, 1941. In Manchuria team• 
·-work between the two parties was a.ppara.nt in all activities 
f:rom railroading to nax-eotios. A few of the most 1mpo:rtant 
facets of the ao~operat1on betwecam the two w&rre,nt furthe)." 
attention. 
The beg1nn1ne; of active oo•operat:ton could be 11 sted 
as August 8, 19:;:3. On this date, leaders of both factions 
de.c:tded that they would# 
N .. t _u :ti:¥~111 ·r · r .1 
·.·: 
• • • d(;)velop Manchuria into an independent nation 
possessine; indivisible relatione. w1 tb the Japanese 
Empire. They would strive for the un1f1oa.tion ot 
Japanese and Manchurian economies in order to 
emtab11sh seeurt:Jly the foundation for the expansion 
of the Emp3.re • s economic powers to the whol$ world• 
Oo..,exiatence e.nd co .... prosperity of Japan and Manchuria. 
was to be restricta~ by t.he de,manda of the national 
defence of Jape.n.30 
16;, 
According io this <lootr1ne, 'transportation, oommunioa.tion; 
an~· other anterp~ieee ln )'d'anohuria. were to be developed. by 
special oompa.n1es directly or 1ntU:reotly under the super• 
vision of Japan so as· to contribute to the "national. 
defensen of the ·Elnpi~.'l · these nspeeial companiea•1 were, 
of oou:rae, the 81tn~~i.Y and their subsidiaries. 
The term nns.tional defense" ·took in quite a. bit of 
terri tory. In fact 1 t enoompaesed all of Manchuria • s 
~toonomy. First the m.ilroads wel"e seized. The Chinest 
owned railways north of the Great ·Wt~tll; a.nd the money eta.nd.;;~ 
1ng in their oredi t in r~a.nchurian banks was confiscated~ 
All ra.1lroa.o.s w¢.u~e oo•ordJ.nated, eormeotEHi \11th, e.nd. placed 
under the ma.na.gamant of agency knotm as tbe 
ll'.ttt..,.·. 'I~ 
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Electrical supply and distribution systems "'rare quickly 
taken over. All sources of revenue were taken by foroe, and 
the revenues expe.~ded to finance the new government.. The 
customs were seized on the pretext tha.t Manoburta was a 
separate state. The .. Central Bank of Manohur,.a was eetab• 
lished to replace the old p:roveneial banks. whose funds we~ 
used to capi ta.1ize the new organization~ A new currency wae 
issued,. 1"he telephone, telegraph, and radio systems, being 
state owned, were seized :t;l.nd placed. under Japane.Hl$ con·trol. 
:tn all Of these publiC. services, .Jap&l10Se officials and 
advisors were placed in the main political and. adminietra• 
ttve offices and exereitH~d effective control of the 
organizations • 'l'ha only people 1.n Japa.n >td th enough knowl• 
' ' 
edge a.nd experience to step into the various a.dm1nistra.t1ve 
. . . 3:3 offices were members of' the .;f!~be,~ay ol~ms.. They were 
$ntrusted. with the economic program in Manchuria. 
This economic program was announced by the puppet 
government o:f.' Henry Pu Yi in 1933 under. the title: "An 
t was 
announce<;l. that~ economic development was to be based on the 
following basic pr·inciplest 
.. (l) To supply state control and t~alte .measurEHll, in 
regard to the important 'branches of economic activity, 
1n order effectively to open up the various ne,tional 
resources w1th which this country is endowed and to 
.. ·. k 1 _ , M ,.11 I l' 1' ,, • 
promote a co""o:rdinated. development iri ·all fields of· 
economic endea:vorJ (2} ·To aim at· the oo•Ol"dination. 
and rat.ionalization of the East Asian. economy, to 
place the emphasis on co-ordination with the good 
neighbor Japan in view of the economic relat1o:r!sh1p 
ot mutual dependence between the t'Wo count.riee_. and 
to make .inc:ree..aingly. closer this reln.t1ons.h1p ·of · 
mutual b$lpfulnees • 34 
In· accordtmoe with basic p:r1no1ples, i:t was announced that 
the Government proposed ~tto malta 1 t a. guid.ing principle that 
important enterpr1aes of the na.ture of national defenae or 
public utilities should be managed by public bodies or 
special companies. u3!5 'l'his could. only mean the ;ai~tit~!H 
for as was pointed out, tbey were the only ones with enough 
experience or finances to tsJte up the task • !''rom the t~.me 
that intervention f':rom the Grea.t Powers ceased to nuate:t>ial-
1ze, the it&l;>a~~ij worked hand in glove with the militarists. 
JD~a!n•Hfinswt\lf~o, ~.Qlnt ie3.9nemis csmmt:!rt!~· The 
~~~11flt~ita and the mil:l ta.r1s ts eont1nued. to wo1•k ·together and 
·. to increas~ their eo...,operation in· Manchuria during the mid-
thirties. The high point of this co•operation was the Japan-
Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee established in 1935. · ~e 
e.g1"E1emant provided th~~.t the CommittEH\) was to oon$ist of 
$1ght members, four from each oountrw. Japan•s members were 
to bes Chief of Staff of the KWantung Army; the Qouneilor 
r;v. J : .•. r' :to :r :·1t2 ·r » ., , 
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of the Embassy in Ma.nohuku.o; the Chief of the Kwantuns 
Bureau; a.nd one member especially appointed .bY the J!l.pa.nese 
Government. 1he latter w-a.e usuallJ a spokesman for th.e 
~~~s~t.s.Y.•36 Ma.nohukuo•s members \'te:re to bet the Min1ate:rs 
of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Finance, and 
the Japanese Director of the Genars.l Affair's Board. All 
questions before the Committee were to be decided by 
tna.jori ty vote. In answering s. question as to the pose1b1l~ 
1 ty of Japan• e being out--voted" iremie:r Oki Hirota replied a 
l ask him (the questioner) to consider the fa.ot 
that three out of the four members of the comm1 ttee 
from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one 
is the Director o;f the GEJneral Affaire Board, who 
is, and. will be a Japanese forever, I am confident. 
Although he is an official of Manehukuo, he 1a a 
central organ assuming lee.dership of that country. 
Therefore, in case of a difference of opinion 
bet'W$en the two countries, it oanmrt be imagined 
that he will make any di.oision that will be diS• 
advantageous to Ja:pa.n.'37 
Here we.s a.n iron• clad. guarantee that the wishes of' thf3 
m111 tarists and. the Zt~JattfUl ware to be carried out. 
Now, we turn to the duties of the Committee. It was 
J J questions oonoernjng the economic ties 
between the two countries and supervise the Joint Hold1ns 
Company to be organized in Ja.pan and Manchukuo. It wa.s to 
36Raymond Vernon and Caroline Wachenheimer, "Dissolu• 
of Japan's Feudal Oombine e; •• li!n!.ttmen' at §ta~e 
~--~~~ . 
37iudfSEHn!~~. sm· o:Lt., P• 636. 
' -
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control the indust~ies o.f ~e:nchuk;uo. It was provided, how• 
ever, that matters im~or~e.nt to ,the economi~ t1~e of botb 
' . 
govarrl~ants, but which were in Japan's power, would not be 
d1souseed by the Committee. Since such topics could not be 
delioerat;ed by the Committee, those matters :r.rrera to be made 
into un1la.teral contracts binding only upon Manchukuo,. 38 
All points of doubt were dealt w1 th admirably by the 
1~1}aa,t!\! and the m1l1 taey. 
One of the first acts of' the Joint Economic CommitteEFJ 
was to integrate the currencies of the two countries. In 
November, 1935. the yen bloc w~s eetabliahedJ and Manchukuois 
currency was no longer basad on silver but was_ stab1l1 zed a.t 
par with the yen. This enabled trade to flow mora freely 
between the new industries of Manchuria· and the combines of 
Japan. 
'lbe next 1mpo:rtl.i\nt atep was the o:rse.nization of the 
Industrial Bank of Manchu}tuo in November. 1936. The bank 
was begun td th a oa.p1 tal of 60 million yen. and served ae an 
ust:ries to be developed under the 
plane. of' the m111 taris ts and the z"~l?.us,u. 39 This bank 
handled all imports made for industrial purposes in 
Manohukuo. The Manchurians were permitted to m~ke deposits 
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1n the Central Bank of ~anoh~ku9. a;pd ~ts pranohee, but they 
t-rere not allowed to borrow f;rom ~he I~dus~rial Bank; only 
Japanese "~re permitted this privilege.., A lfaW of ea,.ings 
was enacted to force the people to save money ~nd deposit it 
in the Central Bank :f'or the JapanesEh At . the high point of 
tbaS$ compulsory savings, over 600 million dollars we!'$ 1n 
the ·:aank~ money that was ea~roarked for the industrial plans 
or the ,l~,b~te.9• 40 
lll!. Stoonsa l~r,lQ<;i ¥2ns,~t:taot:tt?D V..tU• The ~fora• 
mentioned· act1v1 ties were included in what was known a,e the 
First Period Const:ructlon Plan and took in the period from 
19'!51 to 19!$6. In January- 19'7, the S\\'toond Period Construc-
tion Ple.n went into effect. It \'Tae dra1'tn up by Vti!.t'ious 
Ministries of Manobukuo, the Cabinet Planning Bureau, the 
South Manohurie,n Railway Company, leader•s of the .litba£&lh 
and, the·. Ohie:t• of· Staff of the Itwantung Army, 41 Thie .Second 
FiYe Yee,r Plan followed the batU.e principles underlying the 
First Five . Year :Plan and le.id f3mpbas1s on open in e.; up 
l----------l:if.!J-SnuiP<HiHl--1»-111H9.ru!H:"ru-lHl1e--f.me~:-ma-!£Hl~ilab le for 
ttntttional d$fense, » that is to say "war. n The outline o:f' 
the plan decla~$d the policy with ~egard to minins and 
, 
·' ,, 
industries, fields in which, the .bibfAit!iU! were primarily 
interested, to b$l 
• • • that mun1 t1on il1dust:r1ea for :weapons of war, 
airplanes, automobiles, and rolling•atook will be 
:f'it>mly esta.blishad and. basic major industries ·sucb 
as those of iron, liquid :fuel, coal and electric 
·power will he developed•. and emphasis will be laid . 
G$pec1al1y on the development of iron and liquid fwatl 
~n~ustri"m• ,.,hi oh me.terials are necessary for· n~t.1onal 
dei'ense.,"f'~ · 
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It is 1nta:rasti.ng to note how the term ••national defanaen is 
continually associated with the aims of the laib!~QY• At 
any rata, the plan was adopted at· a conference of Provincial 
'Governors and the Chiefs of the General A:f:t'a1:ra Bureau of 
the various lUn:tstriae in Manchuk:uo in January • 1937,. and. 
ratified by the government of Ma.nohultuo on February 17, 19,7. 
For the tn111 ta:riate and the &?-1bf!;tey, tbinge were proceeding 
. . ' 
according to plan. 'l'be de signs that ltera :lni t1.a.ted in th4!1 
Firat Five Year Plan ware oar~1ed even further·:tn the 
Se4ond. At the same· time, mo~ pro :fits we:re· available to 
the l'?t~lUl~S!H for theit- partners in crime, the militarists, 
bad instigated the Marco Polo Bridge "Incident •• and we :toe now 
involved with a full scale war in China. 
lQ! l$1gaySJ! ~ ObiS~· After the Japanese Army had 
made deep penetrat:tons into the interior of China. steps 
were taken by the Japanese to review the administration of 
~---
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the ooeup:ied area.; It wa.a decided tha.t some sort. of China 
Af'fa1x-s Board be ol:"'ganized to supervi~e t .. ne economic :reoon• 
atruotion s.nd development in the occupied areas of China. A 
'special Commission orl Chinese Affa.11 .. s ''~aS created on 
July 26, 19:;8; but 1 te main purpose ttras in crushing the 
resistance of the Na.tiona11st Government and. in organizing a 
pUppet x-egime in i te place. :Ec:wnom:to matters \\"ere bejl'ond 
1ts scope. In the eyE!s of the if!,~b,ati!b a special boe;:ro. was 
needed; and tl}ey got 1 t. 
lQ! ls~A·ln 9J: . .AW Rfr.."te;tsa~m~~~ t3Qa·~· · on 
D$oember 16, 1938, the &J•~iU or Asia Development Board wa.s 
ore;ani '"ed.. According to the regulations governing 1 ts 
.. 
organization, the Board \1ae put in chat-ge of the following: 
poli tics. 11 economies. and oul ture and the formulation of 
pol1oies :relative thereto i the supervision of commercial 
oonc~rns to undertalte enterpr1sea ill China under special 
l$Ws or to do business in Obina; and the coordination of 
admin:tstrat:J.ve affairs in China conducted by Japanese 
4~ Xta heQd offiO$ wa0-i~n~~o~k~~H'Oh,~~~d~t~b~--------~---­
four bra,noh offioE.:te in Shangha.i, Peipine;. Jtalga.n, and Amor 
and t't>ro stl'b•b:ra.nch offices in Canton and 'l:s:tne;ta.o,. 
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Two 1mpox-t~nt ore;~n1%at1ons were ee t up under tha 
l\9:t~A""IU• These were the North Ohine, Development Qompan·r 
.for North Oh:tns. and I the Central China, Pt>omotion Qompa;n;,v tor 
Central OhinB,. Togetha~ they playad ar1 important part in 
t.be plta):lS of the Za~;b.fll't~~ and the. militarists~ 
?.'ba objects of' th$ North Ch1.na. Development Oompanr 
~rere to further economi¢ <l~velopment e,nd. to consolidate 
various undertakin$s 1n North China. Its operations "t>rere 
carried on as a holding. company. :tt finanoed and controlled 
l(l)ading en.te~Jl"iees in transportation, harbor and port 
developmenta. an ~leetr1e power generator plus mining and 
ma.nufaotu:rins. 
The North China. Developm~nt Company operated under : 
the supervision of the Japanese Government and t-ras subject 
to the ordara of the government. ln :faot~ except in routin$ 
_ roattera. it l"equ1:red the ti!.pproval ot the government to:- all 
of 1 tm deo:i. ei(>ns J and ln the maj ort ty o:f CHases' the orders 
o:r tbe J'apaneee Govarnreent wel'e prapa:red by the laadera .of' 
hele:~l29i~li·44 For example. the a.ppro!VaJ of the Japanese 
Gova:t:"nmetlt ,.,a,s r<r>qu1l'$d for the I raiaine; of loans, making . 
ehane;~u~ in the articles of e.eeooie.t1on, sivitlg E&ffect to 
me:rg~n:•s and .. dissolutions and dist:r,.bution o:f profits. The 
. Company's plans for. 1n11estment and finsno.i11g for ea.ch fiscal 
1'72 
year also ·required .the appro:val P.f. the. gov.ernment and pf the 
In short, the combines made sure tl'Hi!.t any .and all 
' ' ~· 
' ,aoti.vit1ea of the suppoee<'Uy "independent .. companies would 
' ' 4 
come. under supervision from itt&£a~~ leaders. S 
The Central. Ohina Promotion· Company had objectives 
very similar to those of .the North China. Development Company 
and -was subje ot to eubsta.nti.ally the .same control by the 
Japane'ee Government and the l,e.~ba.l:e.y. The operatio~e in the 
development of public uti.li ties, traneporte,t1on, an4 natural 
reeou~oes, which 11iill be shortly referred to, came under the 
control of one .or the otner of these oompantes-
Befora dealing with the pa.:r~~iaular ope rat ions of the 
Z\tribatl,l'Q and the militarists in China, re:f'eranc• should be 
me,de to the ":Progre,m for the Economic Development of China" 
adopt$d by. the Planning Board in January, 1~19. It was 
stated in this program tha.t the development o:r natural 
resources in China had :fa:r.:reaohi.ng consequences in real1z· 
ing the 1deas of .economic colla.boration between Japan, 
e e tabliehin a 
. 46 
nNew Ordern in Ea.et Asia. · It was further stated the,t 
these e.cti vi tee were nae vi tal and. u~gent as mili ta,ry 




operations and pol1 tical activities and· that they should be 
carried out even during hosit111ties."41 
Reference should also be made to the nsummary of the 
Program for Economic Construction Embracing Japan. 
Mttnohukuo 11 and China'' put out by the Cabinet Informa.tion 
Bureau on November 5. 1940, the principal purpose of which 
was the establishment of self~supporting and self-sufficient 
structure within ten years to strengthen the position of 
East Asia in world economy. Under the progra.m Je.pan• s 
functi'on l>taa to promote science and techniques e.nd to de-
velop heavy industry, the chemica.l industry ~and mining. 
Mr:mohukuo wa.e to develop 1mporte.nt basic indu a tries and 
China her na.tural resources, particularly mining. It must be 
remembered a.t all times that the li!t?atmp and only the 
~Br~l?~·:M!L! weN capable of supplying the money and the *'know ... 
how" to do all of these things. I.n all of these ma.t.ters 
they were working with the mil1tar1ete because they knew, 
just a.e the war-lords knew, that intervention from the West 
flowing from the p:ro:f'i ts of Japan• s 1mper1alist1o, expansion-
istic policies. If the Ztt.~b§tsy were heei tant partners at 
first. they were more th$n willing aocomplioes by the late 
thirties. Johnstone points out that*. 
The industrial monopolists· joined with the. 
m.ili ta.rista in the attempt· to o:rea.te the Graa,ter 
East Asia. Sphere, where their own stake in eucoess:ful 
oonquest appea.t>ed greater than their chance 'tflg 
p:rofi ts through: psa<H:~ful 1nterne.t1onal tra.de. 
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In these two agreements it is interesting to nota 
that not only '\ottUJ no provision made for consulting Manohukuo 
or Ohina, with ~sa:rd t<;> their approval; but it is made clear 
that decisions ae to ita being put into effect in all its 
aspects t'lere to be mad.e by Japan and Japan alone. 
It is sie;nifi<.Hlnt to note that the plans nm,med ha.d 
three main points: the first ,.,as to supply Japan with war 
materials; the second. was to e.xpa.nd Ja.pan• e armaments~ and 
the third was to meet the needa of peace ... time economy /•·9 
The fox-ego1ng gives e.n outline of the general plans 
and policies adopted. by the mili tar1sts and the Za\btt~Ja· A 
short outline of how the seneral plana were applied to 
pe.rtieula.r indt.tstriea and special pbas~s of economics will 
be. of value at this point. 
~~A~~~ortaM~SD ~ Oom~un~o§~Qi• In 1935 plans were 
dnafted by which Ja:pan t-eek over moat of the re.illnty~SI--41-t:~nr---------~ 
North Ohina and se.oured permission ·to build more roads at 
plaoes of their choosing. Among. the ra,ilroad.s se12E)d were 
! 
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the Tientsin a.nd Shihohiaohuan line, the Shantung Railway, 
and the Lunghai Railway. Tbeae railroads were important in 
the development of new sources of raw mtJ,te.ria .. la and reoe1ved 
first pt'iori ty from the militarists and the Zai;"qa~I\!Y• 
In the f'ieJ.d of communications, the North China 
Telephone and Telegraph Company wa.a organized in July 11 1938. 
The North China Development Company, which was discussed 
earliet', held. S$VEH'.ltY pex- oant of the oapi tal stock of the 
new fi:rm. Its obj.eot was to c·onatruct and operate telegra.ph 
and telephone service including submarine cable between 
North China, Japan, Ma.nabuktto• and the rest of the world. 
· Other ·subsidiary companies of the North China Development 
Company were the North China Communications Company and the 
North China Aviation Compa-ny. The North Ohina Commun1oa• 
tiona Oompan:~ pp~u?atad 3, 760 mile a of ra.ilt1ays• 6.250 m1lea 
of btH~ lines, and 625 miles o:f' inla.nd waterway eommun::Lca-
tions i.n North Ohitua.50 In all of the various companies, 
the posi tiona of influ~nee were held by members of the 
!!~!at~l, ~~!~!a~~$1• In the e:xplo1 tation of na t.ura.l 
~esouroes. the ;e.1!b~tau really showed their true colors. 
«The .Outline of Measures f'or the China Incident"· of 
• 
Deceniber, 1937, provided that the· .Nat.ional Polj.cy Company 
was to take over the. salt. industries and ·practically the 
entire mining industry in ~orth Ohina..52 
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The first step in this exploitation process wa.s the 
.settlng up of the various orga.ni~s.tions wh1oh were to super• 
vise the. undertakings,. 
First, the Central Iron Mine Company, a subsidiat1 of 
the Central China Promotion Oompa~y, was set up in April, 
1938, to develop the ast5:mated one ·hun.dred million tons of 
coal in Central China. 
Next, dapos1 ts of irotl ore in North Ch:t.na astimE,tted 
at approxime.tely t\10 hundred million tons, or more than half 
of China.• s estimated iron ora deposits$ \<tere taken over in 
July, 1939~ by th~ Lungyen Iron Mine Company, a subsidiary 
, ot the North China Development Company. Of the mines coming 
under th~ control of this .Qot.'lpany • tl:le one having the 
la~gr.nl!t el\1!tirnat"d. ciaposi te of all was the L• .. mgyen ~Une in 
Obaha:r l?rov1no$. Fart of the iron ore from this. m1ne and 
~--------~B-~~~~~~~~~~r~~em-ware exp~~aa~~t~o~------~----­
Japan. Of a total produotion of 4;300,000 tons of ore mined 
by the company, 700 11 800 tons 't'-rera used for the production of 
pig. iron; and of the balance; l,4oo.ooo tons were sent to 
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Manchuria and over a million tons to ,Te..pa:n.5' · The Z4i£Et~§!Y 
tnado sure that not only. tbei:r prof1 ts but thalr raw 
materials· came from oonqu&l?$d ar1d explo1 ted areas. · 
:tn Central Ohina, · iron depoai te in the Yangtze yalley 
were estimated at one hundred million tons. For the pttrpose 
of contirtuing the· development of this deposit. the; Central 
China .. Iron ~Une Compe:n;v w~s established undei> .Za1!;l~t~g · 
leadership in Apri.l11 19;8.5
4 'l'he company. ~1ae Und~r the 
direct control of the Central China iromotion Company and 
other Japanese interests: payment for Ohinase interests in 
the property was arranged to be made in ·t.he form of equip. 
ment and goods. 
Ooal deposita in North China we:ra enormous a.nd 
estimated. to be more than 50 p$r cent of the depos1 ts in the 
whole of· China.. In developing these ooal reeouroea, the 
ia~bat.flf:! adopted a policy of controlling the supply to the 
China sa ~n order to ins.ure a further supply for Japan, bav-
, ing parti.culs.r raga,rd :fo:r the :need of coking ooal. The 
+---------~~~~~r-~~h-~~~~~"~g~nnual production, was 
talten over and opel"ated by the Tatung .Ooa.l Mine Company, a 
eubsid:iary of tbe North China Development Company. It 
! ... 1~1 't. :.1.') "1'1,1.·1 II •· ... ff_ .. ,. ; ... 
-------~-----;4---~----------------------------- ---- ------- ------ ------------
~-· pp. 191~192. 
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sbould be noted that all of the different enterprises were 
interwoven to insure the ~~i~~~gy of a single, oo~ord1nated 
policy. Although these were the main ventures in the field 
of natural resources, the ;atlnatiY extended their tentacles 
to all other areas. In short, the entire economy of North 
Ohina and Manchuria was tied firmly to the Zall;>ayS,\,l apron 
atr1nga.55 
;Pyb~is;; U,'t~l& t~tl• Immediately e,f'ter the occupation 
of' Sha.nghe.1 in December, 1937, the Ja.panese took over 
various pUblic ut111 ty companies a.mong which might be 
mentioned the Puntung Electric Supp+J Company, which was 
then made a subsidiary of the Centrftl China Water and. 
Eleotrioi ty Company, which in turn w~s Japanese controlled, 
and the Chinese Electric Power Company in Shanghai; which 
was taken over in June, 1938, and made a subsidiary of th$ 
same holding oompany. In these oaeea the owners of the 
companies were compensated at a valuatlon considerably below 
the real worth of the companies, a valuation that was set by 
e IIUU!r!H4Y leade-:r-f'-lS!hi:. •-""-56"'---------------------------i---
B,~}:lk3-Sf5• From th.e beginning of the occupation of 
North China. the Japanese oi:reula.tad bank notes of the Bank 
of Chosen and in Central China bank notes of the Bank of 
t----------- o ne_ one_,_.su1.• 
561.W•• P• 158. 
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Japan, together with some mili taey or ·OCcupation yen notee. 
However~ the use of Japanese otu•r.enoy. in occupied terri• 
tori&e was distulr'bing to Japan's monetary system,. · Itl ·order 
to remedy this situation. the ~~~b~tss ur.ged that certain 
monetary ehe.nges be made in occupation policies. These 
changes led to· the promulgation of the P'ed.Eu•al Reserv$ Bank 
of China organized in P'ebruary • 1938; the main policy of 
which was to stabilize currency and control the money market 
in foreign exchange. It was authorized to issue paper 
c.nJrrency, which was linked to the Ja.panEu"!e. yen.. and so made 
the basis for J apa.nese inve.stments in North Ohina. Oon• 
trolled by the Japanese Government. this bank became very 
impo:rta.nt and carried out the aims of the ;e.tbe;"tf§U! in the 
:f'ina.noial field.. 57 
As a ~eeult of Japanese control of the economic$ of 
ocoup1ed Chine. and 1 ts control of a substantial part of 
industry and commerce. many Japanese bu sines amen and 
industrialists went to China a.nd· er1te:red into its, economic 
+---------44~-m~~~~~~~~&-thei~~el-e~e ent1re----------------
oomme~o1al f1ela.58 
The _adoption of the measures referred to inevitably 
ha.d the result of ;d'feot1ng the trade and commerce of other 
__ 5_._ ------ -- ----------- ----------- ----- ------------------
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powerth Consequently, on October 6. 1938; United States 
AmbaseEM;tor Joseph Grew w:rot,e to Prime. Mini star Konoye that 
the events in Ma.nohut•io. tte:re being repeated in ~inaf th~,t 
the exchange control in ~orth China was discriminatory J ·that 
with the a.l terat:ton of' customs tariffs the Japa~ese "terould 
control e.ll traneporta. tion and communications J and the 
proposal to create a monopoly ~n woo+ and tobacco was 
putting Japanese industrialists in a preferred position in 
China.. $9 He oonseq~ently asked for di soont:l.nuance o1' 
( l) exch~nge control and. other measures di scri~ine.tory to 
American trade and enterprise; (2) monopolies or preferences 
conferred on Japanese int.erests, e~pe:r1or1 ty of rights in 
oomroe:rce or the economic development. in Qh:lnaJ (3) and. 
interference vri ~h American property and t>ighta, ps.rtic_qlarly 
censorship of mail and restrictions upon residence an<l .. travel 
by, Amer-icans and American trade and intere ate. 60 !l.b this. 
protest, tbe Foreign qr:r:tce, under the prodding of the 
m:tli tar1ets and the !aiqf!tJiU• while a.dmi tting the truth ot 
as being for tbe benefit of China and East Asia. and 
necassary to Japan• e ••national defense. n6l 
·-·--- · · 0~o11r--. J>-p-.---30r;;-30~-r~-
61Johnstone • t20• cit. 
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Natpo~~~fS.• aimilar policies were adopte(i by the 
Japanese in both Ohina and. Manch·ur1.a. ·in rae;aro to narcotics, 
This t.ra:f:fic. \'le.s related. to .mili.tary opera.tione, p·o11 tical 
dSV$lopments, a.nd il'ldU striali~at1on in that, by .mee,ne o't .1 t, 
substantie.l funds. l'let~e Qbta1ned for the va.rious local 
governments. These loc$11 governmellte were set t':P, by tllo 
Japaneee; and if it~ ware not for the funds d~:rived from the 
narcotic tra.f'ficp the money. -peeded. would have to be st:tppl1ed 
by the Japanese or though in~reaeed looal tax~s,, both of 
which ware frol·n:lt1ld upon, Incidentally, the effect on the 
morale of the Chine ee population by the trt5~mendous 1norEHU4e 
in drug a.ddicts can well be :tmaginadot 
Prior· to the outbreak of the Ohina \fa:r.; the Ch'-rla ee. 
Government had b¢an ma.k1~g determined efforts to l'tipE~J out 
. opium smoking.. That these e:r:rorta were meeM.ng ld ·th f!!t!Coess 
1s d$monat:rated by a report made by the Advisory Committee 
of' the League of Nations in June, 19:3911 to the ef'tact tha.t 
the meaeurea taken by the Chinese Government for the 
+------A-»~~~~-An-~~'l¥>·~n-un®~g-u-1-at!one J)Nltl-til-lsa-teu-------~-­
in June, 19:36, had produced highly sa.t:ta:ra.otor.v reaul ts. 62 
I 
' r 
In the field of narcotics, one can grasp a vivid 
~icture of the co•or>erat1on that existed between the tnil1 ta.• 
.rists and the ~J!~'q{tt&m• These t'..ro groupe• together with the 
1f f -! ill .. I J; tl ~ .~ 
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Japanese Foreign O:t'fiee and the Asia Development Board, were 
Connected With the opium traffic in China from 1938 on. 
Prior to 19:;8, the Mitsubiehi Trading Company and the Miteu1 
Bussan Kaisha were making large purchases of Iranian opium 
for Japan, Manohukuo, and Ohina.63 By arrangement with the 
militarists and the Foreign Otfioe, the two companies made 
an agreement in respect to the places from which the opium 
was to be imported and their reepeilotive shares in the bua1· 
' I 
ness. Under this agreement the distribution of opium for 
Japan and Manobukuo was to be handled by the Mitaub1sh1 
Combine and that for Centre,l and South China by the Mi tsu1 
firm. The tUstr1but1on for North China was to be shared 
equally. At the request of the A$1a Development Board• the 
agreement we.s revised by provid.ing for the orge.ni zatton of 
the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association, the business of 
this company to be divided equally between Mitsui and 
M1tsubiah1.64 
It becomes apparant that the Je.tJlat§y moved right in 
r---------~~~n&;wHH~~~~ifl a eam~ai~~erialism-ana------------------­
expansion, They ware not two horses pulling in the opposite 
direction but one well•drilled teamD each member striving 
toward the same goal even though their purposes may have 
beEm different. 
r----------...................... -.. ~...----... ~----~~-~~~------------~----~ --~----~------- --~ ~-------~---------- -- -~---.- ----- -~---~-- --------- -------------~ 
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_ It is ill!portftnt .to recognize that Japan • s war'!'>maohine 
was built w1 th the assistance of' the Zeib§t;Jiij whose repre• 
sentatives have never aettvely opposed th$ idea of conquest 
and domination a'broa(t, Ra.th~u:·, the h.\]i>a tmu have, in fact. 
established those aoonomle interests abroa.d, the protection 
o.f which became a major excuse for territorial e~pa:nsion~ 
If their inter-ests were threatened, they simply called upon 
thE?J mili ta:l?1ats for supportt and anoth$r ••incident" would 
take place., If an "incident" was not apropos, the lf11l,)a!~\a 
managed to uphold their end of the agreement in another 
manner; and. tha.t was thro~gh espionage. 
,1.!1~. ~~~bAt'y !.! t.TtlU\'Q • '- o'l{.~r$&f!S !Hra&onaae a~~t4· 
gg~~t~~M· Besides co•operating with the m111tar~st$ in the 
field of industry e.nd expe.ru:'lion., the ltrt-~-qatfi!!a contr,.buted to 
the plane of the wa;r,o,.lords in another more eedi tious manner• 
'!'he fo:r•e1gn offices of the b~bfr~l!l combines were scattered 
th~oughout the world, particul~rly in the United St~tee, Xt 
wae through these offices the.t much of Jape.n• s foreign t:rad.e 
1 eo tbrougb these offi ees that many 
't•Th:toh 14'ElS useful to the militarists and relayed this 
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information back to Japan through regular trade ohanne~a.65 
Roth c:t tas the tact that only six months before Pearl Harbor 
t.ba Japanese mili ta.riets \te,re able to secure valuable info~ 
ma;tion about the amount of o:tl and gasoline the.t was being 
shipped to Ha\'laii. This information was tra:nsmi.tted through 
the tU tsub:tshl foreign office in the Un1 ted st,ates. 66 It 
\.re,s informe,tion such &e this tha.t enable('l, the war-lords of 
Japan to set a timetable for their plan of conquest in the 
l?e~o:tf:tch The contributions of the Za'bi!J~§!l! :tn this particu• 
lar tield os:nnot be overemphasized. Although this facet of 
m111 te.ritstio•Ja~q~t~y collaboration is often overlooked., it 
is of :prime impo:rte.nce 1p ascertaining the guilt of the 
combines. It must be remembered that eoonomic infilt:t-ation 
1slJ in .many cases, mora suoceaaful than military opere. tiona. 
'l'he proponents of. the doctrine of b~kkQ ~pbiU had a double• 
bladed sword~ One blade wa.a t,he !S:!Jl!Jt'§~. swo:tro o:r the 
. militarists~ and the other was the economic semi ter of the 
Z9.iib{t;t~u. In the field of f'o:reign espionage, this sword 
~ swift and clean, 
We have studied the various fields j,n ttrhioh collusion 
between the rai11 tarists an<:l the !iibrq,lu;sy took place" Now W$ 
65&th 11 SU?.• ~l t., P• 86. 
6· 
must look into the main reason tor the alignment o:f' .'the 
:combines w1 th a.rmy and navy • 
18$ 
E.rof~.l= l!tlme X.~i31son ,r.gr lr&tbats!a..-IQ;llit~Hl. gol,lus:ton• 
There. is no doubt the.t the inoree.eed pl:'(}fi ts tha.t would 
a,corue to the ~ilq,~.~~sa· through a policy of expansion e.nd 
conquest '<ifas the me.:ln reason :for their joining he:nds w1 th 
. ' ' 
the mil1t~a:riata.67 If s.t :firt~t the liibi!~Y were eusp1o1ous 
of the mili te.r,.ats and slow tt~. align themselves w:t th the 
wa~loro.s. they mad$ up for S.t with .the sp,ed with which 
they co-operated when they ~aw the size and amount of the 
prof1 ta which \lfOUld come to them through a. su<HlEHlsfully and 
Vigorously pt.freued polio;r of expansion. As ha.s b~\H3tl noted, 
the depression of 1929 made a deep cut 1nto the p~ofits of 
the eombineth ~e Manehur1a.n .Incident helped to alleviate 
the s:1 tuaM.on; and from then on the money began to flow onoEi 
again into the coffers of the :tnduatrialiata. Th1 a \V'&$ due 
to the fact that a policy of expansion required a ehi:f't1 f':rom 
i 
light to heavy indust:r:tea. This meant a t.:remendous gain for l 
1----
! ~------~~~~~~~~~~~·e-ih$-a~~me in J~a~~ab~l~e~o~f------~-----
producing the :required materials tor the mili te.ry ~ This 
Shift from light to hea-vy industry was especially true in the 
a.coelersted growth of aircrr.d't and tank ,_ndusti;rae, 
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.Although these two phases of production had bean neglected 
during the twemties, they r1,a.ted top p:r1or1 ty in the thirties. 
' 
Al\other industry 'benefiting f'!"om .the expansionistic policy 
of the mili tal:'i s ts was the shipbuilding cor1ee:rns. These 
thraE!.l fe~oets of indust:ry•""ai:ro:ra,:t't, tanks, and sb1pbuild-
1ng••then, were a1d$d tremendously by Japan's imper1al1st1o 
dee1gmq and. all th:rae of these industries were controlled 
by- the. ~~iba,tsy. Roth ci tas the Mi tsub1eh1 oombi.ne as a 
typical e~ample of the ~.no:reased p:rofi ts from increased 
mil:\ t~<try $pending; 
1.he shipbuilding indus try was parM.aula.rly badly 
hit by the depression of 1930•193:5., and the prepa-
re. tiona for e.:rmed aggt"esston came to ite rescue. 
Almost 3,ooo,ooo,ooo yen we:re alloted 1n four naval 
programs beg:tnn:1ng in 19311 anti. three quarters of 
that went to private companies. Large subsidies 
were granted .to insure the d((Jvelopment of a large, 
speedy merchant marine. 1.be declared capital of 
the seven large at shipbuilding companies mot'$ than 
do~bled between the outbreak of the China War in 
1937 and the outbreak of the Pacific \i'ar in 1941 .. 
Mit$Ubish1 shipbuilding itself had a declared capital 
of 120,000 • 000 yen in 1937; by 1941 1 t had ree.ohed 
24o.ooo,ooo •••• 
Mitsubishi profited to an even greater degree 
r-------------~~~~~~~~1o~n~ont~th~~nduat~~~~d~u~e~tvO----------------­
the war in China. and prepare.t:tons for the Pacific 
War. The paid•up capital of Mitsub1sh1's aircraft 
--~ ~--- - ~-- -~-~ ---~~- ----~---- -- -~-·---- -~ ~--- ~ ~~~-- -~.~~--
subsidiary increased from lo ... ooo,ooo yen .in l~5:f37 
to about 6o.ooo,ooo in 1943-0 8 
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The latter date is beyond the scope of this investigation, 
but 1 t is included to give an idea of the tNmendous growth 
of the combines during this period. The huge profits were 
enough to allay the tears of the ZJ!!bateH that an aggressive 
foreign policy would damage their foreign trade and diminish 
their profits. These fears went for naught because the 
exact opposite was true. 
There seems to be 11 ttle basis for the opinion that 
the ZBiq§jsy were forced into active participation in an 
expansionistic and imperialistic policy of agg:ression~" 
Facts seem to prove that both the militarists and the com• 
hines had the same goals; only their methods d.1f'fe:rec1,. It 
might be said the"t aggression and "incidents*' make strange 
bed,.. fellows. Rei schauer states: 
The coalition of the military with the ;a3:b..!~f!l~ 
interests was perhaps nothing more than e, marriage 
of convenience. but 1t was nevertheless a success ... 
. ful working arrangement. And as time went on, it 
became something mo:re. la&bQtey firms, suah as 
· atlJ-Ca.ea s r_apN"""'s'"'-e..s.An_.,.,te=d....__ ______________ .c__ __ _ 
monopoly capitalism, but at the same time, because 
of their very size, they made tha transition to a 
68Roth, .!Zfa• .5!1!:.-. p* 65. Roth goes perhaps farther 
than any other authort ty to show the collusion that existed 
between t.he militarists and. the combines. He attempts to 
prove that only trivial matters such as timing, direction, 
+---------~~~~~~~~~rl4~~~~~~~~-h~en the ~ 
groupe-.~ He- atates-tfiat--the--~uv1-sions--b-eeaxne-1norE!fasfngly- ------------ - -
minor and that the two became an 1nd1 a soluble bloc committed 




t~rtate•controlled economy eae1er than 1 t wou).d otber-
w19e bave b$en. In p~parat1on for the unepec1f1ed 
nn~t1onal crisis" of th$ m1litar1sts, the gov~mment . 
1ncre.ae1ngly a«ununed d1reet1on over broad n~gmente o.f 
indtuat:rey a:nd oommeroe, and. the gre$tt lf&b«feW oombint~e, 
which were comins to ba :run by profess ona maru1serf.l 
ratb~r than by th~1r owner~, werEt convenient units 
of gover•nmEmtal control. · ~e p~s·eu~es of wtu:• 
l:u~atened the s:ro,qth ot euob controls, and the 
Zt1laf4lifY combines tentltld more and. more to become 
eoonom o branch$S of the state. J~pan appeared to 
b$ taldne; th~ first etep$ toward a curious sort of 
atatl!t socialism, born of l!lbf!ilf efilp1 t.e.l.iem and 
a&irtld by m1l;1 te.rte t1~ author! tQ.:r ani em. 09 
The ooal1 t1on of th(1t bea!"$re of n:t'ffi$ end the mt~.kers of a.r-me..• 
mente was ooroplete\1' Japa.n, rultH'i by the m111 tarietSJ and tbe 
!l!b,&~,l!lt g1:rd$<l itself _for war. By Deoembet>, 1941, the two 
fa¢t1.ona were a. $rooothly functioning unit.. llfancbur1a ha.4. 
be.~n ove:rrr.:m, The_ ~ar 1n China, wb1le proceeding slower 
' 
than nnt1o1pated, et1l.l y1$ldecl ltlnd and. prof'i ts to the 
Emp1r4th The Gr-eater b!aet Ae:ia ·C'IO•p:roeperi ty Sph0~ had 
1nf1l tra.t~d hlto French Indo•Ch1na. Propaganda broadcasts 
announo~Hl the dawn of' e. new tra in the Pacific. a da"m :tn 
Which the only l1e;bt war& to be the rieing sun of .,l·a:pan. At 
hom~ the Japanese people, opprese~d. do~trodden~ and 
filled with prom1ees of a New Order in East As1a, follo\~d 
the w!ehel!!l of the tyrants $1'ld tyooons. EV&t7th1ng was set 
tor the fin«:tl Gt$po On Daceniber "f • 1941• the word was 
gi'Ten, t.h~ attacks made, and tb~ world was at war. 
4«J:J~I ,1 .. ,f l II 'hW It "l.H' tl 
Sutllmai3;og. For over a. d~oa.da, h1st,or1ans and 
student a ot AtU.a.n ·and Japane ee politics have be$n trying to 
· fix the blame for the aggressive policies of the .'Japan&se 
Empire begin:t'ling vtith the Ma.nohuria,n Incident of September 
18., 19:51. '!'her$ was little doubt that the rn11,.ta.riets were 
a.mone; those chiefly :responsible for.the crimes and a.t:roei-
tiee committed against humanity.. Others plaoed equal blame 
upon the giantindustrial combines, the ;a.~ba.t~~· Stranse 
tales were told of the Z!il2.,~1U:J. Some said they were men of 
peace who bel:teved in economic penetra,tion onl;r. Others 
said that the za~ba,.~~!! gained stature' prestige !I power, 
profits, and equality with the militarists through a suoces~ 
sion of successful wars, wars in which they ware forced to 
co• operate wi tb the Japanese we.r•lol"de. Throughout this 
thesis, evidence has been submitted to show that the 
lfhribf).t.s'cl and the m:lli tariets were one. They worked and 
strived toward the same id.EHil""""world conquest. 
The m;rth the,t states that the li!~atsu and the m111 .... 
+---------~~~~~~~~~~·~f~~t~ke-int~Gi~~tiQ,~·.-----------­
the fact that the tt•m have co-operated most faithfully in 
the eeventy•five yea.re of Ja.paneee expansion. The t\'lo; 
. . 
rather than occupying separate a.nd distinct pla,ees in the 
I 0 
Japanese scene, are to an axtra.ordinary degree intertwined. 
____________________________ y_, _p_n_:l:y __ f.£_ f~W ______________________ ;. 
. . . 
individuals or factions have ruled the nation. There has 
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been a. oon~inual jockeying for pos1 t1on by the Zaibe.teu, the 
. . 
palace gus,t-d.s, le.ndlorde• A:rmy leaders, Navy leaders. pt'O• 
' ' 
fessional bureaucrats, and pa.rty poli tio1ane ~· At times the 
fight grew rough, and certain ind.i v iduale were hurt. 
A&.eaesina.t1o.ne were common place, but this was all in the 
:frunily. On issues concerning the empire' e e.ggra.ndi~ement, 
as on those affecting popular strivings for democracy, the 
ruling groupe oloee'd ranks. Foremost in this .,closingn 
prooetH1 wer:e the ~!&9.rat~y, and the militarists. 1be bulk of 
power emerged. in th~ir hands • 
. 
To those who belierve that the Za.1bateu oppo.sed the 
m111 tary; hera are. the words of Ginja.ro Fujiwara, hea(i of 
the Mitsui Paper Company and generally recognized as the 
spokesman for the la:3zba~su dt~ring tni e deeiei:\Te decade: 
Diplomacy without force is of no value. No matter 
··how diligent the Japanese may be, no matter how 
superior their tach:n1oal developm$nt or 1nd.ust1"~.al 
administration may be, .. there will be no hope for 
JapEAn's tra.qe expaneion i:f there is no adequate 
force to back 1 t. :Wow the greatest of forces 1@ 
m:t11 t~r;y pl:'eparedne as founded on the Army and Navy. 
·We oatl safely expa.nd abroad Qnd. engage in various 
, . . nt of pr<n->t:ote~cf11c'tt:'i'Ho"~•--------~--
:tn this sense, any outle.y for armament is a form 
of investment. 70 . 
All evfaenoe indicates .that Japan's Empire. an Ernpire 
achieved throttgh force, decept1on 11 treachery, espionage, and 
broken promises; was built by .a work:lne combination of the 
, , r , ' ~(~ 
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big business combines and the militarists. ~e ~tdbatgy 
f'um1shed the."know ... hown for the militarists, not only in 
the manufacture of a.nna.ments and muni tiona, but also 1n the 
operation of government. The eo-operation betw$en the two 
was complete. 
The 1~1~~~i~ helped oreat~ and g~eatly profited by 
Japan's war machine • but they were unable to control the 
monster they created. Failing to prevent the mili tariate 
from d.ominatirlg the governmental policies, particularly 
after 1931, the industrial monopolists joined with the 
militarists in the attempt to create the Greater East Asia 
Sphere, where their cwn stake in successful conquest 
. appeared grea,tar than their oha.noe for p:rofi ts th:rougb 
peaceful international trade. 
This tben was the picture in December, 1941. Japan • e 
ple.n for world conquest, unbelievably successful thus far, 
had one more step 9,nd that was wa.r with the Western Powers 
in general and the United States in particular. This final 
+---------~~~~~&rr~~~~~~mm~~oHf~w~o~r~l&d~o&n~~•t-toppttl~1n~.g~d~o~w~m~-----------­
l1ke a house of' cards. This final step found the doctrine 
of bfak~Q &cb~~~h the belief in ~~~ the imperialistic dreams 
of the mil1 tarists, and. the prof1 t-made schemes of the 
§!~bat!Y marching headlong into oblivion. 
1---------- -----------~- ---- ------
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